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The Second Amendment is the black sheep of the
constitutional family. Paralleling the Amendment's neglect and
abuse by commentators is the curious onslaught of
misinformation and fear in the public arena. In this Article,
Professors McAffee and Quinlan begin the process of restoring
the Second Amendment to its rightful place as an individual right
enjoyed by the citizenry. Reviewing singular facets of the Second
Amendment debate, including the relation between the Militia and
Right to Arms Clauses, the meaning of "keep and bear," the
relevance of militia provisions today and the abandonment by the
Supreme Court as an active participant in the Second Amendment
debate, Professors McAffee and Quinlan conclude that the
Second Amendment embodied a fundamental personal right to its
adopters and that acceptance of their view is supported, rather
than foreclosed, by the entire course of America's constitutional
development over the past two hundred years.
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I. INTRODUCTION-FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR DANGEROUS
ANACHRONISM?
If the Ninth Amendment is the Constitution's neglected "step
child,"' the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Second
Amendment2 is the black sheep of the constitutional family. The rea-
son is clear-the claim that individuals have a constitutional right to
own firearms has been relied on to oppose a range of proposed gun
control laws that many believe are critical to an effective effort to
confront the nation's violent crime problem. The traditional re-
sponse to the black sheep was to hide what was viewed as scandalous
in the closet, and through the years this has been the predominant
response to the right to keep and bear arms within the legal acad-
emy.3 As tends to be the case in such matters, this response included
a heavy element of denial-less spoken about the matter the better,
for the silence by itself implicitly supported the thesis that the right
was innocuous because it was tied to (and limited by) the idea of col-
lective defense.4 But this strategy is ultimately doomed to failure
because the right does have its friends, in the form of the National
1. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 131, 134 (1988) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment has "remained the
stepchild of the Constitution" until quite recently, but concluding that "like Cinderella, it
seems on the verge of taking center stage").
2. The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. For comment on the inattention given the Second Amendment by constitutional
law scholars generally, see Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309,314 (1991);
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639-42
(1989).
4. When members of the legal academy have broken the silence that has engulfed
the subject, they have mainly echoed, sometimes rather casually, the conventional wisdom
that the Second Amendment is about state militias, not a personal right to keep and bear
arms, and hence is basically irrelevant today. See David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of
Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 539,541 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al.
eds., 1992) (lending support to observation that Bill of Rights could be read as a virtual
code of protections to criminal defendants with the statement that "the Second and Third
Amendments have little practical significance"); Richard Lacayo, Beyond the Brady Bill,
TIME, Dec. 20, 1993, at 28 (quoting Professor Laurence H. Tribe as stating that the Sec-
ond Amendment "'is about the right of a state to have an organized militia, in order to
protect the states from being completely overrun by the Federal Government' ").
1997]
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Rifle Association, the opinion of the unwashed masses of people,5
and a growing number of scholarly voices confirming that the right
was viewed as a thing of beauty at its birth.' While the period of de-
nial is gradually ending in the scholarly and public debate, as will be
discussed hereafter, it appears to be alive and well in the federal judi-
ciary.
A. Denial and the Federal Judiciary
Unlike legal scholars, courts cannot simply leave the Second
Amendment entirely off their agenda; litigants have some say in the
issues courts address. But the federal courts have employed their
own form of denial in refusing to confront, in a serious way, the issues
raised by the text and history of the Second Amendment, relying in-
stead on ill-reasoned decisions from the era prior to the
incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment and the modem era of civil liberties. Consequently, the
Second Amendment stands virtually alone among the major civil lib-
erty guarantees of the Bill of Rights in not having been incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states,7 and over
5. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
6. A good deal of scholarship over the past fifteen years supports the view that the
right to keep and bear arms was considered a fundamental, and even a natural, right of
individuals at the time it was adopted in the Second Amendment. See, e.g., CLAYTON E.
CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994);
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989) [hereinafter HALBROOK, A RIGHT
TO BEAR ARMS]; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984) [hereinafter HALBROOK, THAT
EVERY MAN BE ARMED]; JOYCE L. MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1260-66 (1992) [hereinafter Amar,
The Fourteenth Amendment]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-73 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights as a Constitution]; Ber-
nard J. Bordenet, The Right to Possess Arms: The Intent of the Framers of the Second
Amendment, 21 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 1 (1990); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 3; David
T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohi-
bition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983);
Levinson, supra note 3; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the
Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); Robert E. Shaihope, The
Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIsT. 599 (1982); William Van
Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236
(1994); David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV.
1007 (1994).
7. See Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral Justification for Refusing to Implement
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the past several decades the lower federal courts have given it the
narrowest possible interpretation.8 There is little to suggest, moreo-
ver, that this lack of judicial respect is about to end.
Despite a decade of renewed scholarly interest in the history and
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms, and notwithstanding re-
cent scholarly authority that supports the view that the Second
Amendment was intended to secure a personal right to own and use
firearms,9 in the 1995 case, Love v. Pepersack,'1 the United States Su-
preme Court denied certiorari and thereby declined, once again, to
consider the question whether the Amendment applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment or, more generally, imposes any
meaningful limits on governmental authority to regulate firearms."'
the Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 641,
663-71 (1993). The Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment, and the Seventh
Amendment's civil jury right, are the only other rights with any potential application to
modem circumstances that have not been incorporated. See id. at 670-71. Of those two,
the grand jury provision of the federal Bill of Rights did not comport with a significant
number of state law provisions, suggesting that it was not viewed as fundamental to the
same extent as other procedural guarantees. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 82-83 (1949). But see
Amar, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1246-51 (arguing that as of 1866 the
right to indictment by grand jury was widely viewed as fundamental). By contrast to the
grand jury question, in which a great many states have eliminated the grand jury entirely,
the right to a civil jury is hardly under fire.
8. See Quinlan, supra note 7, at 682-88.
9. See sources cited supra note 6.
10. 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995). In Love, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the
states and reaffirmed the conventional holding that the Second Amendment merely pre-
serves the right of state militias to keep and bear arms while offering no protection
whatsoever to an individual's right to own a firearm. See id at 123-24. On the incorpora-
tion issue, the court relied upon cases predating the selective incorporation era that
"merely mimicked others of the same era in holding that none of the rights or freedoms
enumerated in the Bill of Rights were made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the states." Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1239 n.10. For analysis of these cases, see
Quinlan, supra note 7, at 663-69. The court in Love based its holding as to the original
meaning of the Second Amendment on a dubious line of lower federal court decisions.
See id. at 682-88; infra notes 382-86 and accompanying text (discussing the lower federal
court cases).
11. A more recent case, Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 276 (1996), would have provided the Court, if it so chose, with an opportunity to ex-
plore the meaning and scope of the Second Amendment, but the Court once again denied
certiorari. The plaintiff in Hickman owned a security alarm company and was interested
in getting into the field of "executive protection." See id. at 99. The plaintiff tried to
obtain a concealed weapons permit, as provided by California state law, from the County
of Los Angeles and the City of San Fernando. After being repeatedly denied a concealed
weapons permit, plaintiff filed a § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California alleging a violation of his Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms. The district court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff
appealed. See id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that "the
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Love involved denial of an application to purchase a gun based on a
discretionary police practice that lacked any warrant in applicable
state law.' In short, Love was hardly a case in which an important,
let alone a compelling, state interest was involved. For those com-
mitted to a constitutional right to own firearms, the ruling in Love is
especially distressing, not only because the weight of scholarly opin-
ion as to the original meaning of the Second Amendment warrants a
reconsideration of the ill-reasoned decisions of an earlier era,13 but
also because the case itself presented an especially attractive occasion
for acknowledging that there are limits on the power of government
to infringe on the right of gun ownership.
B. The Public Gun Control Debate and the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms.: From Denial to Anger
Considering that claims rooted in the right to keep and bear
arms have become a fixture of the long-running gun control debate in
this country, advocates of gun control and their public media sup-
porters have not been afforded the luxury of simply ignoring the
Second Amendment. Unfortunately, popular debate of the issue,
Second Amendment is a right held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a
weapon by a private citizen." Id. at 101. As a result, the court concluded that plaintiff
lacked standing to bring his lawsuit. See id. Finally, the Hickman court noted that, even if
plaintiff had standing to sue for a violation of the Second Amendment, his suit would still
fail because the Second Amendment is not incorporated against the states. See id. at 103
n.10.
12. The plaintiff in the case, April Love, was denied the right to purchase a gun be-
cause she had been arrested four times, even though the arrests had yielded only a single
misdemeanor conviction. See Love, 47 F.3d at 122. It was apparently standard police
practice to deny applications based on prior arrests even though the relevant statute does
not list such a ground as a reason for denial. See id.; see also MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 442(h) (1996) (listing the grounds for the application of a firearm). It is interesting to
note that the Maryland State Police are overruled in 78% of the appeals taken from per-
mit application denials. See DAVID B. KOPEL, INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPER, WHY GUN
WAITING PERIODS THREATEN PUBLIC SAFETY 47 (1993) (citing testimony of Sergeant
R.G. Pepersack, Maryland State Police Commander, Firearms Licensing Section, before
Subcommittee on the Constitution, June 16, 1987). After obtaining an order in state court
requiring approval of her application, Ms. Love filed a § 1983 action in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland alleging a violation of her Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. See Love, 47 F.3d at 122. The Fourth Circuit case was de-
cided on appeal from an order dismissing her cause of action. See id.
13. One of the nation's foremost constitutional law scholars, Professor William Van
Alstyne, recently compared the current status of the Second Amendment to the status of
the First Amendment at the beginning of this century. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at
1254-55. Given that the right to keep and bear arms "is at least as well anchored in the
Constitution" as the First Amendment claims championed by Holmes and Brandeis sev-
enty years ago, Van Alstyne suggests that the Supreme Court is overdue to begin the
process of giving expression to the "central premise" of the Second Amendment. Id. at
1255.
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like the scholarly and judicial debates, has been characterized by a
basically dismissive approach to claims of constitutional freedom. By
and large, the media has uncritically reported the court decisions re-
jecting individual rights claims, generally concluding that the
constitutional issue is definitively resolved, 4 and repeating the stan-
dard argument that the Amendment is really about protecting state
militias rather than securing a private right to arms."
It is not uncommon for media presentations to assume that the
militia-centered reading of the Amendment is the correct one.
Sometimes this assumption forms the basis of a description of the
Second Amendment and its purposes that the reader is simply to take
for granted.16 Even more seriously, this assumption often underlies
14. See, e.g., John Berendt, The Gun, ESQUIRE, Sept. 1993, at 39 (complaining that
gun control opponents continue to cite the Second Amendment "as an argument against
gun control despite repeated Supreme Court rulings that it is irrelevant"); Big New Drive
for Gun Controls, U.S. NEwS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1975, at 25,27 (noting that "many
legal scholars" support the view that the Amendment "is meant only to give States the
right to have an armed militia of citizens," and observing that "no gun-control law has
ever been challenged successfully in court on Second Amendment grounds"); New Fight
for Gun Controls: The Proposals and Prospects, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 10,
1975, at 51, 52 (concluding that the Supreme Court has ruled that the Second Amendment
secured "States the right to maintain an armed militia" but "does not bar regulation of
firearms owned by individuals"). But see Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional
False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REv. 57, 128
(1995) (claiming that members of the media "typically adopt the NRA's interpretation
uncritically," but without citing any examples); id. (claiming that "it is even harder to find
any press discussion of the narrow judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment").
15. See Berendt, supra note 14, at 39 (observing that the NRA "cynically leaves off"
the first clause of the Second Amendment in emphasizing the right to keep and bear
arms); id. (concluding that any sixth grader could tell you that the Second Amendment
was designed "to guarantee the states the right to maintain militias as a check on the
power of the federal government"); Peter H. Stone, Showing Holes: The Once Mighty
NRA Is Wounded-But Still Dangerous, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 1994, at 42 (observing that
former Chief Justice Burger called the personal right reading a "fraud," and claiming that
"legal scholars have repeatedly pointed out that the amendment contains no substantial
barriers to federal, state, or local gun-control laws"). For additional citations to popular
media claims that the text of the Second Amendment itself forecloses the claim of a per-
sonal right to own firearms, see infra note 71.
16. A classic example of the general media attitude toward the Second Amendment
is provided by the Parade Magazine "Let Freedom Ring" photography contest, held to
celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights. See PARADE MAGAZINE, Dec. 8,
1991, at 5. Two photographs chosen by a panel of "experts" to represent the Second
Amendment depicted a paratrooper from the 82nd Airborne, and, in the second, two
United States Marines. Even those who view the Second Amendment as concerned only
with state militias should have been dismayed at these choices of symbols representing
the Second Amendment. There is no basis to suggest that the Second Amendment is
concerned with protecting a "right" of members of the American armed forces to keep
and bear arms, and even most critics of the idea of a personal right to arms would agree
that members of a national standing army more nearly symbolize the fears that gave rise
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unsupportable claims that reflect a simple lack of research. 17
When the denial stage passes, however, there is anger. The
to the Second Amendment than the guarantee it embodies. See, e.g., Lawrence Delbert
Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J.
AM. HIST. 22, 30 (1984) (referring to the founding generation's view of "the citizen mili-
tia's collective role as the protector of personal liberty and constitutional stability against
ambitious tyrants and uncontrolled mobs" (footnote omitted)); Dennis A. Henigan,
Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107, 121 (1991) (noting
that state militias were viewed by Madison "as a military counterpoint to the power of the
regular standing army" that Congress had been empowered to create).
Parade did not inform its readership that the photograph contest results were hardly
surprising given that among the experts were such luminaries as Dr. Joyce Brothers, for-
mer Chief Justice Warren Burger, and talk show host Sally Jessy Raphael (the judges
were pictured in the story). All three have well known biases against gun ownership. See,
e.g., Interview by Charlayne Hunter-Gault with Warren Burger, The MacNeil/Lehrer
NewsHour, Dec. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newshr File (quoting War-
ren Burger as stating that if he "were writing the Bill of Rights now there wouldn't be any
such thing as the Second Amendment"); Claire Safran, A Tale of Two Cities-and the
Difference Guns Make, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Nov. 1993, at 134,216 (quoting Dr. Joyce
Brothers who sees guns as both a symbol of power and a phallic symbol and blames the
failure to obtain meaningful gun control on America's cowboy myth); Mary Zeiss
Strange, Disarmed by Fear, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1992, at 34, 35-36 (recounting a 1990
episode of the Sally Jessy Raphael Show in which parents whose children were killed in
firearm accidents "told their tragic stories while the camera scanned the anguished faces
of the studio audience and Sally passed the Kleenex box" and in which Raphael
"expressed horror that a woman could be a mother and a gun owner" and portrayed
"guns in general and the NRA in particular in the blackest of terms").
Along similar lines was the portrayal of the Second Amendment as part of a 1990 Bill
of Rights commemorative display at the District Court building in Annapolis, Maryland.
The portion of the display dedicated to the Second Amendment noted America's high
homicide rates and easy access to handguns, and stated that the Framers were "not con-
cerned with the right to bear arms for personal use," but were instead seeking to ensure
that "able-bodied men, and now women, could be equipped and trained to defend the
Republic." See Take Shots at This, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at B2.
17. An example of this more serious form of media denial was provided by National
Public Radio ("NPR") reporter Nina Totenberg in 1991. Totenberg reported that NPR
had contacted the National Rifle Association seeking the names of constitutional law
scholars who support the individual right interpretation. Although three names were
given, Totenberg stated, on the air, that "the NRA was unable to name a single professor
of constitutional law who would say the Second Amendment protects an individual right."
John Elvin, Questioning Nina, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A6. Had Totenberg done
some basic research, she would have found plenty of distinguished scholars who have
published articles in scholarly legal journals supporting the individual right interpretation
of the Second Amendment. See sources cited supra note 6. Even if Totenberg wanted
only constitutional law professors, surely Sanford Levinson and Akhil Amar, two of the
nation's leading constitutional law scholars, would have sufficed. It should be noted,
moreover, that Don Kates, a leading Second Amendment scholar, taught law at St. Louis
University School of Law. Even the limited nature of her request, demanding the names
of constitutional law professors, reflects a lack of care in light of the historical nature of
many of the relevant questions. Among scholars who have made immensely important
contributions to the Second Amendment debate, Joyce Malcolm and Robert Shalhope are
well-respected historians, she at Bentley College and he at the University of Oklahoma.
See MALCOLM, supra note 6; Shalhope supra note 6.
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merits of the textual and historical issues aside, invocation of the
right to bear arms has been viewed with alarm and frustration among
many participants in the public discourse relating to gun control."
The claim that gun ownership constitutes a fundamental right does
not go together well with the general theme of twenty-five years of
gun control advocacy that focuses on an alleged "epidemic" of gun
violence and perceives America as "gun crazy."'9 Indeed, the right to
keep and bear arms has become a kind of symbol of the perceived
intransigence of the gun rights lobby and its inclination to see gun
18. For an especially powerful, recent illustration of the frustration many gun control
advocates feel at the invocation of the Second Amendment in the gun control debate, see
Herz, supra note 14, at 62-63, 117-18 (elaborating on view that the media, as well as the
political and legal establishments, have failed in a "dialogic" duty to confront the alleged
misconceptions and distortions about the status of the right to keep and bear arms that
the author sees as resulting from the lobbying and public information campaign con-
ducted by the NRA and other gun rights organizations). Not prone to understatement,
Herz calls the opposing view a "constitutional fish story," id. at 61, a "deception" that
creates "constitutional false consciousness," id. at 62 (emphasis omitted), a "delusional
constitutional barrier," id. at 63, a "fake" as well as a material misstatement of "the
meaning of the Second Amendment," id. at 84, a "constitutional bluff," id., a "sleight-of-
hand" that "distorts the constitutional text itself," id. at 103, an "intentional deception,"
id. at 106, "fictional," id. at 107, a "false 'trump' card," and a "bogus 'rights' ace deemed
more powerful than any vision of the common good," id. at 109, a "constitutional distor-
tion," id. at 111, a "constitutional smokescreen," id. at 112, and a "constitutional
charade." Id. at 152.
19. For samples from the vast literature lamenting America's love affair with fire-
arms and the corresponding resistance to significant gun control efforts, see Nancy Gibbs,
Up In Arms, TIME, Dec. 20, 1993, at 18, 19-20 (recounting various horrible gun violence
crimes and quoting a sociologist who notes the growing sense "that we've got to do some-
thing about all those guns"); id. at 26 (referring to the trend of seeing guns as presenting a
public health crisis); William Greider, A Pistol-Whipped Nation: Pass the Brady Bill-
Then Ban Handguns, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 30, 1993, at 31, 32 (stating a litany of gun
violence statistics and summarizing Senator John Chafee's view that the gun problem is
"not just about criminals," but "about everyone who owns guns"); id. (insisting that it is
time for a "brave new politics"-to ban handguns); Jon Katz, The War at Home: How the
Media Miss the Story on 34,000 Gun Deaths Each Year, ROLLING STONE, July 8-22, 1993,
at 37, 38 (arguing that gun violence is largely ignored by the media because violence oc-
curs in inner cities, but claiming that such violence "is the bloodiest story in the nation's
history"); Safran, supra note 16, at 134 (summarizing claims that different murder rates in
Vancouver and Seattle reflect differing approaches to gun control); Marilyn Stasio, Gun
Crazy: Are We a Country Out of Control?, COSMOPOLITAN, Mar. 1994, at 180, 180-82
(recounting recent firearms killings and sundry grim statistics as to violent use of firearms
and concluding that "[g]uns have become the most obvious and powerful symbol of the
criminal violence that we fear above all other threats"); id. at 183 (lamenting that the risk
of violence has led to increased firearms purchases, especially by women, and quoting a
psychiatrist's conclusion that firearms are an "essentially male obsession" used to
"combat spinelessness," and that obtaining firearms increases insecurity rather than secu-
rity for purchasers); Gordon Witkin et al., Kids Who Kill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 8, 1991, at 26,26 (surveying rise in youth firearms violence and concluding that it is
"the presence of so many guns that makes the current atmosphere so volatile").
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control as a "rights" issue rather than a straightforward crime control
or public health issue.' Along these lines, when the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch published a special series commemorating the 200th anni-
versary of the Bill of Rights, the segment on the Second Amendment
contained a substantial sidebar summarizing the anti-gun views of a
woman whose brother had been shot by a criminal-a strange choice
indeed in what was otherwise a celebratory treatment of the heritage
of the Bill of Rights."'
Not surprisingly, the right to keep and bear arms provokes simi-
lar reactions among scholars and judgesY When scholars conclude
that the Framers intended a personal right to keep and bear arms,
this finding is viewed as "embarrassing" by civil libertarian advocates
of extensive gun regulation,' and when it is found that the Amend-
ment was designed to facilitate the right of the people to resist
tyrannous government, it is seen as "terrifying." 4 Gun rights sup-
20. See, e.g., Bill Bradley, America's Efforts to Curb Violence: The Anti-Crime Bill Is
Not Enough, USA TODAY, Nov. 1994 (Magazine), at 30, 33 (urging the need to "restrict
the handguns used in 80% of America's gun murders," the author laments that "[w]hat is
common sense to people of virtually every other country in the world becomes a constitu-
tional crisis for Americans"); Herz, supra note 14, at 58 (lamenting the "constitutional
false consciousness [that] has perpetuated a system that provides notoriously easy access
to all types of high-powered weapons"); id. at 61 (stating that "Second Amendment de-
ception represents an especially severe threat to rational policy making in a
representative democracy" because it prevents us from undertaking a "rational cost-
benefit analysis" as to the impact of widespread gun ownership).
21. See ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 1991, at C1. Discussing the right to keep
and bear arms in the context of criminal misuse of a firearm, something that is clearly not
the subject of constitutional protection, is analogous to discussing the First Amendment
right of free speech in the context of a parent whose child was the victim of a child por-
nographer. In both instances, the existence of the constitutionally protected right,
whether it be free speech or the right to keep and bear arms, has little, if anything, to do
with the personal tragedy inflicted upon a person by a criminal who is not even arguably
exercising the right under discussion.
22. See, e.g., Another Judge Takes Aim at Second Amendment, THE NEW GUN WEEK,
Aug. 4, 1995, at 9 (quoting United States District Judge Lyle Strom as stating, in the con-
text of a criminal conviction of a drive-by shooter, that the NRA "not only misread the
Constitution but misrepresents it to the citizens of this country"); Herz, supra note 14, at
58 (stating that the "constitutional false consciousness" of a personal right to own fire-
arms perpetuates a system of easy access to "high-powered weapons," with the result that
"America has become the runaway world leader in gun violence"); Interview by Char-
layne Hunter-Gault with Warren Burger, supra note 16 (quoting former Chief Justice
Burger as stating that the Second Amendment "has been the subject of one of the great-
est pieces of fraud.., on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever
seen in my lifetime").
23. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 642.
24. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrify-
ing Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 553 (1991); see also Henigan, supra note 16,
at 110 (discussing the view that the Second Amendment is related to the right of revolu-
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porters, moreover, are found guilty by association. The victims of
gun violence, it is frequently observed, are often women and African
Americans; the inference drawn, more or less explicitly, is that gun
rights advocates are basically indifferent to the rights and interests of
these groups.' Because extremist political groups, especially on the
fight, are almost always gun rights advocates, gun rights advocacy is
often associated with anti-government paranoia.' It is, in short, an
tion as an "insurrectionist theory" that presents "a profoundly dangerous doctrine of un-
restrained individual rights which, if adopted by the courts, would threaten the rule of law
itself").
25. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE,
supra note 4, at 453, 502 (arguing that "it seems likely that the Second Amendment re-
flects and reinforces the unusual levels of violence in our culture"); id. (stating that
"violence harms women and other groups more than it harms men like the founding fa-
thers"); id. (stating the Second Amendment also serves as "a countermajoritarian
impediment to women's effective use of the political system," especially given polling
data indicating that women support handgun bans at higher rates than men); Wendy
Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford
Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 665 (1989). Brown
has observed that "the most routine victims of this 'right' are ... urban Black men be-
tween the ages of sixteen and thirty-four, for whom homicide is the leading cause of
death, and women, one of whom is raped every six minutes, one out of three times at
gunpoint or knifepoint." Id In addition, Brown has argued that the "republican" vision
of the Second Amendment, with its linkage to traditional doctrines of armed resistance to
tyranny, is "at best nostalgic, and at worst dangerously naive and no little bit sexist" in
arguing "as if we did not live in a nuclear era, an era of thoroughly disintegrated public
life and disintegrating social order, and an era of rampant violence within and against the
urban poor and against women of all socio-economic classes." Id.; see also Herz, supra
note 14, at 115 (purporting to detect "a lingering scent of racism in the gun lobby's
ranks"); id. (suggesting that in the assault weapons debate the "pleasure of more efficient
or pleasurable hunting and target competition weapons is seen to outweigh the hundreds
of lives (mostly of persons of color in the inner city) lost to semiautomatic gunfire").
Professor Becker does not consider the possibility that fairly held but conflicting
views about the relationship between gun rights and violent crime might explain the
commitment to Second Amendment rights. In fact, Becker's opposition to a fundamental
constitutional right is premised on a conclusory treatment of what "seems likely" to the
author about the relationship between gun rights and societal violence. Every constitu-
tional guarantee, of course, creates an impediment to "effective use of the political
system" by those opposed to the right in question; that is the whole point of securing a
right in the Constitution. The possibility, moreover, that opposition to gun rights by
women reflects a socialization that serves to reinforce their subordinate status in our cul-
ture goes unconsidered. Cf Becker, supra, at 497-98 (suggesting that the exclusion of
women from combat reflects and reinforces "the taboo against women using force, espe-
cially lethal force," and the "socialization of girls and women... to be less physically
aggressive than boys and men" and thereby "preserves male interests.., with respect to
men's power over women through physical intimidation throughout society").
26. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 113-15 (arguing that the "gun lobby's" opposition
to meaningful control serves the interests not only of criminals and terrorists, but also of
"fanatics and unstable people;" gun rights fanatics have thus engaged in violence and
threats of violence and produced an "ultra-alienated mentality" among the gun lobby's
ranks); Eric Black, The Second Amendment: Necessary Safeguard or Constitutional Fos-
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oft-stated opinion that the right to keep and bear arms is a dangerous
anachronism in the late twentieth century.
The view that the right to keep and bear arms is an anachronism
in the modem world almost certainly predominates among media and
academic elites;8 it is the average American who appears to disagree.
In a recent conversation with colleagues, several expressed the view
that if the Constitution were being drafted today, the Second
Amendment would not be included. But it is not clear that this is
correct, at least if the voice of the people is heard. Polling data sug-
gests that a majority of Americans believe they have an individual
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.29 Moreover, surveys also
indicate that the number of United States households that own fire-
sil?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 26, 1995, at 4 (reporting joke to the effect that the
difference between a civil libertarian and a paranoid right-wing nut is that the latter
"thinks the Second Amendment is still in the Constitution"); id. (commenting on atmos-
phere after Oklahoma City bombing in which people who believe in gun rights are
"lumped together with self-styled militias and even with the fanatics who blew up the
Oklahoma federal building").
27. See MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 165 (suggesting that many who acknowledge the
history showing an intent to create a personal right see the Amendment as "a dangerous
anachronism" today). For the view that the right is an anachronism based on the modem,
militia-centered reading of the Amendment, see generally Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A.
Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia
Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989).
28. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights Against the States, 19 HARV. J L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 444 n.8 (1996) (reporting that
when asked what they think is meant by the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," many non-lawyers generally include the right to keep and bear arms
alongside other traditional liberties, but "[t]hey do not say this at elite law schools").
Additionally, the so-called "Model State Constitution" developed by the Legislative
Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University does not contain a guarantee to keep
and bear arms. See Model State Constitution, in 1 LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH
FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIV., CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND
STATE (Alexander H. Platt ed., 1978).
29. See, e.g., Bob Baker, The Times Poll: Nation Divided on What Law Should Allow,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1991, at A28, (documenting that 62% stated that the right to own a
firearm was guaranteed by the Constitution, 12% stated that the right was guaranteed by
"regular law," and only 16% stated that the right was not guaranteed at all); Ingrid Grol-
ler, The Arming of America, PARENTS' MAG., Sept. 1990, at 28, 28 (finding that 53%
believed that the right to own a firearm was guaranteed by the Second Amendment,
whereas only 33% believed that the Second Amendment protected state militias and not
individuals); Gordon Witkin et al., The Fight to Bear Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 22, 1995, at 28 (reporting that 75% of Americans favor an individual right to bear
arms); see also Grover G. Norquist, Democrats Misfire on Guns, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb.
1994, at 78, 78 ("Frank Luntz, pollster for the Perot and Giuliani campaigns, showed that
88 percent of Americans believe a citizen has the right to own a gun .... "); Gordon Wit-
kin, Should You Own a Gun?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 24, 29-31
(reporting that 74% believe it is acceptable for Americans to have guns in their homes;
86% of men and 67% of women support the right of Americans to own guns; 80% of
whites and 65% of blacks support gun rights).
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arms ranges from forty-six percent to fifty-one percent.l Most tell-
ing, however, is that forty-three states have their own right to keep
and bear arms provisions,3' seven of which are new or amended pro-
visions adopted in the last fifteen years. 2 It is perhaps unsurprising,
then, that much of the political advocacy concerning gun control
avoids the constitutional question altogether and emphasizes the
theme of reasonable regulation rather than the irrelevance of the
right to arms.33 This is one reason to discuss whether the constitu-
tional question is truly relevant to the gun control debate as it is
developing, before more fully summarizing and assessing the claim
that the right to keep and bear arms is basically an anachronism.
30. In 1959, when Gallup first asked the question "do you have a gun at home," 49%
of Americans said they did. See Brad Edmondson, Most Homes Armed, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1994, at 19, 19. Since 1959, polls have consistently shown a rate of
firearms ownership hovering around the 50% mark. See JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL.,
UNDER THE GUN 34 (1983); see also Edmondson, supra, at 19 (finding 51% according to
an October 1993 Gallup Poll); Groller, supra note 29, at 28 (finding 49% according to a
national poll commissioned by Parents' Magazine); New Fight for Gun Controls: The
Proposals and Prospects, supra note 14, at 51 (finding 47% according to a 1975 Harris
Poll); Susan H. Schoolfield, Can Children and Guns Coexist In the Home?, USA TODAY,
Jan. 1994 (Magazine), at 40, 41 (finding 46% according to a 1991 Gallup Poll); Witkin,
supra note 29, at 24, 31 (reporting that 78% of rural residents, 44% of city residents, and
43% of suburban residents own guns).
31. For the text of these state right to keep and bear arms provisions, see Appendix.
32. Delaware adopted a right to keep and bear arms amendment in 1987. See DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 20. Maine amended its right to keep and bear arms provision in 1987,
from one which had limited the right to "the common defense," to one granting an indi-
vidual right without limitation to the common defense. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 16. One
year later, in 1988, Nebraskans adopted a constitutional amendment giving its citizens the
right to keep and bear arms. See NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 1. A right to keep and bear arms
amendment was added to the Nevada Constitution in 1982. See NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11.
North Dakota adopted a right to keep and bear arms amendment in 1984. See N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 1. The Utah Constitution was amended in 1984 to explicitly grant an in-
dividual right to keep and bear arms "for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6.
Finally, West Virginia adopted a right to keep and bear arms guarantee in 1986. See W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 22.
33. Typical of this stance is the approach taken by President Clinton. For example, in
1993 he stated:
I live in a State where more than half the people have a hunting or fishing li-
cense or both. I believe in the right to keep and bear arms. I believe in the right
to hunt. I believe in all of this. I do not believe that we're well served by having
a bunch of 14- or 15-year-old kids out there with handguns shooting each other
because of blood battles between gangs or because they're mad or because
they're high on drugs. It's wrong. We've got to do something about it.
William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit, in 1 PUB. PAPERS 73, 76 (Feb
10, 1993).
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C The Stakes in the Constitutional Debate Relating to Gun Control:
Is There a Slippery Slope Here?
As noted above, advocates of increased gun restrictions often
profess a desire for merely "reasonable" or "limited" controls. Rea-
sonableness, of course, is, like beauty, truly in the eyes of the
beholder. Despite frequent complaints about the unreasonableness
of the gun rights lobby, there are forceful advocates of the personal
right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment who ac-
knowledge that its recognition need not preclude regulation designed
to prevent and punish the misuse of firearms.3' But if anything is
clear in the gun control debate, it is that the hostility that a great
many gun control advocates hold toward the idea of a. constitutional
right to own firearms stems from the belief that their agenda cannot
be reconciled with any meaningful constitutional right to own fire-
arms.35 From leaders of the anti-gun movement to their media and
legislative supporters, the ultimate goal of firearm reduction if not
complete eradication is increasingly being made clear.3 ' Each legisla-
tive achievement is viewed as a stepping stone to the ultimate
objective: "'total control of handguns in the United States.' "1
34. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 3, at 315; Kates, supra note 6, at 257-89;
Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1253-54.
35. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 150-52 (arguing that "[a]ggressive and compre-
hensive national firearms regulation will only come when the false consciousness
surrounding the Second Amendment is swept aside"); id. at 152 (concluding that the
"disease" of "gun love," equated with drug and alcohol abuse, stands as a barrier to the
"radical steps" required to stem gun deaths).
36. A typical statement is Representative Charles Schumer's assurance to a national
television audience that "[w]e're going to hammer guns on the anvil of relentless legisla-
tive strategy. We're going to beat guns into submission." Nightly News (NBC television
broadcast, Nov. 30, 1993). Schumer's statement of purpose lends credence to Marshall
DeRosa's claim that "Congress is at the Second Amendment's door with a battering
ram." MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE POLITICS OF
CREATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: DISPARAGING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF POPULAR
CONTROL 139 (1996).
37. Andrew J. McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53,87 n.159
(1992) (quoting an interview by Pete Shields, the founder of Handgun Control Inc.). In
another interview, Shields stated:
[T]he first problem is to slow down the increasing number of handguns being
produced and sold in this country. The second problem is to get handguns regis-
tered. And the final problem is to make possession of all handguns and all
handgun ammunition-except for the military, policemen, licensed security
guards, licensed sporting clubs, and licensed gun collectors-totally illegal.
Richard Harris, A Reporter at Large: Handguns, NEW YORKER, July 26, 1976, at 53, 53;
see also Erik Eckholm, Thorny Issue In Gun Control Curbing Responsible Owners, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at A5 (" 'There will always be people who disagree, but for the
greater good of the community we will have to pass a [handgun] ban against their
wishes.'" (quoting Jeffrey Muchnick, Legislative Director of the Coalition to Stop Gun
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This is why key proponents of the Brady Handgun Violence Pro-
tection Act (Brady Act)' viewed it, in significant measure, as a
"cornerstone" or "framework" upon which to construct additional
controls." Senator Ted Stevens's prediction during the 1991 debate
over the Brady Bill that the bill was "just the beginning of a flood of
Violence)); Lacayo, supra note 4, at 31 (pointing out that "[o]utright prohibition-at least
of handguns-is exactly what some people have in mind"); id. (noting that Senator John
Chafee "has twice introduced a bill to ban their sale, manufacture and possession" and
that other government officials favor such action).
38. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994)). The
Brady Act has had its own problems. Five federal district courts struck down the Act's
background check requirement as a violation of the Tenth Amendment and/or the Com-
merce Clause. See Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1089 (W.D. La. 1994);
McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321,327-28 (S.D. Miss. 1994), petition for cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 19, 1996) (No. 95-2052), and petition for cerL filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. June 25, 1996) (No. 95-2077); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp.
1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996), and peti-
tion for cert filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3856 (U.S. June 13, 1996) (No. 95-2006); Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1383-84 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 1025
(9th Cir. 1995), and cert. granted sub nom. Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996);
Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. granted sub nom.
Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996). Only one federal district court upheld the
background check requirement against Tenth Amendment challenge. See Koog v. United
States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996), peti-
tion for cert filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 19, 1996) (No. 95-2052), and petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. June 25, 1996) (No. 95-2077). The circuit courts of
appeals are split over the constitutionality of the background check requirement. The
Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the background check requirement did not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'g
860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'g
856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), and 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994). The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, held that the background check requirement did violate the Tenth
Amendment. See Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'g 863 F. Supp.
321 (S.D. Miss. 1994), and rev'g 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994). For examination of
the challenges to the Brady Act, see Michael J. Delaney, Note, Lethal Weapon: Will
Tenth Amendment Challenges Kill the Brady Act?, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (1995); Jonathan
Duncan, Comment, Looks Like a Waiting Period for the Brady Bilk Tenth Amendment
Challenges to a Controversial Unfunded Mandate, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 835 (1995); Dyan
Finguerra, Note, The Tenth Amendment Shoots Down the Brady Act, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 637
(1995).
39. See William J. Clinton, Remarks in a Telephone Conversation with the Space
Shuttle Endeavor Astronauts and an Exchange with Reporters, in 2 PUB. PAPERS 2147,
2149-50 (Dec. 10, 1993) (stating, in response to a reporter's question about gun control,
that the "Brady bill was a good first step" but that "it [was] nowhere near enough. It is
the beginning and we have got to move forward."); Linda M. Harrington, In 8 Years Toll
Soars as Brady Gun Bill Awaits OK, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1993, § 1, at 1 (quoting Hand-
gun Control Inc. (HCI) spokeswoman Susan Whitmore as saying '[w]e need to lay this
cornerstone before we build on it' "); The Hotline, Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Hotlne File (quoting HCI Chairwoman Sarah Brady as saying "now that
we've got the framework in place.... we can move on to more effective pieces of legisla-
tion that will really begin to make a difference").
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restrictions planned by gun control advocates"'  has in fact been
borne out by the veritable floodgate of proposed legislative restric-
tions that followed the bill's passage in 1993. Two bills proposed in
1994 would have enacted a wide range of restrictions on gun owners,
many of which reflect the desire to reduce gun ownership through
burdensome regulation.41 In addition, numerous gun control bills
were introduced in the 103rd42 and 104th43 Congresses, and a federal
40. 137 CONG. REC. S8934 (daily ed. June 28, 1991) (statement of Senator Ted Ste-
vens).
41. Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, H.R. 3932, 103d Cong. (1994); S. 1882,
103d Cong. (1994); Handgun Control and Violence Prevention Act of 1994, S. 2053, 103d
Cong. (1994), reintroduced as S. 631, 104th Cong. (1995). These two bills contained sub-
stantially the same regulations, and would have:
1. made it illegal to purchase a handgun without a valid, "nationally uniform,"
state-issued handgun license;
2. required that all handgun transfers be registered with local officials;
3. limited handgun purchases to one per month;
4. increased the fee for a federal firearms license from $200 to $3,000 for a
three-year license;
5. provided for the computerization of "all records of receipts and disposition
of firearms" by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms;
6. required a federal license to deal in ammunition;
7. regulated the manufacture, importation and sale of "particularly dangerous"
handgun ammunition;
8. required the "proper storage" of firearms away from juveniles;
9. made it unlawful for anyone to possess more than 20 firearms or more than
1,000 rounds of ammunition unless that person obtains a "federal arsenal li-
cense" at a cost of $300 for a three-year period (with the likelihood of
escalating license fees in the future);
10. required holders of a federal arsenal license to meet all "obligations and re-
quirements" pertaining to licensed dealers;
11. banned "Saturday Night Specials"; and
12. required manufacturers to add "safety devices" to guns.
See Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, H.R. 3932; S. 1882; Handgun Control and
Violence Prevention Act of 1994, S. 2053. James Brady characterized the House bill,
which was commonly referred to as Brady II, as" 'a combination of steps that adds up to
an end to America's gun violence.'" William Neikirk, Clinton Decries Gun Violence,
Weighs Tough New Measures, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 1993, § 1, at 7.
42. See S. 1647, 103d Cong. (1993) (providing for a "fair process" to help eradicate
from the United States those firearms that have "no legitimate purpose" and which "are
so lethal that they constitute an unreasonable risk to law enforcement and the public at
large," while simultaneously ensuring that law-abiding citizens have access to "firearms
created for legitimate purposes"); Real Cost of Handgun Ammunition Act, S. 1616, 103d
Cong. (1993) (proposing a tax increase on handgun ammunition, imposition of a "special
occupational tax" and "registration requirements" on importers and manufacturers of
handgun ammunition); Public Health and Safety Act of 1993, S. 892, 103d Cong. (1993)
(establishing a six-month grace period during which owners of handguns would be re-
quired to turn in their guns and receive the gun's fair market value or $25, whichever is
greater; after the six-month grace period, only law enforcement and military personnel,
security guards, antique collectors, and target shooters belonging to a gun club could pos-
sess a handgun); H.R. 3720, 103d Cong. (1993) (regulating the manufacture, importation,
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"assault weapons" ban was enacted in 1994."
and sale of "jacketed hollow point" ammunition); H.R. 3542, 103d Cong. (1993)
(regulating the manufacture, importation, and sale of "certain particularly dangerous
bullets"); Public Safety and Protection Act of 1994, H.R. 3482, 103d Cong. (1993)
(establishing a system for regulating the possession and transfer of handguns and handgun
ammunition); Gun Safety Act of 1993, H.R. 3263, 103d Cong. (1993) (authorizing the
Consumer Product Safety Commission to regulate "the risk of injury associated with fire-
arms"); Public Health and Safety Act of 1993, H.R. 3132, 103d Cong. (1993) (banning the
manufacture, importation, exportation, sale, purchase, transfer, receipt, possession, or
transportation of handguns and handgun ammunition); Quinlan, supra note 7, at 645 n.23
(summarizing additional 1993 bills); see also Firearms Safety and Violence Prevention
Act, H.R. 4903, 103d Cong. (1994) (expanding the powers of the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and sale of firearms and
ammunition, including "firearm products" and non-powder firearms); Public Safety and
Licensing Act of 1994, H.R. 4591, 103d Cong. (1994) (establishing a system for regulating
and licensing the distribution of firearms); H.R. 4323, 103d Cong. (1994) (requiring am-
munition to bear serial numbers); Safe Public Housing Act, H.R. 4062, 103d Cong. (1994)
(providing for referenda among public housing residents to determine whether firearms
shall be prohibited or limited in such developments); Interstate Gun Control Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, S. 2261, 103d Cong. (1994) (imposing a sentence of up to five years and
a $5,000 fine for failure to comply with firearm purchase requirements in a new state of
residence); Gun Violence Health Care Costs Prevention Act, S. 1798, 103d Cong. (1994)
(increasing the manufacturer's excise tax on handguns, "assault weapons," and ammuni-
tion to 30%; establishing a 30% federal retail sales and transfer tax on handguns, "assault
weapons," and ammunition).
43. See, e.g., Multiple Handgun Transfer Prohibition Act of 1995, H.R. 964, 104th
Cong. (1995) (prohibiting the transfer of two or more handguns to an individual in any 30-
day period); Public Health and Safety Act of 1995, H.R. 916, 104th Cong. (1995) (banning
the manufacture, importation, sale, and possession of handguns and handgun ammuni-
tion); H.R. 250, 104th Cong. (1995) (banning possession or transfer of "non-sporting
handguns"); Gun Violence Economic Equity Act of 1995, H.R. 174, 104th Cong. (1995)
(imposing strict liability on manufacturers, importers, and dealers of handguns and
"assault weapons"); H.R. 169, 104th Cong. (1995) (requiring mandatory registration of
handguns); Ammunition Safety Act of 1995, S. 433, 104th Cong. (1995) (requiring a back-
ground check of ammunition purchasers, imposing new license requirements on
ammunition dealers, and regulating new types of destructive ammunition); Real Cost of
Destructive Ammunition Act, S. 124, 104th Cong. (1995) (increasing the tax on handgun
ammunition and imposing a special occupational tax and registration requirements on
importers and manufacturers of handgun ammunition); S. 122, 104th Cong. (1995)
(prohibiting the use of certain ammunition); Violent Crime Control Act of 1995, S. 120,
104th Cong. (1995) (imposing a record-keeping requirement on the disposition of ammu-
nition and increasing the tax on certain bullets); S. 119, 104th Cong. (1995) (imposing tax
on .25 caliber, .32 caliber, and 9 millimeter ammunition); S. 118, 104th Cong. (1995)
(banning manufacture, transfer, or importation of .25 caliber, .32 caliber, and 9 millimeter
ammunition).
44. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, tit. XI, § 110102(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1996 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(v) (1994))
(implementing a semi-automatic weapons ban). Semi-automatic firearms, which are pejo-
ratively and incorrectly identified as "assault weapons," are the current cause celebre of
the gun prohibition movement.
[O]ver the last three decades, the gun control movement has shifted the bad gun
definition from scoped, bolt action rifles (in the 1960s in response to the Ken-
nedy assassination and the event dubbed the "Texas School Tower Massacre")
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Given these facts, it is difficult to discount the fears of gun own-
ers that federal legislation like the Brady Act and the "assault
weapons" ban are mainly about establishing a grounding from which
to expand an ever-tighter web of restrictions on the rights of law-
abiding citizens who own guns. Suggesting that opposition to addi-
tional controls is only natural "given the rancor with which controls
are advocated and the purposes avowed by their more extreme advo-
cates," Don Kates poses the telling question: "Would driver licensing
and automobile registration have been adopted if they had been ad-
vocated on the basis ... that the desired end is to progressively
increase regulation until cars are unavailable to all but the military
and the police?"4 In short, anti-gun forces are attempting to make
good on Representative Charles Schumer's pledge to "hammer guns
on the anvil of relentless legislative strategy.""
to inexpensive handguns (in the 1970s and early 1980s) and now to semiauto-
matic rifles.
Nicholas J. Johnson, Shots Across No Man's Land A Response to Handgun Control,
Inc.'s Richard Aborn, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 442 (1995). For several excellent
sources repudiating the claims of anti-gun advocates that semi-automatic firearms are
evil, the weapons of choice for criminals, responsible for a wave of carnage not seen since
Biblical times, and a threat to the lives of every decent American, see ERIC C. MORGAN
& DAVID B. KOPEL, INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPER, THE "ASSAULT WEAPON" PANIC:
POLITICAL CORRECrNESS TAKES AIM AT THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1993); Kristine R.
DeMay, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Semi-Automatic
"Assault Weapon"--The Latest Victim in this Country's War Against Crime, 16 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199 (1994); David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault
Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381 (1994); Joseph P. Tartaro, The Great Assault
Weapon Hoax, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 619 (1995); Eric C. Morgan, Note, Assault Rifle
Legislation: Unwise and Unconstitutional, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 143 (1990).
45. DON B. KATES, JR., PACIFIC RES. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, GUNS, MURDERS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION: A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF GUN CONTROL 9 (1990). To similar
effect, Professor Andrew J. McClurg notes:
There is no doubt that the agenda of many Brady bill proponents encompasses
much more than the adoption of waiting periods and background checks. Many
Brady bill supporters want to prohibit private possession of handguns altogether.
This is what differentiates the Second Amendment slippery slope argument from
most other arguments. Persons who believe in a civil remedy for libel are not ul-
timately looking to abolish newspapers. People who opposed polygamy in the
19th century did not want to outlaw the Mormon church. Most people who ad-
vocate wider search and seizure authority for the police do not want to do away
with the Fourth Amendment. But many of those who support waiting periods
and background checks for handgun purchases do want to completely ban hand-
guns.
McClurg, supra note 37, at 88 (footnote omitted).
46. Statement of Charles Schumer, Nightly News, supra note 36.
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D. The Fundamental Question: Is the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
an Anachronism?
As noted in Part I-B above, many of society's elite decision-
makers believe that the right to keep and bear arms is an anachro-
nism-and to the extent that it serves as a barrier to effective gun
control legislation, a dangerous anachronism at that. But there are
variations on this basic theme. For some, of course, this conclusion
rests on a highly contested interpretation of the Amendment. If the
Second Amendment is really about militias, rather than about guns,
and if the sort of militias to which it refers no longer exist, the provi-
sion is an anachronism because there is no longer any reason to
invoke it.' According to this view, the right to keep and bear arms
still exists, but as with the Third Amendment right not to have sol-
diers quartered in your home, it has no relevance.s This argument
amounts to a claim that modern proponents of gun rights have either
misinterpreted the Second Amendment or misrepresented it to the
American public.49 The Amendment, under this view, has no bearing
on the gun control issues being debated in legislative chambers
throughout America today. The issue raised by this argument is
whether its proponents have correctly interpreted the Second
Amendment.
An equally standard argument insists that the constitutional
status of the claimed personal right to keep and bear arms has long
since been resolved and to continue to raise a long-settled issue is to
rely upon an anachronism. No less than a former Solicitor General
has stated that it is "perhaps the most well-settled proposition in
American constitutional law" that "the Second Amendment poses no
barrier to strong gun laws."'  As if this language were not strong
47. See Henigan, supra note 16, at 108-09; Herz, supra note 14, at 64-67. A variation
of this argument is that the Second Amendment forbids the federal government to disarm
the National Guard "against the will of state legislatures." Roy G. Weatherup, Standing
Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of The Second Amendment, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 1001 (1975). Either way, the right has no connection to the
gun control debate that might make it relevant today.
48. The Third Amendment is another Bill of Rights provision that has not been in-
corporated against the states, but for the obvious reason that the problem to which it is
addressed has virtually never arisen. Cf. Levinson, supra note 3, at 641 & n.25
(comparing Second and Third Amendments and referring to the only Third Amendment
case presented to a court).
49. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 67 (calling individual right reading "a fabrica-
tion"); id. at 103-10 (describing campaign of NRA and others as "constitutional
deception" designed to hoodwink a naive public into believing there is a constitutional
right to bear arms despite clear case law and troublesome text).
50. Erwin N. Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment "Rights," WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
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enough, Andrew Herz has recently complained that the gun rights
lobby has generated "phantom constitutional barriers discredited by
the courts."5 ' The view that the Second Amendment guarantees any
significant protection to a personal right to own a firearm is, accord-
ing to Herz, simply a "fabrication."52  While Herz supports this
conclusion with a small dose of text and history,3 along with some
reliance on the "changed social circumstances" of modem America
compared to the founding period,s his "fabrication" charge rests cen-
trally on the claim that the rejected view "is not the law of the land"
because the federal courts "have invariably ruled that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms applies only to those individuals using
firearms in connection with their service in an organized state mili-
tia."55
There is, additionally, a third version of the anachronism argu-
ment. Some modem scholars acknowledge that under the Second
Amendment all citizens were to hold a personal right to private arms,
but they insist that the presuppositions of this right no longer exist.
The concept of a general militia, comprised of virtually all adult
males who make up the political communities within the states, has
1990, at C7; accord Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 40 (stating that the conclusion
that the Second Amendment does not secure a personal right to arms "may be the most
firmly established proposition in American constitutional law"). Such claims amount to
hyperbole at the least-the doctrines of judicial review or implied powers, to use obvious
examples, seem like more logical candidates for the title thus claimed for the non-
individual right interpretation of the Second Amendment. For the alternative view that
existing case law has not "firmly established" this reading of the Second Amendment, see
infra Part IV-A.
51. Herz, supra note 14, at 61.
52. See id. at 67-68. Herz suggests that the argument for a private right to arms re-
flects that a "single-issue pressure group has effectively mobilized a rabidly vocal
minority to drown out and shout down virtually all other voices in the constitutional con-
versation." Id at 61. Consequently, "we cannot even hear the judicial voices that are
supposed to be the primary arbiters of the Constitution." Id.
53. See id. at 64-66. Herz quickly clarifies, however, that he rejects adherence to the
view that any constitutional provision can generate a single correct answer, see id. at 65,
or that, even if it could, we should be bound by the decisions of "a small group of white
property-owning males who lived in a world utterly different than our own." Id. at 66.
54. See id. at 68.
55. Id. The claim that the Second Amendment secures a private right to firearms for
self-defense or other purposes is, accordingly, "simply a misstatement of the Second
Amendment's operative meaning." Id at 118. Society's elite leaders, says Herz, owe a
duty to straighten the public out on the "settled case law" on the Second Amendment, lest
they be charged with having "misled the public" and "marginaliz[ing] the judiciary's es-
sential task of constitutional interpretation." Id. This is the primary ground upon which
he bases his tirade of expletives at those who persist in referring to a constitutional right
to keep and bear arms as though it might be relevant to modem debate over gun control
legislation. See Herz, supra note 14, passim. For a critique of this sort of reliance on the
relevant federal precedents, see infra Part IV-A.
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no modem counterpart.6 Moreover, the republican ideology that
underlay the notion of a general citizen militia has given way to a lib-
eral individualism that does not call for the sort of patriotic sacrifice
upon which the general militia rested, and most modem Americans
know little or nothing about the philosophy that informed the clause.
Consequently, few citizens today would even understand, let alone
endorse, the founding generation's idea that a militia is "necessary to
the security of a free state."' Thus, the central rationale for the right
to keep and bear arms-that it would perpetuate a security-
enhancing citizen militia-no longer exists.
The Framers also believed that an armed citizenry would pro-
vide a safeguard against governmental tyranny." But this
revolutionary philosophy, which remained a potent force at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, is now largely irrelevant in the
nation with the oldest constitution, and perhaps the most stable gov-
ernment, in the world. If the philosophy of the right of revolution
itself is not dead, to many the idea that an armed citizenry might be a
potent force against tyrannous government seems laughable in an era
in which the United States government possesses nuclear weapons.59
To the extent that ideas of personal self-defense played a role in
the adoption of the Second Amendment, it has been argued that
states should be able to regulate, or even prohibit, firearm ownership
on the ground that widespread possession of firearms diminishes,
rather than enhances, personal security.' There is no question that
56. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 39-40.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. II. It has been accurately observed that "the original mean-
ing of the [Second] [A]mendment is obscured by the vast gulf of time and perspective
which separates us from the Founders-and our greater distance yet from the history and
historians, the philosophy and philosophers who shaped the Founders' thought." Alan M.
Gottlieb, Gun Ownership: A Constitutional Right, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 113, 113 (1982).
58. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 322 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (observing that in contrast to European governments who were "afraid to trust the
people with arms," in America an armed people, aided by their state governments, would
be able to overthrow a federal tyranny).
59. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 664-65 (doubting whether "an armed citizenry
is a viable mode of resistance" against "the arsenal of the modern state," or whether
small arms are of any "serious assistance" in defending the state itself in a nuclear age).
As with many aspects of the debate over firearms, their uses and abuses, it is our view
that the potential contribution of firearms to resistance to tyranny is a richer question
than dismissive references to modem arsenals and nuclear states would suggest. For a
more moderate critique of the Framers' expectations as to the possibility of mass resis-
tance, see Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the
Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 646-49 (1995).
60. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional
Protection for a Right of Security, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 69, 103 (1986).
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
we live in an interdependent society in which we come into close
proximity to our fellow citizens on a more or less constant basis. For
critics of a right to own and use firearms, widespread possession and
use of firearms is perceived as making our world more dangerous
rather than less dangerous. Moreover, it can be argued that the so-
cial contract theory that we give up some rights to obtain the
"protection" of government seems especially applicable to gun rights
inasmuch as modem communal life includes well-organized police
forces for the protection of citizens-a feature of modern life without
any counterpart in the United States of 1787.
On one or more of these grounds, many organizations and com-
mentators contend that, whatever the intentions of the Amendment's
framers, we would be better off not attempting to bring forward the
allegedly outdated Second Amendment because it would mean some-
thing far different to us than it did to its drafters and, in the long run,
it would hurt the cause of promoting fidelity to the Constitution.'
According to this argument, the Second Amendment does not
"translate" in the context of modem society, because our society's
philosophical presuppositions and material conditions have changed
in critically important ways since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
While the first and second versions of the anachronism argument
rest on assumptions relating to the process by which we give authori-
tative meaning to the Constitution over time, the third version relates
to what the Second Amendment should plausibly be understood to
mean in the context of modem America-or perhaps to whether we
should even have a Second Amendment at all. While many propo-
nents of the anachronism argument who would ignore the original
meaning are undoubtedly non-originalists, it can be argued that the
problem of "translating" 200-year-old norms to a modem culture ap-
peals to those committed to an ideal of "fidelity" in constitutional
61. This type of argument was familiar to the Framers themselves, at least as a draft-
ing consideration. The debate over the inclusion of specific provisions in the Constitution
at the time of the founding frequently considered the extent to which they embodied prin-
ciples likely to be unaffected by the changes that time would bring. A particular concern
was that the inclusion of a provision that could prove anachronistic might cause disrespect
for, and thus undermine, not only the provision in question, but the Constitution as a
whole. As Madison wrote to Jefferson, "I am inclined to think that absolute restrictions in
cases that are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided."
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 295,299 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1977) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. See generally Philip A. Hamburger, The Con-
stitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 275 (1989)
(describing Federalists' efforts "to exclude from the Constitution such rules and struc-
tures as would need to be adapted flexibly to changes in American society").
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interpretation as much as it does to those who simply would not be
bound by decisions made in such a distant past.62
All three versions of the anachronism argument present issues
that Second Amendment scholars should feel compelled to address.
In this Article, we discuss whether constitutional text and history, on
the one hand, or case law precedent, on the other, basically moot the
question of whether a personal right to keep and bear arms makes
any sense in modem America.3 Part II of this Article analyzes vari-
ous issues raised by the text of the Second Amendment. In
particular, Part II-A refutes the claim that the Second Amendment's
wording and syntax precludes an interpretation that recognizes a per-
sonal right to have firearms. Part II-B, in turn, develops the issues of
meaning raised by the Second Amendment's language guaranteeing a
right to "keep and bear" arms. Both Parts II-A and B criticize over-
blown claims as to the force of the Second Amendment's language by
itself and argue that the critical questions raised by the text of the
Amendment can only be answered by reading the text in the context
of the concerns that gave rise to it. Part III analyzes the Second
Amendment in light of the extrinsic evidence concerning the original
intentions of those who drafted and ratified it. Part III-A examines
the evidence as to the "mischief," or defect, to which the Second
Amendment was addressed. We conclude that the Second Amend-
ment arose, as did the Bill of Rights generally, from the fears
generated by the omission of a number of fundamental guarantees in
the Constitution as proposed to the states. In particular, the Consti-
tution's critics feared that the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, as secured originally by the 1689 English Bill of Rights and
guaranteed by state constitutions in the early American republic,
would be jeopardized because of the omission of such a guarantee in
a Constitution of enlarged national powers. By contrast, we show
that the historical evidence does not support the modem claim that
the Second Amendment was a response to concerns about the extent
of control over state militias granted the national government by the
proposed Constitution.
62. For an interesting treatment of the sorts of problems raised even within a com-
mitment to remaining faithful to "meaning" over time, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
63. Because we conclude in this Article that neither the tools of originalism nor stare
decisis present substantial barriers to recognizing a personal right to own firearms, a fol-
low-up article will confront the many rich questions relating to the possibility (or the
desirability) of explicating and applying a personal right to arms as we approach the end
of the twentieth century.
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Part III-B shows that the Second Amendment was drafted to
provide an efficient "remedy" to the mischief created by the omission
of the long-established guarantee of a right to keep and bear arms.
The drafting history of the Amendment confirms that the Framers
sought to secure a personal right to keep and bear arms, both to fa-
cilitate the natural right of self-defense and to assure an armed
citizenry from which to draw a citizen militia to protect the commu-
nity from foreign invasion or tyrannical leaders. The history also
shows that the people's right to keep and bear arms was drafted by
Madison to ensure an enforceable constitutional right, while the
Amendment's statement that a "well-regulated Militia" is "necessary
to the security of a free state" was drafted as a declaration of classical
republican principles favoring a militia over a standing army, but not
as an enforceable limitation on national power.
Next, Part III-C surveys the post-ratification statements of legal
commentators, courts, and Reconstruction-era legislators confirming
the pervasive understanding that the Second Amendment guarantees
a personal right to have firearms. The evidence reviewed shows that
the personal right understanding of the Amendment was the uni-
formly held reading for more than a century after the adoption of the
Bill of Rights.
Finally, Part IV addresses the claim of some recent commenta-
tors that stare decisis stands as an insurmountable barrier to bringing
forward the right to keep and bear arms. Part IV-A analyzes the
body of federal case law on the Second Amendment and concludes
that it presents no such barrier. The few cases in which the United
States Supreme Court has addressed the Amendment include analy-
sis that is far more favorable to the individual right interpretation
than has often been acknowledged by commentators. Part IV-A also
demonstrates that the lower federal court cases squarely rejecting an
individual right understanding of the Second Amendment ignore
overwhelming evidence as to the original meaning of the Amend-
ment, as well as the wealth of materials showing that an individual
right reading was the general understanding of the Amendment
throughout the nineteenth century. These decisions rest on a mis-
reading of relevant Supreme Court precedent and rely on outdated
cases relating to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Part V-B suggests that, even if modem federal precedent stood
as a barrier to recognition of an individual right to keep and bear
arms under the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court's modern
fundamental rights case law would require fresh consideration of the
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right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right of personhood.
We review the modem Supreme Court's development of an impor-
tant, if controversial, line of fundamental rights decisions explicating
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-a body of
case law that has arisen during the nearly sixty years since the Su-
preme Court last addressed an issue arising under the Second
Amendment. We show, in turn, that an examination of the criteria
for inclusion within the category of fundamental rights articulated by
the Supreme Court and explicated by commentators, reveals that
modern courts cannot justifiably rely on cases narrowly construing
the Second Amendment as a basis for rejecting the claim that the
right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to a system of ordered
liberty and a fundamental right in the American tradition. We con-
clude that, unless the Court is willing to reconsider its fundamental
rights doctrine in its entirety, the historical right of self-defense will
have to be confronted to determine whether the individual right to
have firearms should be recognized as among the fundamental rights
of personhood guaranteed to all Americans.
Part IV-C reviews another feature of the American constitu-
tional landscape that reveals the futility of attempting to rely on
federal cases rejecting a personal right to arms to justify terminating
debate on the merits of a right to keep and bear arms-the pervasive
recognition of the right to keep and bear arms in many state constitu-
tions, often recognizing a personal right to arms in express language.
We show that even if the federal Second Amendment were viewed as
having a meaning fixed by modem precedent, none of this case law
precludes state courts from construing their state constitutional pro-
visions to recognize a personal right to arms. Considering that the
gun control debate has as much significance at the state level as it
does at the federal level, the meaning of the right to keep and bear
arms, and inevitably its "fit" in our modem world, will remain issues
that thoughtful constitutional decision-makers will be forced to con-
sider.
II. THE TEXT OF THE SEcOND AMENDMENT
The central question in the Second Amendment debate is
whether the right to "keep and bear arms" gives to individual citizens
the right to own and use private firearms outside the context of serv-
ice in a state-organized militia. Advocates of the more restrictive
reading answer this question in the negative. They contend that the
Amendment's first clause, the Militia Clause ("A well regulated Mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free State"), sets forth the
1997]
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limited purpose for which the right contained in the Amendment's
second clause, the Right to Arms Clause ("the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"), is secured."6 Accord-
ingly, under this line of thought, the right is limited to the public
sphere of militia service, and has no implications at all for the non-
militiaman. The Amendment only provides that the federal govern-
ment may not dismantle the militias within the states, nor prohibit
those in the militia from possessing and using weapons when they are
engaged in militia service.6s
Those who argue that the Second Amendment recognizes an in-
dividual right to bear arms contend that the right to keep and bear
arms stands on its own footing, despite the close historical connection
between the ideal of a citizen-based militia defense system and the
notion of an armed citizenry. The pedigree of the Second Amend-
ment right to arms extends at least to the 1689 English Bill of Rights,
which guaranteed Englishmen the right to private weapons for lawful
purposes." This constitutional guarantee, in turn, assures the exis-
tence of an armed people from whom a citizen-based militia can be
derived. While the right to keep and bear arms was designed to as-
sure the existence of a body of citizens with private arms, and thereby
64. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CON-
STITUTION 11 (1991).
65. These views are often referred to as the "collective" or "states' rights" readings
of the Amendment, inasmuch as they rest on the premise that the real thrust of the provi-
sion was to assure the continuation of the militia system, or perhaps the power of states to
continue it. The conventional characterization of these views as exclusively "collective"
or "states' rights" constructions has been questioned, however, because these readings
arguably entail at least an individual right to use weapons as part of militia service. See
Herz, supra note 14, at 61-62 & n.11. Accordingly, it is said that the real line of distinc-
tion is between the personal right of gun ownership for private purposes (including self-
defense) and a right of access to guns only as a militia member, rather than between an
"individual" and a "collective" or "states' right." See id. at 61 n.11 (citing Ralph J. Roh-
ner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U. L.
REv. 53, 55 n.20 (1966)). However these differences of formulation are resolved, this
Article will treat the central issue as whether the Amendment protects private gun rights,
apart from the immediate context of militia service. In this regard, there is no need to
choose between a "collective" and an "individual" rights reading; the Amendment can be
read as securing both an "individual" and a "collective" right. We would emphasize,
however, that the more restricted version of a so-called personal right to arms is hardly a
personal right at all. What sort of "personal right" is it that can be effectively extin-
guished merely by changing the terms of militia service?
66. The 1689 English Bill of Rights provided: "That the Subjects which are Protes-
tants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by
Law." Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Seteling the Succession
of the Crowne, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (Eng.). For an examination of the English right to
arms guarantee, see HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 43-54;
MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 113-34.
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reinforce the viability of the militia system, the right was never lim-
ited to militias or militiamen; in fact, the right to arms grew out of the
common-law and natural right of self-defense and, in turn, was
viewed as lending support to that underlying right as well as to the
goal of collective defense.67
Although many on both sides of this debate have agreed that the
Amendment can be understood only in proper historical context,
each has advanced important claims about the text that will serve to
frame the issues. The text also warrants independent attention be-
cause it has become increasingly common for contributors to the
public and scholarly debate to claim that the language of the Second
Amendment resolves the fundamental debate as to the relevant
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.'
A number of critical questions are raised by the text of the Sec-
ond Amendment: What is the relationship between the
Amendment's two clauses? Does the Amendment's Militia Clause
function as a limitation or qualification of the guarantee embodied in
the Right to Arms Clause? Does "the people" to whom the right to
arms is guaranteed refer to the entire body of citizens, whether mem-
bers of the militia or not, or merely to the militia as an institutional
symbol of popular involvement in public life? Does the guarantee of
a right to "keep and bear" arms indicate a uniquely military context
in which the right is to be exercised? The sections that follow will
develop the issues raised by these questions and, at the same time,
illuminate some crucial questions of method in constitutional inter-
pretation.
A. The Relation Between the Militia and Right to Arms Clauses
Advocates of the more restrictive reading of the right to keep
and bear arms contend that the Militia Clause is the key to under-
standing the Second Amendment. Most contend that when the right
to arms guarantee is read in historical context, it essentially amounts
to a claim that the people as a whole should be able to have a militia
to guarantee their collective security. 9 The Second Amendment, ac-
cordingly, reflects this priority in its text; the people have a right to
have arms in the context of a well regulated militia. The Militia
67. See HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 49-54.
68. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 64, at 11.
69. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 31 (arguing that various state constitutional pro-
visions relating to citizen use of arms "guaranteed the sovereign citizenry, described
collectively as 'the people' or 'the militia,' a role in the common defense").
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Clause thus serves to "limit" or "qualify" what might otherwise be
taken as a general and unrestricted popular right to arms; it confirms
the militia-based historical understanding of the popular right to
arms.70 Even so, most of the scholarly proponents of this argument
about the relationship between the clauses would acknowledge that
its force turns on whether the historical evidence establishes that the
right to arms was generally understood as being uniquely tied to mili-
tias and militia service. If so, the text can be seen as reflecting, and
perhaps reinforcing, this larger understanding of the Amendment's
purpose.
But arguments can easily take on a life of their own, and it is
now a common phenomenon for advocates of this interpretation in
the popular media to use the placement of the Militia and Right to
Arms Clauses in the Amendment as virtually a trump in the argu-
ment. These advocates contend that gun rights proponents simply
70. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 32 (contending that arrangement of the
language was to place stress "on the militia aspect of keeping and bearing arms" and that
other language would have been employed to express a "broad 'individual' right to carry
arms, outside of the military context"); Herz, supra note 14, at 64 (describing standard
argument for restrictive reading based in part on the structure of the provision); id. at 66
(referring to "the explicit qualification opening the Second Amendment" that "suggests a
narrow focus on the militia in defining the right to bear arms").
71. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, 'Right to Bear Arms' Belongs to States, Court Rulings
Affirm, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1995, at A10 (quoting former Chief Justice Burger's view that
reliance on Second Amendment for individual right to own guns perpetuates a "fraud" on
American public); id. (citing "widespread legal and judicial view" that the Amendment
"guarantees a states' right to be armed" and focusing particularly on "the importance of
the opening clause referring to a 'well-regulated militia' "); Griswold, supra note 50, at C7
(quoting full text and stating that the Amendment's purpose is uniquely and "clearly ex-
pressed in its text" and concluding from the text and modem court decisions that the right
to arms is limited to organized state militias); Go Ahead NRA, Make My Day, CHI. TRIB.,
June 3, 1991, at 14 (criticizing NRA for emphasizing second clause as "selective editing"
because first clause reflects purpose to preserve the militia); Gun Rights are a Myth, USA
TODAY, Dec. 28, 1994, at 8A (calling individual right to bear arms "a fabrication, a myth"
and arguing that while "[i]ts structure is tortured," the Amendment's "preamble is plain"
and establishes that the right "exists only in the context of 'a well-regulated militia'" and
concluding that "[n]o matter how many hairs you split, there is no other way to read the
sentence"); Guns: A History Lesson, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1988, Pt. II, at 6 (contending
that when the Second Amendment is read "in its entirety, it is clear that the right to bear
arms is a conditional right" and that the Amendment "is really about national security");
id. (calling the NRA's reading a "twisted interpretation"); Listening to G. Gordon Liddy,
BALT. SUN, June 7, 1995, at 14A (quoting former Chief Justice Burger for view that
"[t]he very language of the Second Amendment refutes any argument that it was in-
tended to guarantee every citizen an unfettered right to any kind of weapon he or she
desires"); Of Guns and 2nd Amendment Myths, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1993, at 22 (quoting
language of the Second Amendment and criticizing NRA for mak[ing] its argument "by
conveniently ignoring the first half of the Second Amendment"); id. (arguing that reliance




fail to perceive, or choose to ignore, the obvious fact that the right in
the second clause is framed and limited by the language of the first
clause.' This use of the Militia Clause as a trump has even found its
way in to the scholarly literature.' Those who rely on the text as the
key weapon make only the most general claims in support of the his-
torical purpose supposedly embodied in this text.74 It has been
argued that the text of the Militia Clause requires constitutional in-
terpreters to favor limits on the right to bear arms over conflicting
understandings of that right derived from the "background under-
standing" of those who drafted and ratified the Amendment. We are
told that this is true because while "history serves to illuminate the
text," it is "only the text itself which is law." 75
Consider the full argument of Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C.
Doff:
72. See supra note 70.
73. See, e.g., WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 22
(1989) (" 'A well-regulated militia' clearly negates any individual right to keep and bear
arms."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988)
(arguing that the "nearly unique inclusion of a purposive preamble" supports conclusion
that the Framers "'opted against leaving to the future the attribution of [other] pur-
poses'" to the Amendment (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95
(1980))); id. (concluding that "well regulated militia" language in the preamble makes
invocation of the Amendment against state or local gun control laws "extremely prob-
lematic"); Michael K. Beard & Kristin M. Rand, The Handgun Battle, 20 BILL OF RTS. J.
13, 13 (1987) (concluding that individual right idea is "a myth" perpetrated in large part
because the NRA "systematically deletes the phrase 'A well regulated militia being nec-
essary to the security of a free state'" (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II)); Herz, supra note
14, at 103-04 (arguing that gun lobby organizations "distort[] the constitutional text itself"
by referring to the right to keep and bear arms without reference to the qualifying lan-
guage that begins the Amendment).
74. Apart from those who use the initial clause of the Amendment as a kind of incan-
tation, there are those who use it to bolster extremely general, and largely undefended
(not to mention indefensible), historical claims. See, e.g., Harry Louis Seldon, The Militia
Amendment; It Says Nothing About the Rights of Individuals, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1993,
at C7 (referring to Second Amendment as "the militia amendment" and claiming that a
"careful" reading of the text reveals the Amendment's exclusive focus on the militia); id.
(asserting, without documentation or analysis of the Second Amendment's pre-
ratification history, that the Amendment was spurred by a 1780s "fear of a standing
army" and commitment to militia system of defense); Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Let the NRA
Go to Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1989, at A15 (stating that although "NRA literature
usually amputates or plays down [the] prefatory dependent clause," it is what "explains
the historic purpose of the Second Amendment"); id. (omitting the state constitutional
guarantees that anticipate the Second Amendment, but asserting that history reveals that
the "historic apprehension [of standing armies] was still fresh" and that the purpose of the
Second Amendment was "to ensure the survival of the state militias").
75. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 64, at 11. For useful commentary on the traditional
claim that "only the text itself" is the law, see Thomas B. McAffee, Reed Dickerson's
Originalism-What it Contributes to Contemporary Constitutional Debate, 16 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 617,625-30 (1992).
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Unique among the provisions of the Constitution, the Sec-
ond Amendment comes with its own mini-preamble, setting
forth its purpose: to foster a "well-regulated Militia." This
purpose has little to do with individuals possessing weapons
to be used against their neighbors; as a result, the Second
Amendment has not been interpreted by the courts to pro-
hibit regulation of private gun ownership. Nonetheless, in
an essay provocatively titled "The Embarrassing Second
Amendment," Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas
argues that because the enactment of the Second Amend-
ment took place during an era that valued armed citizens as
a civic republican bulwark against tyranny, it must be inter-
preted according to civic republican traditions. Levinson
may well be right that the Second Amendment was enacted
against a civic republican background that saw individual
gun-ownership as part of the "right of the people to keep
and bear Arms" that promotes a "well-regulated Militia."
But the Second Amendment did not enact the background
understanding. The only purpose it enacted is the one con-
tained in the text, for only its words are law. And in modem
circumstances, those words most plausibly may be read to
preserve a power of the state militias against abolition by
the federal government, not the asserted right of individuals
to possess all manner of lethal weapons.76
By its own terms, this argument proceeds along odd lines. It re-
lies upon the text establishing the militia as the focus of the
Amendment as a justification for failing to explore the probable in-
tended meaning of the other critical language in the Amendment's
text-the express grant of a right to keep and bear arms to "the peo-
ple."' Don Kates has argued powerfully that, in the context of the
balance of the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment's recognition
of a right vested in the "the people" strongly supports an individual
right, rather than a state right, interpretation. 8 Tribe and Doff do
76. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 64, at 11 (footnotes omitted).
77. As Sanford Levinson has remarked, "[e]ven if we accept the preamble as signifi-
cant, we must still try to figure out what might be suggested by guaranteeing to 'the
people the right to keep and bear arms.'" Levinson, supra note 3, at 645.
78. See Kates, supra note 6, at 218 (observing that to transform "the people" refer-
enced in the Second Amendment to "the states," one must assume that the phrase has a
radically different meaning in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments than in
the Second, and that the Framers distinguished between "the people" and "the states" in
the Tenth Amendment, but used the former to mean the latter in the Second); accord
Levinson, supra note 3, at 645 (claiming that "the people" refers to" 'sovereign citizenry'
collectively organized" is an argument that "founders... upon examination of the text of
the federal Bill of Rights itself"); MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 162 (similar observation);
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not address the relevance of these reinforcing texts, let alone the his-
torical arguments that the Amendment's reference to "the people"
reflects a history relating to an individual right to have arms.79 What
started out, then, as an argument in favor of what is "contained in the
text," as against a mere background understanding, winds up as quick
justification for rewriting the balance of the text in order to privilege
a preferred reading based on "modem circumstances."' Moreover,
given that the right of the people to keep and bear arms had previ-
ously been guaranteed, both in the English Bill of Rights, s" and in
several state declarations of rights," and thus had served as a popular
cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,287 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing in a Fourth Amendment case that "the term 'the people' is better understood as
a rhetorical counterpart to 'the Government,' such that rights that were reserved to 'the
people' were to protect all those subject to 'the Government' "); id (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (equating" 'the people' "with" 'the governed' ").
79. For treatments of the English portion of that history, see HALBROOK, THAT
EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 43-54; MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 113-34; see
also supra note 66 and accompanying text (citing 1689 English Bill of Rights which guar-
anteed the private right to arms). The experience of American colonists, as well as the
constitutions of the states, with this same right to have arms, is treated in MALCOLM,
supra note 6, at 138-50. For a treatment of the relevance of that history to the interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment, see infra notes 163-241 and accompanying text. If this
legal and constitutional history explains the choice of language in the Right to Arms
Clause, it bears directly on what the language employed meant to both the adopters of the
Second Amendment and the audience to whom it was communicated; this sort of history
extends beyond any meaningful conception of a background understanding that might (or
might not) shape the drafting or comprehension of a text. See supra notes 74-75 and ac-
companying text.
80. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 64, at 11. In fact, Tribe and Dorf acknowledge that
the Framers may have seen "individual gun-ownership as part of the 'right of the people
to keep and bear Arms' that promotes a 'well regulated Militia,' "but view this as a back-
ground understanding because of the idea's non-textual, "civic republican" roots. lId But
it is inconsistent to admit that, in light of widely shared assumptions, "the people" was
understood to refer to individuals when that language was employed, but then to dismiss
this meaning of the words as mere background understanding that can be ignored. See
supra note 78. For a useful general commentary on this sort of interpretive stance, which
claims fidelity to bare text while eschewing interest in how it was actually understood by
its adopters and a relevant legislative audience, see Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind,
88 MICH. L. REV. 104 passim (1989). If giving the text primacy is in furtherance of our
goal to interpret, and not to write, a Constitution, as these authors suggest, see TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 64, at 14, we should privilege the plain meaning of the text to those who
employed it over both mere background assumptions and preferred readings based on
modern circumstances.
81. See supra note 66. For treatment of the significance of the English Bill of Rights
in construing the Second Amendment, see infra notes 163-99 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII (1780), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1888, 1892 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter STATE
CONSTITUTIONS] ("The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defence."). For treatment of the state constitutional provisions, see infra notes 200-41
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limit on colonial and state governments,8 most textualist canons of
construction would acknowledge that the provision ought to be read
in para materia with these related provisions.' The most obvious
question suggested by these earlier texts is whether it seems plausible
that a guarantee so obviously derived from these state counterparts
would have been uniquely designed only "to preserve a power of the
state militias against abolition by the federal government. '  What
did these analogous guarantees mean as against state governments? 6
Particularly when conceived as a right against state government, the
right to "keep and bear" arms seems to be an empty shell if it in-
cludes, for example, only the right to employ a firearm while actually
serving in the militia, but not a right to hold it privately. Under such
and accompanying text.
83. The meaning and scope of these earlier guarantees are themselves the subject of
heated debate in the Second Amendment literature. See infra notes 210-39 and accompa-
nying text. No one disputes that they served as limits on colonial and state governments.
84. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
105 (1975).
85. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 64, at 11. No thoughtful commentator questions that
the guarantee and its counterparts in the Bill of Rights served originally to limit only the
federal government. But Tribe and Dorf follow the lead of commentators who have sug-
gested that it is the power of the states to maintain militias that is uniquely secured by the
Amendment, rather than any meaningful right of "the people" as distinguished from the
states. See, e.g., Henigan, supra note 16, at 108 (summarizing view that the Second
Amendment was adopted to assure the continuation and effectiveness of the state militias
and hence serves only to limit laws that interfere with the arming of state militias); id. at
112 & n.23 (stating that since an important purpose of the Amendment is "to defend the
state as an entity of government," it would be "paradoxical to apply the Amendment to
limit the power of state government" via incorporation through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). But see Williams, supra note 24, at 577 (contending that republicans saw the
militia as a check on state as well as federal governments and noting that "state constitu-
tions, too, contained right to arms provisions" and concluding that "apart from its
association with local governments" that "the militia promised virtuous control of force").
86. As with other "states' right" commentators, Tribe and Dorf make no attempt to
confront what substantially identical language would have meant in a context in which
structural issues concerning the power of the federal government vis-a-vis the states could
not have been involved. The right of "the people" of Massachusetts to "keep and bear
arms," as guaranteed by their state constitution, see MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII, re-
printed in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 82, at 1892, could hardly have been
intended to secure only the right of the state to continue to operate a state militia.
Against whom would the right have operated? Tribe's and Dorf's apparent adoption of
the states' right understanding of the Second Amendment adds a special sort of irony to
their treatment. Tribe and Dorf began their analysis by claiming to privilege adopted text
over unadopted background understandings. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text. But it is well known that the notion that the sole purpose of the Second Amendment
was to protect the rights of states to maintain effective militias originated as a theory of
how the Amendment grew out of the ratification-period debate over the militia provisions
contained in the originally proposed constitution. See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 27, at 21-31. For analysis of the relevance of the debate over the Constitution's mili-
tia provisions to the Second Amendment, see infra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
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a construction, the state might constitutionally disarm the people,
and emasculate the protection to liberty that many thought the mili-
tia provided, merely by prohibiting private ownership of weapons
and then choosing not to call the militia to dutyY
If the second clause of the Second Amendment seems to cut in
favor of a personal, as well as a collective, right to possess private
firearms, the first clause need not be read to point the other way. As
even Tribe and Doff effectively acknowledge, the existence of an
armed people from which to draw the militia, a people guaranteed
the right to hold private arms, could have been seen as a key to fos-
tering the militia envisioned by the Militia Clause." In fact, classical
republican rhetoric relating to the militia contemplates an ideal of
universal service and an underlying assumption of an armed citi-
zenry. 
9
Before we conclude that the stated goal of "security of a free
State" suggests a very narrow end to which the Amendment was di-
87. Indeed, if the right is read as at most guaranteeing the right of militiamen to carry
weapons as part of their official duties, cf. Herz, supra note 14, at 65-67 (construing the
Second Amendment), the state could accomplish the goal of preventing popular opposi-
tion to oppression (fear of which was a core reason for valuing the militia) by simply
disbanding the militia completely. After all, the Second Amendment Militia Clause by its
terms merely declares a preference for militias, implicitly as contrasted to reliance upon
standing armies in peacetime, but does not require government to actually sponsor a mili-
tia nor prohibit it from discontinuing the practice. A leading nineteenth-century
constitutional commentator, Thomas Cooley, wrote that "if the right [to keep and bear
arms] were [sic] limited to those enrolled [in the militia], the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the government it was
meant to hold in check." THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 298 (3d ed. 1898).
88. See supra note 80 (pointing to acknowledgment by Tribe and Doff that individual
gun-ownership was seen during the founding era as part of the right to arms "that pro-
motes a 'well regulated Militia' "). William Van Alstyne has suggested:
[The] very assumption of the [Militia Clause] is that ordinary citizens (rather
than merely soldiers, or merely the police) may themselves possess arms, for it is
from these ordinary citizens, who as citizens have a right to keep and bear arms
(as the second clause provides), that such a well regulated militia as a state may
provide for, is itself to be drawn.
Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1242. By contrast, as Malcolm has remarked: "[I]t would
seem redundant to specify that members of a militia had the right to be armed. A militia
could scarcely function otherwise." MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 163.
89. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 24, at 577-79. Williams's review of classical repub-
lican thought as favoring a universal militia, an orthodoxy that is documented in his work
as influencing the adoption of the Second Amendment, demonstrates the basic irrele-
vance of the modern scholarly debate about the nature and composition of the state
militias circa 1787. The Second Amendment reflects a commitment to the ideal of a uni-
versal militia and an armed citizenry, and this oft-articulated ideal is more relevant to
understanding the original meaning of the Amendment than any body of evidence about
the actual functioning of state militias at the time of the founding.
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rected,'o we ought to be fairly sure that we know what that phrase
means. Does this text suggest that the primary goal is the security of
the political entities known as the states,91 or perhaps "the govern-
ment" in general, meaning both the federal and state governments?'
Or, given the provision's location within the Bill of Rights, ought we
to consider that the real emphasis was on securing a "free State," with
the corresponding implication that the end to be achieved is freedom
as much as it is security or government?9" The emphasis belongs on
freedom more than on the state, inasmuch as government itself was
viewed under prevailing social contract theory as the agent of a free
and sovereign people and as a tool for securing personal and collec-
tive freedom and rights." Founding-era Americans, moreover, who
90. See Henigan, supra note 16, at 112-13.
91. See id. at 112 (concluding that "[p]resumably, the term 'free state' is a reference
to the states as entities of governmental authority").
92. Considering that Article I grants Congress the power to call forth the state mili-
tias, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, and the state militia's value was contrasted to the
perceived evils of standing armies, the security of the nation as a whole was a necessary
goal of the militias. Compare Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 33 n.214 (stating view
that the Antifederalists who were most responsible for the Second Amendment would not
have wanted it "implied that the Amendment was concerned with the defense of the na-
tion as a whole"), with The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania Minority Report], reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 618,623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] (showing Antifederalist minority advocating a
proposed amendment providing that "the people have a right to bear arms for the defense
of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game"
(emphasis added)). Produced originally under the general editorship of Merrill Jensen,
this critical multi-volume resource is now edited by John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J.
Saladino.
93. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1244 (observing that the Second Amendment
refers to the security of a "'free State'" rather than "the security of THE STATE," in
contrast to "certain national constitutions that put a privileged emphasis on the security
of 'the state' "); id. (stating that such provisions do not appear in a bill of rights nor in-
clude language suggesting any right to arms "apart from state service" because such a
recognition "might well pose a threat to the security of 'the state'" (footnotes omitted)).
But cf. Henigan, supra note 16, at 112 (suggesting that the Second Amendment does not
purport "to express distrust of state governmental power, and to create a right to be
armed against abuses of that power," but rather "elevate[s] the defense of state govern-
ment to a constitutionally protected value" (footnote omitted)).
94. See, e.g., VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 3 (1776), reprinted in 7 STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, supra note 82, at 3812, 3813 ("That government is, or ought to be, instituted
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or communit[y].");
MERCY WAMEN, A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT (1788), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 272, 278 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saldino eds., 1986) (quoting oft-cited statement of Blackstone that "the prin-
cipal aim of society is to protect individuals in the absolute rights which were vested in
them by the immediate laws of nature").
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fought to preserve their liberty, would have been uninterested in any
"security" that did not include security against tyranny."
If we place the focus on freedom as much as on government, we
see that the text itself reflects that the militia was highly regarded not
only because of its potential role in confronting external threats or
widespread lawlessness (e.g., a Shay's Rebellion), but also because of
the part it might play in confronting any attempt to impose despotic
government.96 Further, a right to a militia as a popular guarantee of
freedom would be a chimera if a tyrant's goal could be realized by the
simple expedients of requiring the storing of all militia arms in a cen-
tral, government-controlled location and the prohibition of private
gun ownership." It might then be clear that it was no accident that
95. Indeed, even the term "security" itself held connotations related to freedom for
Americans of the founding era. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN
THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 68-70, 91 (1988). Americans believed that
government was properly judged by a sovereign people in terms of whether it protected
or threatened individual and collective security, understood broadly, and this notion was
ingrained in them from their English constitutional and revolutionary heritage. See id
John Phillip Reid observes that the rights of "free" Englishmen were traditionally defined
in contrast with what was deemed the opposite condition of slavery. See id. at 91. An-
other opposition to slavery was that of "security," which referred to the protection the
people received when government acted fairly, and in accordance with the principles of
due process, rather than arbitrarily. See id at 85-87. Thus, in 1775 the New York Gen-
eral Assembly objected to British claims of unlimited authority over the colonies on the
ground that "a power of so unbounded an extent" would "totally deprive us of security,
and reduce us to a state of the most abject servitude." ld. at 85-86 (quoting Memorial
from New York General Assembly to House of Lords, Mar. 25, 1775, in 1 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES 1316 (Peter Force ed., 1837)). To eighteenth-century Americans, the
"security" of a free state would have suggested security against oppressive government as
much as against foreign invaders or lawless mobs.
96. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1890 (1833) (describing the militia as "the natural defence of a free country,"
not only against "foreign invasions" and "domestic insurrections," but also against
"domestic usurpations of power by rulers"). One of the most effective advocates of the
militia-grounded view of the right to arms, Lawrence Cress, refers to the founding genera-
tion's view of "the citizen militia's collective role as the protector of personal liberty and
constitutional stability against ambitious tyrants and uncontrolled mobs." Cress, supra
note 16, at 30. If the Second Amendment guarantees an armed citizenry to promote the
viability of the militia so that it might play this role for the national government, as even
Henigan seems to acknowledge, see Henigan, supra note 16, at 121 (noting that Madison
viewed state militias "as a military counterpoint to the power of the regular standing
army"), it would seem apparent that the analogous guarantees of the state constitutions
imply that the militia was intended to play a similar role as to the governments of the
states. This, in turn, suggests that the federal provision cannot properly be construed as
only a structural guarantee in favor of the states.
97. But cf. Seldon, supra note 74, at C7 (arguing that the Amendment had the limited
purpose of assuring continuation of state militias comprised of citizens with a duty to bear
arms under state militia laws; concluding, however, that now that "the state militias have
become the National Guard," and members are not required to provide their own arms,
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the right embodied in the second clause of the Second Amendment
was written in favor of "the people" rather than in favor of
"militiamen performing militia duties" or in favor of state govern-
ments.
If we capture the language describing the goal as "the security of
a free State" through the wider lens of the people's interest in free-
dom, we might also begin to see that the goal of collective security
furthered by the militia and the right to arms went beyond what to-
day we think of as military duties, with a sole focus on securing the
people against external and large-scale threats. In the generations
preceding the founding era, citizens had a duty to be armed to lend
support to collective security through occasional militia service, as
well as in ways we would recognize today as police rather than as
military functions. 8 Surprisingly enough, for many modern Ameri-
cans, acts that today might be seen as protected by a privilege of self-
defense or defense of others, were viewed in the founding era as the
performance of duties of citizenship as much as they were the exer-
cise of a privilege." The variety of roles served by the armed citizen
militiamen, roles in which their efforts were often supplemented by
citizens who were not formally eligible for militia service, reflect that
the goals served by the clauses of the Second Amendment included
the personal security of every member of society, for a society can be
called free only to the extent that it guarantees security to each of its
members.1'
The structural argument given above indicates that the Amend-
the Amendment is no longer related to idea of an armed citizenry). So one of the ac-
knowledged purposes of protecting militias themselves-securing the means of the
citizenry to resist oppression-goes by the board as a result of the simple historical devel-
opment of a new organizational scheme for arming the militia. Compare Seldon's
minimalization of the implications of this conclusion with the fears expressed by citizens
of Massachusetts as to this possibility being raised by the language proposed for a right to
arms provision in their 1780 constitution. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
98. See Kates, supra note 6, at 214-15. Kates contends that the historical militia is
properly seen as "a system under which virtually every male of military age was legally
required to possess his own arms for personal defense, crime prevention, and community
defense." Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143, 145 (1986) (footnote omitted). In any event, the purpose of having an armed
community of citizens clearly went beyond the modem military idea of collective defense.
See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common
Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285,291-92 (1983).
99. See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-
Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 91-93 (1992).
100. See supra notes 92-95 (describing the relationship between arms, "security," and
freedom); see also Kates, supra note 99, at 93-94 (describing the classical tendency to
equate arms both with the idea of a free citizen and with the development of the manly
virtues of the good republican).
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ment's language can be read as guaranteeing a private right to arms
even when we start with the premise that the Militia Clause functions
as a "mini-preamble" that orients the Amendment to fostering a mili-
tia. But the Militia Clause need not be read as limiting the
Amendment's arms guarantee in such a fashion. Although it appears
formally as an introductory clause, the Militia Clause is not de-
scribed, either in the text or in any contemporaneous source, as a
"mini-preamble" or a limiting clause. Moreover, neither the syntax
nor the text requires that it be read as a limitation on the right to
keep and bear arms.'' That a purpose served by the arms guarantee,
even a central purpose, is to promote the perpetuation of the militia
system need not imply that the militia system is the only end served
by that guarantee. To conclude otherwise based on text and syntax
alone is basically to rely on the reasoning underlying the common-
law maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which takes the nam-
ing of one thing to imply the exclusion of others.'" As with many
common-law rules of construction, the exclusio maxim is often a use-
ful cue to perceiving statutory design, as in the example of the
enumerated powers scheme of Article I of the Constitution." 3 At the
same time, leading authorities on statutory construction agree that
this doctrine is almost never self-applying and requires careful atten-
tion to the entire context of the provision in question to determine
whether the exclusio inference was intended. '°4 One reason for skep-
101. As David C. Williams put it, despite the "purpose clause" of the Second Amend-
ment, "based only on its language, the provision might ensure the right of arms for many
purposes." Williams, supra note 24, at 597 n.252 (citation omitted).
102. See DICKERSON, supra note 84, at 234-35 (describing this canon of construction).
103. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The idea that Congress is limited to the powers
granted, and that all other powers are reserved, is a reasonable inference from the lan-
guage of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which, prior to enumerating the powers
of Congress under the Constitution, states, "The Congress shall have Power ..... Id.
104. See DICKERSON, supra note 84, at 234-35 (observing that this canon is hardly a
"rule" at all, as it is sometimes suggested to be, and that "this maxim is at best a descrip-
tion after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context"). In the example of the
enumerated powers scheme of Article I, the application of the maxim receives strong
confirmation from both internal and external contexts. First, the last clause of this section
of the Constitution, the one we know as the Necessary and Proper Clause, further clarifies
that this is indeed the correct inference, as it purports to acknowledge the existence of
ancillary powers and defines the extent to which such powers may legitimately be exer-
cised. If the listing of powers was intended merely to exemplify or illustrate what was
intended to be a general set of national powers, rather than to define and limit the powers
to be exercised by the nation, there would be no reason to state the power to execute the
other named powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause thus states a negative restriction,
namely, that if an act of Congress does not bear the stated relationship to one of the enu-
merated powers, Congress will have acted beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority.
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ticism about the usefulness of the maxim is that the mentioning of
particular items in a text often reflects not a design to preclude oth-
ers, but only the fact that, for a variety of possible reasons, the
mentioned item was particularly before the mind of the drafters. 5
Placing these two clauses into a total context requires going be-
yond the text itself. There are, however, textual clues suggesting that
reliance upon the placement of these clauses alone would be prema-
ture, if not obviously fallacious. We are unaware, for example, of any
evidence suggesting that the Second Amendment was intended to
have a different meaning than the amendment proposed by the Vir-
ginia state ratifying convention, from which James Madison drafted
the Second Amendment. That proposal included both clauses of
what became the Second Amendment, but neither its language nor
structure suggest that the two clauses lack independent force.
Among other things, the two clauses are separated by semi-colons
and placed in reverse order from the order found in the final text of
the Amendment. 6 As stated there, the Right to Arms provision
Moving beyond the text, the enumeration of powers in the Constitution followed the
practice established in the Articles of Confederation, in which the exclusive powers of the
national government were enumerated. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX
(1777), reprinted in 1 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 86, 89
(listing powers); id. art. II, at 86 (stating explicitly that "[e]ach state retains its sover-
eignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled").
Finally, Madison and other key supporters of the Constitution clarified that this was the
intended design of Article I, § 8. See, e.g., THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 8,
1789, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 69, 85 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (quoting Madison's view that the proposed amendment
that correlates with the Tenth Amendment "may be considered as superfluous," but sug-
gesting that "there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow
that the fact is as stated").
105. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 349-50 (1993). Strikingly, a careful review of
the drafting process and legislative history of the Second Amendment reveals that the
desire to include a declaration of the value of the militia, while giving it a secondary status
to the legal guarantee embodied in the right to keep and bear arms, adequately explains
the drafting decision to employ the Militia Clause as an introduction to the Amendment.
See infra notes 263-97 and accompanying text. This history contradicts any idea that the
introductory clause was intended to serve as words of limitation on the right stated in the
balance of the text.
106. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text. The Virginia state proposal stated
in relevant part: "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regu-
lated Militia composed of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural
and safe defence of a free State." Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention
(June 27,1788), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 17, 19. Notice that
these quite separate clauses state the existence of a "right" and declare a principle of
government without specifying a prohibition on government power. The most important
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clearly is not limited to serving the end of ensuring the existence of a
militia. That the clauses were thought of as independent, if closely
related, provisions, is further suggested by the fact that the substance
of each of the two clauses was included, without any reference at all
to the other, in provisions found in predecessor state constitutional
provisions."7 At the very least, these additional textual clues, which
go unmentioned by those who, like Tribe and Dorf, place great
weight on the wording and placement of the two clauses, strongly
suggest the need to look more closely at both clauses and their rela-
tionship to each other, with the help of the context that the relevant
historical materials might provide.
B. What Does It Mean to "Keep and Bear" Arms?
Those who claim that the Second Amendment does not guaran-
tee any right to own and carry private arms also assert that their
understanding is built into the very terminology by which the right to
arms is described. A private individual might own or possess arms,
she might use or employ them, but only members of a militia "keep
and bear" arms, because the concept of "bearing" arms suggests a
military use."8 Accordingly, it is argued that even the clause guaran-
teeing a right to arms lends support to the idea that it is only in the
limited context of a "well-regulated militia" that the right obtains
meaning."' Critics of the right to private arms theory have thus pro-
vided multiple references to the historical use of "keep" and "bear"
in military settings as well as to the choice of other language in non-
military settings."0
It is highly probable that the Framers of relevant constitutional
provisions, including the Second Amendment, chose language that
associated the right to arms with citizen militias and collective de-
fense. This is natural enough, for government actions against the
right of the people to be armed had, in their historical knowledge and
shift of emphasis between the Virginia proposal and the Second Amendment is the clari-
fication of the Right to Arms Clause as at least a cautionary limitation on government
power "that shall not be infringed"-a shift that is not duplicated in the Militia Clause.
This shift may be one key to understanding the new emphasis on their connection, as well
as the reversal of the order in which the clauses are presented. See infra notes 282-86 and
accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text (treating the difference between
the "militia" and "arms" provisions in the states' constitutions).
108. See John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Ex-
perience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148, 148 (1971); Gary Wills, The Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, NEW YoRK REV., Sept. 21, 1995, at 64-65.
109. See Levin, supra note 108, at 148.
110. See id. at 149.
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experience, been targeted at preventing the people from being en-
abled to collectively defend their rights and liberties."' There had
never been a mass seizure of firearms in the American colonies (or
practically anywhere) to prevent their employment in purely private
acts of self-defense; there had been, on the other hand, seizures of
stocks of weapons, as well as of privately held weapons, in the at-
tempt to prevent effective resistance against English policies-
seizures that were resisted as blatant violations of the English Bill of
Rights.' But even if the right was framed as a right to "bear" arms
to reinforce that the right extended to arms to be employed in the
community's collective defense, this need not imply that the term
would have no application outside the actions of a formal militia. At
the very least, the popular resistance engaged in by the American
colonists often involved local militias, but it extended to virtually the
entire population; those not serving within the militia were equally
assertive of the claim of the English constitutional right to "have"
arms and to carry them as security for their own defense and the de-
fense of their communities.
There are, additionally, grounds to warrant careful consideration
of the right to "keep and bear" arms in the total historical context of
the right to arms, rather than purely by reference to evidence of us-
age in other settings. For one thing, the argument from the particular
words chosen to describe the right appears to cut both ways. Even if
the right to "bear" arms was restricted to the performance of militia
duties, the purpose of assuring the existence of a militia could have
been realized by guaranteeing only a right to "bear" arms; the right
111. As Theodore Schroeder observed, the core value of the guarantee of a right to
keep and bear arms is clearly security against government "because only governments
have ever disarmed any considerable class of people as a means toward their enslave-
ment." THEODORE SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 104 (reprint ed. 1969).
The Framers would have known this all too well, and in fact knew that the English right to
arms was responsive to the disarming en masse of English citizens so as to prevent resis-
tance to royal policies. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 144-46; Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroach-
ments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: Pre-Revolutionary Origins of the Second
Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91, 112-19 (1989).
113. For example, Malcolm observes that in 1769 a Massachusetts newspaper re-
sponded to the charge that a general call for the people to arm themselves was seditious
not only by invoking the English Bill of Rights, but by pointing to local laws that had re-
quired that every household be armed, not merely those containing individuals eligible for
militia service. See MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 144-45. Notwithstanding the importance
of the citizen militia in the ideology and rhetoric of the early Americans, the conception
of the right of collective defense, which was for them an extension of each citizen's right




to "keep" arms would seem to include at least a personal right to
have in one's control, as well as in one's home, the weapons one
might "bear" in support of the common defense.1 Arguably the ac-
knowledgment of a right to "keep" arms is suggestive of itself that
the right-bearer is to have a wide discretion to employ the arms for
lawful purposes."'
Moreover, despite the frequent linkage between "bearing" arms
and military service, it is clear that the term was not invariably used
as a term of art to refer solely to the employment of weapons in a
military setting. An early Virginia law required that "all men that are
fittinge to beare armes, shall bringe their pieces to the church uppon
payne of every offence.""1 6 It is important to underscore that this was
not a militia law, and that laws requiring the virtually universal hold-
ing and carrying of weapons were common in the colonies."7
Similarly, Stephen P. Halbrook has observed that in a 1785 game bill,
that was drafted by Jefferson and proposed by Madison in the Vir-
ginia Assembly, a violator of the bill's provisions was to be prohibited
to "bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing
military duty."'1 As Halbrook observes, this statement reflects that
bearing arms was not exclusively associated with performing militia
duties nor limited to a military context.1 9
114. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 108, at 153 (acknowledging that the right to "have"
arms was "an adjunct of the right of revolution" and citing Blackstone's treatment focus-
ing on the right to protect one's fundamental rights). To the extent that proponents of the
militia-grounded reading of the Amendment acknowledge that the guarantee extends a
right to all militiamen and not merely to the state government that organizes them, see
supra note 87, this acknowledgment would at the least call into doubt whether the right
extends only to using arms during brief occasions of active militia training or service. For
further commentary on the significance of the term "keep," in the context of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution in which it was first employed, see infra notes 236-37 and
accompanying text.
115. If nothing else, the infrequency with which militias engaged in any sort of formal
training exercises meant that, as a practical matter, militiamen were charged with be-
coming proficient in the use of firearms; so the private use of a firearm also could have
been seen as an act in furtherance of the individual's militia duty. For the practical con-
nection between private ownership of firearms and citizen militias, see CRAMER, supra
note 6, at 21-22.
116. MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 139 (quoting I THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 174 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823)).
117. See id. at 138-40.
118. Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the
Right to "Bear Arms," 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 153 (1986).
119. See id; see also HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 223
n.145 (referring to same example and concluding that "to Madison and his contemporar-
ies, to 'bear' an arm was to carry it in one's hands or on one's person for hunting, militia
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Perhaps most importantly, while the right to arms guaranteed by
the English Bill of Rights did not use either of the terms under dis-
cussion, but referred instead to the right to "have" arms," it appears
that Americans viewed that provision as acknowledging a broad right
to own and use weapons for lawful purposes and perceived the state
constitutional guarantees, cast in terms of the right to "bear" or to
"keep and bear" arms, as offering them comparable protection."' If
these historical claims are true, and if there is a continuity between
the guarantees of the state constitutions and the Second Amendment,
there is good reason to doubt that the language was employed in or-
der to describe a narrow right that extended only to arms employed
in formal militia service." We turn next to history to determine
whether the context of the adoption of the Second Amendment
service, or any other purpose"); id. at 219 n.92 (relying on definition of "bear" in 1828
Webster's Dictionary, written by well-known Federalist, Noah Webster, in which bearing
arms is referred to outside a military context). For an especially compelling counter-
example of the usage of the term "bear" in the context of the right to arms, see infra note
121 (describing proposed right to arms amendment of Pennsylvania ratification minority
that employs the term "bear" in the precise manner described by Halbrook).
120. See supra note 66.
121. The American understanding of the relationship between state declarations of
rights and the English Bill of Rights is developed fully in Part III-A-3. See infra notes
163-241 and accompanying text; see also PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XIII (1776), re-
printed in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 82, at 3081, 3083 (recognizing that "the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state"); Anthony
J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke from the Right to Bear Arms and the Second Amendment,
29 AKRON L. REv. 57, 86 (1995) (relying on the Pennsylvania provision as evidence that
Framers believed that one could "bear" arms in connection with self-defense). That im-
portant forces in Pennsylvania both understood their own tradition in this fashion and
employed the term "bear" quite broadly, is reflected in the minority report of the Penn-
sylvania Ratifying Convention, which demanded an amendment to the Constitution
guaranteeing the people's right "to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own
state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game." Pennsylvania Minority
Report, supra note 92, at 623-24 (emphasis added). This group of influential Antifeder-
alist spokesmen were obviously comfortable with the idea that one might "bear" arms in
connection with game hunting as well as in a military setting. For a more complete analy-
sis of related issues, see infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
122. While it is hardly a part of the formal legislative record of the Second Amend-
ment, it is at least striking in this context that a prominent Federalist, Tench Coxe, who
was closely connected to James Madison, stated in June of 1789, one week after Madison
introduced his proposed amendments in Congress, that the proposed arms guarantee
"confirmed" the people's right "to keep and bear their private arms." PHILADELPHIA
FED. GAZETE, June 18, 1789. Coxe's reference to "private arms" is suggestive that he
perceived no barrier between the language chosen to convey the right in question and the
idea that the right included a guarantee to private (and not merely militia) arms; refer-
ence to the term "bear" with purely "private arms" also suggests that he did not perceive
the term as limited to an organized military context. Such statements at the least suggest
the need for careful analysis of the historical context to determine the meaning most
probably intended by those who drafted and adopted the Second Amendment.
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might shed light on the issues raised by its text.
III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
When legal texts lend themselves to conflicting interpretations,
as they often do, a time-honored technique for shedding light on the
intended meaning is to consider the text in the light of what external
context reveals to be the purpose for which it was enacted. As for-
mulated in the oft-cited Heydon's Case,'" interpreters are to look for
the "mischief' to which the provision is addressed, or the "defect" in
existing law it was designed to correct, and the "remedy" that was
conceived to cure the mischief or defect. Then, in turn, they are to
interpret the text, if possible, so as to defeat the feared mischief and
advance the contemplated remedy. Such an analysis of the Second
Amendment may prove helpful to analyzing the conflicting claims
about the proper interpretation of the text.
A. The "Mischief" Giving Rise to the Second Amendment
There is an unusual amount of conflict as to the precise nature of
the concerns that led to the adoption of the Second Amendment."
At a high level of generality, all commentators agree that the Bill of
Rights in general addresses the widespread fear that the unamended
Constitution established an all-powerful national government.2' It is
also indisputable that the most compelling argument advanced
against the proposed Constitution was that it failed to provide ade-
quate security for the traditional, fundamental rights of the people in
the form of a declaration or bill of rights.'" Also in general terms,
commentators agree that the Second Amendment was at least a par-
tial response to concerns about the extent of military power granted
123. See 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584); see also CHARLES B. NuTrING & REED
DICKERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 449 (5th ed. 1978) (stating that
"knowing the evil at which the statute is directed is the most important key to meaning").
124. Compare Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 30 (concluding, based on review
of ratification-era debates, that the "'right to bear arms' concerned the ability of the
states to maintain an effective militia, not an individual right to keep weapons for any
purpose whatsoever"), with Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1245-46 (contending that ratifi-
cation-era debates support the conclusion that the Second Amendment was designed to
guarantee the previously established personal right to have firearms).
125. See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 19-20; Van Alstyne, supra note 6,
at 1245-46; Weatherup, supra note 47, at 984-85
126. For comment, see MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 157-58; Hardy, supra note 6, at 598;
Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1246-47.
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to the new government by the Constitution. 27 Here commentators
part company. Perhaps the most intriguing argument advanced
against the notion that the Second Amendment secures a private
right to arms is the assertion that the common-law and natural rights
foundations for such a private right are largely irrelevant because the
Amendment is so clearly the outgrowth of a ratification-period struc-
tural debate as to the division of authority between Congress and the
states with respect to control of the state militias.
1. The Limited Relevance of the Militia Provisions of the
Constitution
Advocates of a militia-only reading of the Second Amendment
have contended that its provisions are best understood as the product
of the ratification-era debate over the potential for abuse inherent in
the Constitution's militia provisions" that empowered Congress to
exercise control over the militias of the states.'29 Critics of the pro-
posed Constitution, known as Antifederalists, charged that the
Constitution's militia provisions would empower Congress to harm
the state militias by both neglect and abuse, including decisions to
withhold arms and supplies necessary for an effective militia.3 ' De-
spite assurances by Federalist defenders of the Constitution that
states retained adequate authority with respect to their militias, in-
cluding the authority to appoint militia officers,' and concurrent
authority to arm their own militias,' Antifederalist spokesmen de-
manded the inclusion of constitutional safeguards on behalf of the
militias and the states, including safeguards that would establish
127. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 155-59 (summarizing concerns expressed in
ratification-era debate, including fears expressed as to Congress's authority to establish a
standing army); Cress, supra note 16, at 32-36 (discussing the debate surrounding the
need to balance Congress's authority to establish an army with states' rights to maintain
citizen militias).
128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (providing power to call forth the militia); id. art.
I, § 8, cl. 16 (involving power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia); id. (relating to
the power to govern portion of militia "employed in the Service of the United States").
129. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 30; Weatherup, supra note 47, at 1000;
see also Cress, supra note 16, at 38 (stating that the purpose was to prohibit Congress
"from taking any action that might disarm or otherwise render the militia less effective").
130. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 35-36; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 26-
30.
131. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 181,185 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
132. See Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788) [hereinafter Virginia Debates],
in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 382-83, 419 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) [hereinafter
DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS].
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greater state authority over their own militias.33 Seeing the Second
Amendment as a unique outgrowth of this ratification-era debate as
to state versus congressional power over the militias, commentators
have contended that "the concern of the Second Amendment is
solely the distribution of military power between the states and the
federal government." '3
By contrast, those who defend the private right to arms reading
of the Second Amendment contend that the militia-centered ratifica-
tion debate must be seen against the backdrop of the general sorts of
concerns that had previously led state constitutional draftsmen to as-
sert the classical preference for citizen-based militias as the primary
defense of nations and to guarantee the right to bear arms. Accord-
ing to their view, the "defect" in the Constitution that led to the
adoption of the Second Amendment was its failure to include these
traditional rights of Englishmen as limits on a government that many
believed had been granted ample powers with which to threaten
those rights.135 To the extent that the debate over the militia provi-
sions of the Constitution is used to establish anything more than the
basis for concern that the Constitution threatened previously estab-
lished constitutional principles, reliance on it is misplaced.
Based on a straightforward analysis of relevant texts alone, it
seems clear that the relationship between the Second Amendment
and the debate over Congress's militia powers has been greatly exag-
gerated by commentators anxious to limit the Amendment's scope.
133. As one example, in perhaps the classic Antifederalist work, the author of Letters
from the Federal Farmer contended that the Constitution ought to secure a universal mili-
tia "and guard against a select militia, by providing that the militia shall always be kept
well organized, armed, and disciplined, and include, according to the past and general
usage of the states, all men capable of bearing arms." Letter from the Federal Farmer
(Jan. 25, 1788) [hereinafter Federal Farmer], in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
339, 341 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). He went on to suggest that "[a]s a farther check,
it may be proper to add, that the militia of any state shall not remain in the service of the
union, beyond a given period, without the express consent of the state legislature." d2 at
342; see also Cress, supra note 16, at 35 (summarizing various proposals to qualify or limit
Congress's authority to regulate the state militias).
134. Henigan, supra note 16, at 109 n.12; accord Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at
30 (stating that the" 'right to bear arms' concerned the ability of the states to maintain an
effective militia, not an individual right to keep weapons for any purpose whatsoever");
Weatherup, supra note 47, at 1000 (stating that the Second Amendment was "designed
solely to protect the states against the general government, not to create a personal right
which either state or federal authorities are bound to respect"); cf. Cress, supra note 16,
at 38 (placing less emphasis on state authority, but nevertheless stating that the purpose
of the Second Amendment was to limit Congress's regulatory authority over the militia
and stating that the purpose was to prohibit Congress "from taking any action that might
disarm or otherwise render the militia less effective").
135. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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As previously noted, the text of the Second Amendment is drawn
from language already included in several state declarations of
rights. '36 Advocates of a purely states' rights interpretation of the
Amendment have not attempted any explanation as to why a purely
structural limitation to preserve state power would have been drawn
from the pre-existing constitutional provisions that served to limit
state government. Ratification references to the right to arms appear
most often in proposed amendments to the Constitution alongside
traditional individual rights guarantees such as freedom of con-
science, the press, and the guarantee of juries in civil cases.137
Equally important, the demands that grew directly from fears
about the militia provisions of Article I were embodied in proposed
amendments to the Constitution, and these proposed amendments
were never adopted. 8 The Virginia experience is most representa-
tive, as that is where the debate over the militia provisions was most
fully developed.' The committee appointed by the state's ratifying
convention to draft proposed amendments presented the convention
with two distinct sets of amendments-one of which was called a
"Declaration or Bill of Rights," following the tradition of establishing
a separate document to state principles and to declare the rights re-
tained by the people, and the other of which was referred to simply as
"Amendments to the body of the Constitution."' 4 The Virginia state
proposal that both refers to the militia and that guarantees the peo-
ple the "right to keep and bear arms" is included within this proposed
136. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
137. Some opponents of the Constitution feared the loss of the right to arms because
they believed that Congress's regulatory power of the militias could lead to disarmament.
See, e.g., Luther Martin, Address No. 1 (Mar. 18, 1788), reprinted in 16 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 415, 419 (expressing fears that federal government
would disarm the people by manipulating the militias through the regulatory powers
given). But its express invocations came at the time that amendments to the Constitution
were proposed within the state conventions. See infra notes 263-81 and accompanying
text (describing proposed right to arms amendments).
138. See, e.g., Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 21, 28 (proposing to limit the author-
ity of Congress to require militia duty outside the states without state legislative
consent-a guarantee that would be difficult to infer from the Second Amendment). As
David C. Williams has noted, "[t]he militia is so central to republican thinking that it is
surprising that the proponents of the Amendment did not secure a constitutional mandate
for one." Williams, supra note 24, at 594. Indeed, he observes that Elbridge Gerry
moved that the Second Amendment proposal be revised "to mandate a federal duty to
assemble a militia, but his motion failed without a second and without discussion." Id.
(citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 751 (Joseph Goles ed., 1789)).
139. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 27.
140. See Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 106, at 17-21.
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bill of fights. On the other hand, an amendment proposed for the
body of the Constitution granted to each state "the power to provide
for organizing, arming and disciplining it's [sic] own Militia, whenso-
ever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same," and
specified particular limits on Congress's power over members of the
state militias. 4'
When James Madison, the principal author of the Bill of Rights,
drafted his proposed amendments, he drew upon the language Vir-
ginia proposed for a "Bill of Rights" and simply ignored the more
specific militia-related amendments it had advocated. Within his
proposed framework of inserting the amendments into the body of
the Constitution, Madison proposed to insert his "Second Amend-
ment" language in Article I, Section 9, in the middle of various
guarantees on behalf of traditional claims of individual rights.42 Not
perceiving himself as reallocating authority from the nation to the
states, or as redefining the basic terms of congressional regulatory
authority, Madison did not propose to insert any modifying language
into Article I, Section 8.' When more specific militia-related pro-
posals were offered during the deliberations in Congress, they were
141. Id. at 20. Ehrman and Henigan divide the militia-related Virginia proposals into
statements of "principle" and proposed amendments that "protected these principles."
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 30. Having thus linked the Virginia proposals to-
gether, and viewing both as an outgrowth of the debate over the Constitution's militia
provisions, they assure us that they were all proposed "in the context of whether the gov-
ernment would affirmatively provide arms for the militia." Id. at 31. But if the
implication of such analysis is that "[t]he 'right to bear arms' concerned the ability of the
states to maintain an effective militia," as they assert, id. at 30, it would mean that the two
proposed amendments were basically identical in substance.
142. See James Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 11, 12. Madison followed the pattern established by the state
proposals for amendments. Five states submitted arms guarantee proposals, the same
number as freedom of the press; and only three states submitted proposals for a guaran-
tee of free speech. See 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 983, 1167
tbl. (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. For additional
analysis of Madison's proposal, see infra notes 282-90 and accompanying text.
143. See David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of
Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 58 (1987). Congress eventually decided to place the amendments
at the end of the original document, but even in that setting the placement of the right to
keep and bear arms cuts sharply against the states' rights construction:
Were the Second Amendment a mere federalism ("States' rights") provision, as
it is not, it would assuredly appear in a place appropriate to that purpose (i.e.,
not in the same list with the First through the Eighth Amendments, but nearby
the Tenth Amendment), and it would doubtless reflect the same federalism style
as the Tenth Amendment; for example, it might read: "Congress shall make no
law impairing the right of each state to maintain such well regulated militia as it
may deem necessary to its security as a free state."
Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1243 n.19.
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rejected."4 Despite modem claims to the contrary, the Amendment
does not by its terms guarantee that a militia Will be maintained or
that the national government holds a duty to maintain the universal,
or general, state militias as they existed in 1787.14
Beyond the relevant texts, the general history lends support to
the conclusion that the Second Amendment was not drafted to re-
store power to the states or to recast Congress's militia powers. To
begin with, the debate over the militia provisions in the Constitution
involved important substantive disagreement as to the powers that
could safely be entrusted to Congress. The Federalists not only de-
fended the power given to Congress to control the militias, but
contended that national power to effectively utilize the states' militias
was itself an important device for avoiding the necessity of a large
standing army in peacetime-something many at all ends of the po-
litical spectrum appeared to prefer.Y6 While the Federalists would
not have conceded that Congress's powers would extend to disarming
the American people as Antifederalists feared 47-- they were ulti-
144. See, e.g., Roger Sherman's Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 266, 267. (proposing that militias be
governed by the states subject only to uniform rules of "organization and discipline"
(proposal never left House committee)); Additional Articles of Amendment (Sept. 8,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 42, 44 (proposing to grant
power to states to organize, arm, and discipline militias in event of congressional neglect
and to impose some limits on congressional power over militias).
145. In fact, an Antifederalist critic of the proposed amendment observed that "this
article only makes the observation that a 'well regulated militia, composed of the body of
the people, is the best security of a free state;' it does not ordain, or constitutionally pro-
vide for, the establishment of one." Williams, supra note 24, at 595 n.241 (quoting
Centinel, Revived, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, No. XXIX, Sept. 9, 1789, at 2). In fair-
ness, it might have been debated as an original matter whether Congress holds the power
to establish a select militia along the lines of the modern National Guard. According. to
the Federalists, moreover, the states could both assert the power to establish universal
militias and supply any deficit in federal support for the militias, and these assumptions
probably led Madison to conclude that a specific guarantee of state power was simply
unnecessary. But the Second Amendment does not appear to speak to either question.
146. See Virginia Debates, supra note 132, at 381. The Federalist argument that pres-
ervation of the state militias would be the key to avoiding large standing armies reflected
that they had deliberately granted to Congress the power to establish standing armies in
peacetime. Despite their commitment to the militia system, the Constitution's supporters
were not persuaded that a citizen militia could meet the defense needs of the nation as it
expanded. For an overview, see MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 151-55.
147. Ironically enough, while proponents of the "states' rights" reading insist that the
expressed concerns about disarming the people related solely to the states' authority to
ensure arms for their militias, see supra note 85, in fact, Antifederalists often expressed
the fear as moving in the opposite direction: Congress's broad regulatory power over the
militias would enable it to create a select militia and then, in turn, to disarm the general
citizenry, to the detriment of liberty and the idea of a popular check on government. See,
e.g., 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 509 (John Smilie, Dec. 6,
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mately willing to reaffirm the basic right to arms-but they would not
have agreed to an amendment that they perceived as modifying Con-
gress's authority over the state militias in any significant way, and the
Second Amendment by its terms does not purport to give authority
over the militias back to the states. '4 What it does purport to do is to
reaffirm the value of militias and to secure to "the people" their right
to "keep and bear arms," paralleling closely the state constitutional
guarantees that had been designed to secure what Americans viewed
as among the fundamental rights they had held as Englishmen.
2. The Relevance of the Omission of a Bill of Rights
As suggested above, it was not the debate over Congress's militia
powers that led to the adoption of the Second Amendment. Rather,
1787, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention) (warning that Congress would have power to
"give us a select militia which will, in fact, be a standing army--or Congress, afraid of a
general militia, may say there shall be no militia at all;" and, worse yet, with a select mili-
tia formed, "the people in general may be disarmed"). The irony, of course, is that while
the republican-minded Antifederalists valued the universal militia precisely because of its
linkage to the idea of an armed citizenry, the modem states' rights understanding of the
Second Amendment reverses this priority by shifting the emphasis almost exclusively to
the militia precisely to make the rights of the people to arms a dead letter.
148. The conflicting views of the Federalist proponents of the Constitution, and their
Antifederalist opponents, as to Congress's powers both to create a standing army and to
control the state militias, reflects a general theme of their conflict over the merits of the
Constitution. The Federalists were committed to the necessity of strengthening the fed-
eral government and in general perceived that the dangers of empowering government
were outweighed by the benefits to be accrued and the risks associated with failing to
empower government to perform essential functions. See, e.g., Letter of George Wash-
ington to Bushrod Washington, in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
92, at 152, 154 (Nov. 10, 1787) (stating that he had "never yet been able to discover the
propriety of placing it absolutely out of the power of men to render essential Services,
because a possibility remains of their doing ill"); James Iredell, Address to the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788) [hereinafter N.C. Debates], in 4 DEBATES
IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 132, at 1, 95 (arguing that "[n]o power, of any
kind or degree, can be given but what may be abused" and that keys are to "consider
whether any particular power is absolutely necessary" and to recognize that "possible
abuses [of powers] ought not to be pointed out, without at the same time considering their
use"). By contrast, the Antifederalists were wary of government power, and most espe-
cially of centralized power. They believed that the Constitution's proponents were too
anxious to delegate power to the national government and too little concerned with pre-
serving local and popular rights. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, supra note 133, at 329
("[M]any of us are quite disposed to barter [our freedom] away for what we call energy,
coercion, and some other terms we use as vaguely as that of liberty."); Mentor, PE-
TERSBURG VIRGINIA GAZETTE (Apr. 3, 1788), reprinted in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 578, 579 (querying that given the powers granted and
justifications offered, "are we not to think that our rights and liberties, our instruction and
welfare, are no longer leading objects in the eyes of those we have set over us"). The
decision to add amendments constituting a bill of rights did not reflect any general healing
of these basic differences of perspective.
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as with the other individual rights guarantees included in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution, the Second Amendment
stemmed from a general fear that the national government was em-
powered by the Constitution to invade well-established rights of
importance to the people. Advocates of the states' rights reading of
the Second Amendment focus their attention on the Virginia Rati-
fying Convention's debate over the militia provisions of Article V. u
But the debate in Virginia with the clearest connection to the
amendments drafted by James Madison was the one concerning the
necessity and propriety of setting forth a comprehensive statement of
the people's rights in a bill of rights. The Antifederalists agreed with
Patrick Henry that a bill of rights was critical because "all rights not
expressly and unequivocally reserved to the people are impliedly and
incidentally relinquished to rulers, as necessarily inseparable from
the delegated powers."m Relying on this logic, Antifederalists con-
cluded that all of the people's fundamental rights, except the small
number already set forth in the Constitution's text, would be for-
feited to the federal government unless a bill of rights was added to
the Constitution.
Federalists, on the other hand, argued that the Antifederalist
logic requiring a comprehensive bill of rights was applicable only to
the constitutions of the states because the state legislatures held gen-
eral legislative power from which any right must be carved as an
exception.'" By contrast, they argued, the national legislature cre-
ated by the Constitution had been granted only enumerated powers
and did not possess, as an original matter, the power to invade fun-
damental rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the
press."' One reason this debate was virtually unresolvable was that
149. See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 27-28. For a critique of their reli-
ance on this Virginia debate as the precursor to the Second Amendment, see supra notes
139-45 and accompanying text.
150. Virginia Debates, supra note 132, at 445.
151. In the words of George Nicholas, responding to Patrick Henry and others, the
Antifederalist logic held as to the legislatures of the states only because they possessed a
"general power of legislation." Id. at 451. Nicholas's response repeated the standard
answer to the Antifederalist logic. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in
Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 92, at 337, 339 (arguing that under state constitutions the people "invested their rep-
resentatives with every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve");
N.C. Debates, supra note 148, at 149 (contending that if the Framers "had formed a gen-
eral legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would not only have been proper,
but necessary; and it would have then operated as an exception to the legislative authority
in such particulars").
152. In Virginia, Nicholas argued that Congress held only "a special power of legisla-
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the disagreement turned not only on differences in general theory,
but also on differing assessments as to the probable scope of the
powers actually granted to the national government.153
There was only one way that the Virginia Convention could
reach consensus on the bill of rights issue-to agree to propose
amendments to the Constitution without purporting to determine in
any given case whether the guarantee stated an essential limit on the
powers delegated by the Constitution or was merely a cautionary
provision designed to reassure those concerned about the potential
reach of national power."M This essentially "agnostic" stance as to the
necessity of including apparent exceptions to federal power enabled
all parties to agree to recommending amendments, while at the same
time answering a Federalist objection that the inclusion of non-
tion," by virtue of the limited grants of power delegated by Article I, and thus "does not
contain that plenitude of power" that demands the inclusion of the limiting clauses of a
bill of rights. George Nicholas, Address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14,
1788), in Virginia Debates, supra note 132, at 451. Once again, this argument tracked
with standard Federalist defenses of the omission of a bill of rights. See, e.g., James Wil-
son, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia, supra note 151, at 339 (arguing that
"congressional authority is to be collected.., from the positive grant expressed in the
instrument of union" and consequently "every thing which is not given, is reserved");
N.C. Debates, supra note 148, at 149 (stating that where a legislature's powers are "of a
particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the case of the Constitution before us,... a
bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be absurd and dangerous").
153. For a more comprehensive summary of the somewhat theoretical debate over the
necessity of a bill of rights as to a government of enumerated powers, see Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1228-
33 (1990). The basic problem was that the Federalist defense of the Constitution's omis-
sion of a bill of rights rested on an analogy to the equivalent omission of a bill of rights
from the Articles of Confederation, with its limited delegation of powers to the national
government. See id. at 1243. But the Constitution's critics perceived the differences be-
tween the proposed Constitution and the Articles as being critical, for the Constitution
granted broadly worded new powers to the national government, powers that would op-
erate directly on the citizenry rather than merely on the states, and omitted the Articles'
express provision that all the sovereign powers and rights not granted to the nation were
reserved to the states. See id. at 1243-44.
154. In fact, the Virginia proposal's resolution of the issue was anticipated several
months earlier by the perceptive Antifederalist, the Federal Farmer. In his famous work,
he first argued that the Federalist claims that enumerated powers adequately substituted
for a bill of rights were overstated, especially given the inclusion of limiting provisions,
such as the prohibition on granting titles of nobility. But even if such a provision did not
imply the existence of a power from which it was excepted, it suggested the value of an-
other kind of provision: "But this clause was in the confederation, and is said to be
introduced into the constitution from very great caution. Even a cautionary provision
implies a doubt, at least, that it is necessary; and if so in this case, clearly it is also alike
necessary in all similar ones." Federal Farmer, supra note 133, at 326. The Federal
Farmer suggested that any doubt ought to be resolved in favor of the inclusion of basic
rights; once the parties could agree that limiting provisions might be included as a cau-
tionary step, they could go forward with reassuring amendments without any party having
to concede their original position as to whether such provisions were strictly necessary.
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essential "limiting" clauses might create an inference of more expan-
sive national powers than actually intended by the Constitution.'
Once the parties resolved their disagreement about the necessity of
setting forth the fundamental rights of the people, consensus on a
number of basic rights would be the key to reaching agreement in the
process of amending the Constitution.
If anything is clear in the process by which the Bill of Rights was
adopted, it is that the Federalists in Congress were opposed to fun-
damental structural changes, but "were willing to accept amendments
which protected individual liberty and minority rights or explicitly
reaffirmed limitations on the national government that the federalists
believed were already in the Constitution of 1787. ' 1S6 Faithful to
these Federalist commitments, Madison went to lengths to ensure, as
he explained in correspondence, that "[tihe structure & stamina of
the Govt. are as little touched as possible," and that proposed
amendments would be limited to those "which are important in the
eyes of many and can be objectionable in those of none."'57 In prac-
tice, this meant that Madison chose from among the state proposals
the amendments that would "serve the double purpose of satisfying
the minds of well meaning opponents [of the Constitution], and of
providing additional guards in favour of liberty."'56
155. This basic agreement among the parties was stated expressly in the Virginia Con-
vention's proposed amendment that, after some revisions, would become the Ninth
Amendment: "That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain
powers, be not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to extend the powers of Congress;
but that they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this
shall be the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution." Virginia Ratifying
Convention (1788), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 142, at 766, 844.
For commentary on the significance of this proposal as a response to the overall course of
debate over the necessity of a bill of rights, see McAffee, supra note 153, at 1263-64.
156. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Amendments as a Declaration of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 351,352 (1992).
157. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 11
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 61, at 219,219.
158. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789). in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 61, at 404, 404. Madison indicated to Eve that the first Congress
should recommend "provisions for all essential rights." Id at 405; see also Finkelman,
supra note 156, at 367 (describing Madison's letter to Eve and the thought process behind
the Bill of Rights); Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J.
251, 258 (1992) (reviewing state proposals and Madison's proposed amendments). Lutz
observed that Madison
avoided any alteration in the institutions defined by the Constitution, largely ig-
nored specific prohibitions on national power, and opted instead for a list of
rights that would clearly connect with the preferences of state governments, but




Paul Finkelman has described in some detail the pattern by
which Madison and his Federalist counterparts in Congress system-
atically supported well-established individual rights guarantees while
rejecting proposed amendments that "'sounded in structure'" and
were viewed as posing a threat to the powers established by the Con-
stitution. ' Among his examples of structural amendments rejected
by the Federalists were those that "would have truly crippled the na-
tion's ability to conduct a military policy"-the amendments
staunchly supported by Antifederalists opposing standing armies and
preventing "the federal government from interfering with the state
militias. ' 'lW Finkelman contrasts this conflict over structural limits on
military powers with the guarantees now contained in the Second
Amendment-guarantees accepted by Federalists and Antifederalists
alike because they were viewed as protective of fundamental rights
rather than as altering the structure of authority established by the
Constitution.' The clauses of the Second Amendment, recognizing
the importance of militias and preserving the people's right to arms,
fit nicely within the framework of proposing well-established funda-
mental rights. 2 The limitations proposed as a result of Antifederalist
fears of Congress's militia powers, on the other hand, fell into the
group of amendments that Madison did not propose, and would not
have proposed, and which his allies in Congress defeated. While
these conclusions hardly establish that the Second Amendment in-
cludes a right to have private arms, they do suggest that the defect in
the law to which the Second Amendment was addressed was simply
the omission of these fundamental rights from the Constitution as
originally adopted. To understand what was at stake in the adoption
of the Second Amendment, it is thus essential to determine the role
its two clauses played in the state constitutions of the early American
Id. at 258.
159. Finkelman, supra note 156, at 368-78. Another historian, Joyce Malcolm, ob-
serves that Madison "deliberately proposed amendments that would not detract from
federal powers, among them a right for the citizenry to be armed." MALCOLM, supra
note 6, at 159.
160. Finkelman, supra note 156, at 373.
161. See id Finkelman's analysis should be taken as particularly compelling in light of
his general agreement with the view that the Second Amendment secures a collective
right to bear arms in the context of militia service, rather than a private right to own one's
own arms. See id. at 363 n.46.
162. Based on a painstaking comparison of all the documents in question, the political
scientist, Donald Lutz, concluded that in fact "[tjhe state constitutions and their respec-
tive bills of rights, not the amendments proposed by state ratifying conventions, are the
immediate source from which the U.S. Bill of Rights was derived." Lutz, supra note 158,
at 261.
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republic. It is these topics that the following subsections address.
3. "The Right to Keep and Bear Arms" That Was at Risk Under the
Unamended Constitution
As noted above, the right to arms had been expressly secured
within the texts of several state constitutions.'63 But despite claims to
the contrary,' 64 the key to understanding this right, and the state and
federal constitutional provisions securing it, is found in the American
heritage of English rights and the revolutionary-era commitment to
natural rights. It is critical, for example, to understand that the pro-
totype state constitutional guarantees of the right to arms were
adopted in the wake of British incursions on the right to arms that the
colonists viewed as both a legal and a natural right, as well as an im-
portant symbol of freedom-it was a topic, in short, that went to the
very center of their revolutionary struggle.'6
a. The Right to Arms Held by the American Colonists
There is a long-standing tradition of associating the right to keep
and bear arms with the analogous guarantee of the English Bill of
Rights.' 66 The tradition seems well-grounded, given that the Ameri-
can colonists continually invoked their English constitutional rights
during the revolutionary struggle, and the right to posses firearms
was among the rights invoked. In 1769, the Boston Evening Post, a
newspaper with a wide circulation, defended a general call to arms by
asserting that "the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recog-
nized by the Bill of Rights."' 67 A subsequent article asserted that
"'[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves,
confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their defence.' ,,16s
163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
165. The revolutionary generation would thus have agreed with Joseph Story's asser-
tion that "[t]he right of citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the
palladium of the liberties of a republic." 3 STORY, supra note 96, at 746.
166. See, e.g., Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243,249 (1846); 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 143 n.40 (1803).
167. MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 144-45 (quoting BOSTON EVENING POST, Feb. 6,
1769, reprinted in BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE 1768-1769, AS REVEALED IN A
JOURNAL OFTHE TIMES 61, 61 (Oliver Morton Dickerson ed., 1936)).
168. Id. at 145 (quoting NEW YORK J. SUPP., Apr. 13, 1769)). In 1772, Samuel Adams
included not only the traditional trilogy of "life, liberty, and property" as among the
"Natural Rights of the Colonists as Men," but also "'the right to support and defend
these in the best manner they can.'" Id. at 149 (quoting SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS
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On the very eve of revolution, North Carolina representatives to the
Continental Congress Richard Caswell, William Hooper, and Joseph
Hewes wrote to local "committees of safety" urging the people of
North Carolina to prepare for resistance and to form themselves into
a militia based upon "'the Right of every English subject to be pre-
pared with Weapons for his Defense.' ,,19
It is noteworthy that these examples of revolutionary-era state-
ments asserting the right to arms are stated three different ways-in
two instances the right is said to be held by "every English subject"
and by "the people" respectively, and, in the third instance, "the
privilege of possessing" arms is merely asserted to exist, without
clarifying precisely who holds the right. These forms of expression
reflect that the right was viewed as both a collective and an individual
right, and that this way of conceiving the right was itself part of the
English heritage.' In fact, the English guarantee, which states that
"'[slubjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence
suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law,' ,,.. is framed as
OF THE COLONISTS, reprinted in 7 OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS 417, 417 (1948)). For Adams,
the right to support and defend were "'deductions from the duty of self-preservation,
commonly called the first law of nature.'" Id; see also MASS. Decl. of Rts. XVII (1780)
(listing right of "defending their lives and liberties" and "protecting property" as among
the inalienable rights of people).
169. Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights:
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 VT. L. REv. 255, 280
(1985) (quoting Richard Caswell et al., To the Committees of the Several Towns and
Counties of the Province of North Carolina, NORTH CAROLINA GAZETrE (New Bern),
July 7, 1775, at 2, col. 3). Despite the reference to forming a militia, it is clear in context
that this was a general call to arms. The authors subsequently urged recipients to" 'be in
Readiness to defend yourselves against any Violence that may be exerted against your
Persons and Properties.'" Id (quoting Caswell et al., supra, at 2, col. 3). This representa-
tive statement is especially relevant because Richard Caswell and Joseph Hewes were
subsequently appointed to the committee to frame a bill of rights and constitution for the
state of North Carolina. Their understanding of the preexisting English right to arms
would almost certainly have influenced their drafting and understanding of the constitu-
tional right to arms. See id at 282-83; see also infra note 214 (noting the role of Caswell
and Hewes in the framing of North Carolina's bill of rights-one of the state bills of rights
that included the right to have arms).
170. The inclination to state the right as a collective right of the people may partly
have reflected the close connection between the exercise of the right to arms in prepara-
tion to resist illegal acts of oppression and the overall assertion of claims on behalf of the
sovereign people of the American colonies to control their own collective destiny. Even
more to our point, however, the insistence on referencing the right of "the people" almost
certainly reflects both the English and American experience with the controversy that
invariably arises when a collective right to have arms for the defense of popular rights
against government is asserted; a right to have arms for personal self-defense was less
controversial, especially in colonial America, than this sort of collective right.
171. Malcolm, supra note 98, at 307 (quoting Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of
the Subject and Seteling the Succession of the Crowne, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (Eng.)).
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a grant of right to an entire class of citizens (not expressly to indi-
viduals); yet it was understood in both England and America as
permitting each and every Protestant "to have Arms" for the defense
of self and community 2
The guarantee of arms in the English Bill of Rights grew directly
from wholesale attempts to disarm large numbers of citizens by both
Charles I and James II. Of most significance was James's efforts to
disarm Protestant subjects in an effort to strengthen the Crown and
the hand of Catholicism in England."" James both strengthened his
standing army and reorganized militia forces so that they would serve
the Crown's interests more loyally.174 With the military secured, the
Crown used the militia to embark on a massive program of disarming
potentially disloyal Protestants by a variety of legal schemes and ra-
tionales. 75 When the Convention of Parliament met in 1689 and
drafted the Bill of Rights as part of the settlement, whereby William
and Mary ascended to the Throne, one of the items on the agenda
was to affirm the right of Protestant citizenry to have arms as a check
against arbitrary power. 76 The final form of the guarantee promised
that "'the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their
Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law.' "'7
Advocates of a militia-only reading of the Second Amendment
have placed the right to arms guarantee of the English constitution in
the context of the closely-related opposition to standing armies and
the classical preference for citizen militias. Accordingly, they con-
tend that the language of the provision does not refer to an
"individual right" to have arms; instead, they read the provision as
though it included the sort of limiting language that they take the
Militia Clause of the Second Amendment to be. 7  These arguments
172. See MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 134, 142-43.
173. See id. at 50-52, 94-97, 100-06. One of the most potent weapons of disarmament,
ironically enough, was the Militia Act of 1662, which empowered militia officers to seize
arms from any person they believed to be "dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom." See
id. at 50. Particularly, the crown placed the militia directly under its own authority, and in
effect created a select militia that included only those most loyal to the crown; the militia
became a tool of oppression. See id.
174. See id. at 95-99.
175. See id. at 103-06.
176. See id- at 117-20.
177. Malcolm, supra note 98, at 307 (quoting Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of
the Subject and Seteling the Succession of the Crowne, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (Eng.)).
178. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 26 (contending that the provision "laid down the
right of a class of citizens, Protestants, to take part in the military affairs of the realm");
Weatherup, supra note 47, at 973-74 (construing the English right as conveying "no rec-
ognition of any personal right to bear arms on the part of subjects generally," but merely
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in the statements of members of the Revolutionary Convention as to
their grievance associated with the right to arms.' S Equally impor-
tant, however, is that the demand for specific references to a purpose
to secure the right of private self-defense, or of any other particular
use of arms, involves the fallacy of what Lon Fuller called "the
pointer theory of meaning." '189 According to this view, the way to de-
termine whether the right of citizens to have arms for "their defence"
included purely private self-defense is to discover whether the adopt-
ers of the provision held a picture in their mind of an individual
defending himself or his family against a robber or burglar. On the
other hand, if the pre-adoption discussion of the right focused on
collective security, including the dangers of oppression or invasion, it
is supposed that the "defence" for which arms were secured was lim-
ited to these immediate objects of concern.' But the meaning of
words is more general than assumed by this sort of thinking, and in-
terpreters should seek the intended general meaning of a legal text
they are to construe. 9' There is nothing in the historical context of
the English guarantee to suggest that private self-defense is so far
removed from the collective security concerns naturally raised by
mass disarming programs, or that a right to use arms in private self-
defense would have been viewed as so unacceptable, that the relevant
188. In the Convention debates "members expressed their outrage at the disarmament
of law-abiding subjects during the reigns of Charles and James." MALCOLM, supra note
6, at 115. In particular, one member objected that individuals had been disarmed and
imprisoned "under pretence" that they were "disturbing the Government." Id. at 116; see
also Hardy, supra note 143, at 21-22 (describing the debate). As Don Kates has observed,
much of this outrage reflected the desire for personal protection in a dangerous world.
See Kates, supra note 6, at 236 ("In an age as subject to apolitical crime and violence as
the seventeenth to eighteenth-century England, few people were courageous or foolhardy
enough to want to live without weapons to defend themselves and their families.").
189. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 84 (rev. ed. 1969). For useful dis-
cussion of the implications of Fuller's insight, see DICKERSON, supra note 84, at 76-77;
Patrick J. Kelley, Advice from the Consummate Draftsman: Reed Dickerson on Statutory
Interpretation, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 591, 604 (1992).
190. Notice that this sort of methodology involves a thinly disguised form of strict
construction that in practice "fails to implement the policy established by the statute or
constitution in favor of giving effect only to the specific, known intentions (read specifi-
cally intended applications) of the adopters." McAffee, supra note 75, at 647.
191. See discussion in sources cited supra note 189. Developing the same basic point
in discussing the interpretation of powers granted by the Constitution, William Van Al-
styne has observed that to discover "what the Founders believed to require the inclusion
of a given power among the enumerated powers of Congress ... is scarcely dispositive of
the different question respecting the breadth of the power thus given." William Van Al-
styne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 260 (1973). Put
another way, "the intended meaning of a provision is not necessarily limited to its con-
templated specific applications." McAffee, supra note 75, at 647.
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legislative audience would have tacitly assumed that the guarantee
would not extend beyond the needs of common defense."
In fact, the subsequent history points in the opposite direction.
During the course of the eighteenth century, the right of English
subjects to own and use firearms for all lawful purposes became well
established. During the American founding period, the recorder of
London, the city's legal advisor, stated in a legal opinion that it was
"'clear and undeniable'" that the Protestants' right to "'have arms
for their own defence'" included the right "'to use them for lawful
purposes.' ,,..3 The Recorder emphasized that this right was related
to the duty of "'all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear
arms ... to be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil
magistrates, in the execution of the laws and the preservation of pub-
lic peace.' ,,94 Taking it as virtually a given that the right to arms is
possessed "'individually,' " the recorder concluded that the right
"'may, and in many cases, must, be exercised collectively,'" and that
this was also established by relevant legal authority.95 Whatever the
intentions of those involved in the settlement of 1689, the historical
evidence supports the view that the American colonists believed that
they had a right as Englishmen to have arms for purposes of private
self-defense. 9 6 The most pervasive influence on their thinking as to
scope of the English right was almost certainly Blackstone's widely-
read Commentaries on the Laws of England."9 According to Black-
192. It is often recognized that "context conditions meaning, and context often serves
to cut down an otherwise overbroad literal meaning because the shared commitments of
the speaker and the intended audience make it possible to conclude that the legislature
could not have intended the broad statutory language to apply to X." Kelley, supra note
189, at 606. In this case, however, we know that the "common defense" at issue was
viewed by most thoughtful people as a mere extension of the general right of self-defense
held by each individual citizen. See Kates, supra note 99, at 89-93 (documenting views of
Montesquieu, Locke, and other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers on the fun-
damental nature of the right of self-defense). Furthermore, the Framers of the Bill of
Rights provision omitted the word "common" that might have suggested a collective de-
fense purpose. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
193. MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 134 (quoting WILLIAM BLIZZARD, DESULTORY
REFLECTION ON POLICE: WITH AN ESSAY ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES
AND AMENDING CRIMINALS 59-60 (1785)).
194. Id. (quoting BLIZZARD, supra note 193, at 59-60).
195. Id. (quoting BLIZZARD, supra note 193, at 59-60).
196. See supra note 166-69. Don Kates points out that if the English guarantee is re-
lated to American law, it undermines the notion of a states' rights understanding of the
Second Amendment: "There were no states in England to be protected against disarma-
ment. So what Parliament was complaining of could only have been the seizure of arms
from individual citizens in violation of their common law rights." Kates, supra note 6, at
238.
197. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765).
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are based on a misreading of the history and a misplaced logic in ex-
plicating the text.' 9
In her careful treatment, historian Joyce Malcolm observes that
the English right to arms was not about securing militias. Rather, it
grew in part from the use of the King's militia to confiscate firearms
from Protestant citizens as a means of preventing popular resistance
to royal prerogatives."' The guarantee was thus intended as a right of
all Protestants, not merely those who belonged to the militia. The
drafting history, moreover, lends additional force to the conclusion
that the guarantee was intended to secure an individual right. As
originally drafted, the guarantee was stated as an expansive right of
Protestants to "'provide and keep Arms for their common De-
fence,'" with the apparent implication of a collective right of the
citizenry to act in concert to gather arms for collective resistance."'
As the guarantee was revised during the process of negotiation, it
evolved into a somewhat less threatening, precisely because more
individualistic, right of all Protestants to "have" arms for "their De-
fence."" Malcolm concludes that these language changes "seem to
have marked a final shift away from private ownership of arms as a
political duty and toward a right to have arms for individual de-
fense.' 'l In short, the issue that caused some difficulty during the
process of consideration was not whether individuals would have the
right to hold arms-this was a given-but the extent to which the
wording should convey the idea of a collective citizenry empowered
to organize themselves for armed resistance.
Some have argued that the lack of evidence that people were
as granting members of the militia the right to "keep and bear arms in accordance with
their militia duties").
179. Referring to Weatherup's claim, see supra note 178, Malcolm observes that the
militia "isn't mentioned in the English right or in later justifications of it." Malcolm, su-
pra note 98, at 306. Nothing in the history reviewed above suggests that the events
leading to the English guarantee of a right to arms raised only concerns as to the right to
participate in a militia. The history surrounding the adoption of the guarantee lends fur-
ther support to the individual right interpretation. See infra notes 180-83 and
accompanying text. As to the claim that the militia-based reading of the English right is
based on misplaced logic in explicating the text, see infra notes 184-92.
180. See Malcolm, supra note 98, at 306; see also supra note 173 (describing use of the
Militia Act of 1662).
181. Malcolm, supra note 98, at 307 (quoting ANONYMOUS ACCOUNT OF THE
CONVENTION PROCEEDING (Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1688)).
182. MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 117-19.
183. Id. at 119. She thus observes that at least one prominent commentator saw the
revised language as "emasculat[ing]" the protection offered by the guarantee in shifting
the promise from saving the state to repelling burglars. See Ud (citing J.R. WESTERN,
MONARCHY AND REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH STATE IN THE 1680S, at 339 (1972)).
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concerned with purely personal self-defense confirms that the Eng-
lish guarantee was related to militia service rather than to a purely
private interest in arms."' As observed above in analyzing the text of
the Second Amendment,'8 to a large extent the point seems irrele-
vant inasmuch as the guarantee of a private right to have arms, even
when not engaged in formal militia service, would contribute to col-
lective security interests as well as the maintenance of an effective
militia system.6 The claim that a concern for issues of personal de-
fense was not evident is also question-begging, because the text's
guarantee of a right to have arms to Protestants for "their defence"
reads quite naturally to include private as well as collective defense-
especially considering that the word "common" was eliminated in the
final text of the provision." Moreover, concern about the threat
posed to personal security in being forcibly disarmed seems implicit
184. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 26 (supporting the conclusion that the right to
arms meant a right to participate in military affairs because "[n]owhere was an individ-
ual's right to arm in self-defense guaranteed"). Cress also draws an inference against a
private right to arms in the English Bill of Rights because the limitation was directed ex-
clusively at the monarchy and thus was expressly limited to arms "allowed by law." Id.
But this observation has little relevance to the current debate. While Malcolm and Hardy
document that the English right to arms was taken seriously by Parliament during the
eighteenth century, see MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 122-34; Hardy, supra note 143, at 22-
23, the more fundamental point is that Cress's observation is equally true of most of the
fundamental rights of Englishmen; indeed, the American founders contrasted their own
constitutional order from that of the British precisely on the ground that the American
system limited both the executive and legislative branches of government. See Statement
of James Madison (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at
77, 80 (observing that England has "gone no farther than to raise a barrier against the
power of the crown [while] the power of the legislature is left altogether indefinite").
Accordingly, none of the American arms guarantees, including the Second Amendment,
contain any similar qualification of the right to arms. See Kates, supra note 6, at 237-38 &
237 n.144 (observing that reliance on Parliamentary discretion at the time of the settle-
ment, or since, is to simply confound English and American constitutional systems).
Kates has also observed that Henry St. George Tucker, an important founding-era Vir-
ginian and prominent legal commentator, pointedly contrasted the broad guarantee of the
Second Amendment with the qualified right held by Englishmen. See id. at 237 n.144.
185. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
186. The role of an armed citizenry in collective defense is supported by evidence from
the Convention that produced the English Bill of Rights. Malcolm reports that a manu-
script of a speech apparently given by Thomas Erie, a veteran of several Parliaments,
shows that he proposed both the establishment of a formal militia comprised of men of at
least moderate means and a general arming of all established citizens of the community as
a further supplement to collective defense needs. See MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 116-17.
Moreover, even if collective defense concerns constituted the sole purpose for guaran-
teeing a right to private arms, it does not follow that the right would give no security to
other lawful uses of firearms; normally if a particular use of an arm were in itself lawful,
the only other question is whether the user had a right to possess the firearm in the first
place; the reason the right was given hardly matters. See id. at 117.
187. See supra note 181-82 and accompanying text.
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in the statements of members of the Revolutionary Convention as to
their grievance associated with the right to arms."s Equally impor-
tant, however, is that the demand for specific references to a purpose
to secure the right of private self-defense, or of any other particular
use of arms, involves the fallacy of what Lon Fuller called "the
pointer theory of meaning."1"9 According to this view, the way to de-
termine whether the right of citizens to have arms for "their defence"
included purely private self-defense is to discover whether the adopt-
ers of the provision held a picture in their mind of an individual
defending himself or his family against a robber or burglar. On the
other hand, if the pre-adoption discussion of the right focused on
collective security, including the dangers of oppression or invasion, it
is supposed that the "defence" for which arms were secured was lim-
ited to these immediate objects of concern."' But the meaning of
words is more general than assumed by this sort of thinking, and in-
terpreters should seek the intended general meaning of a legal text
they are to construe. 9' There is nothing in the historical context of
the English guarantee to suggest that private self-defense is so far
removed from the collective security concerns naturally raised by
mass disarming programs, or that a right to use arms in private self-
defense would have been viewed as so unacceptable, that the relevant
188. In the Convention debates "members expressed their outrage at the disarmament
of law-abiding subjects during the reigns of Charles and James." MALCOLM, supra note
6, at 115. In particular, one member objected that individuals had been disarmed and
imprisoned "under pretence" that they were "disturbing the Government." Id. at 116; see
also Hardy, supra note 143, at 21-22 (describing the debate). As Don Kates has observed,
much of this outrage reflected the desire for personal protection in a dangerous world.
See Kates, supra note 6, at 236 ("In an age as subject to apolitical crime and violence as
the seventeenth to eighteenth-century England, few people were courageous or foolhardy
enough to want to live without weapons to defend themselves and their families.").
189. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 84 (rev. ed. 1969). For useful dis-
cussion of the implications of Fuller's insight, see DICKERSON, supra note 84, at 76-77;
Patrick J. Kelley, Advice from the Consummate Draftsman: Reed Dickerson on Statutory
Interpretation, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 591,604 (1992).
190. Notice that this sort of methodology involves a thinly disguised form of strict
construction that in practice "fails to implement the policy established by the statute or
constitution in favor of giving effect only to the specific, known intentions (read specifi-
cally intended applications) of the adopters." McAffee, supra note 75, at 647.
191. See discussion in sources cited supra note 189. Developing the same basic point
in discussing the interpretation of powers granted by the Constitution, William Van Al-
styne has observed that to discover "what the Founders believed to require the inclusion
of a given power among the enumerated powers of Congress ... is scarcely dispositive of
the different question respecting the breadth of the power thus given." William Van Al-
styne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 229, 260 (1973). Put
another way, "the intended meaning of a provision is not necessarily limited to its con-
templated specific applications." McAffee, supra note 75, at 647.
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legislative audience would have tacitly assumed that the guarantee
would not extend beyond the needs of common defense."
In fact, the subsequent history points in the opposite direction.
During the course of the eighteenth century, the right of English
subjects to own and use firearms for all lawful purposes became well
established. During the American founding period, the recorder of
London, the city's legal advisor, stated in a legal opinion that it was
"'clear and undeniable'" that the Protestants' right to "'have arms
for their own defence'" included the right "'to use them for lawful
purposes.' ,..3 The Recorder emphasized that this right was related
to the duty of "'all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear
arms ... to be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil
magistrates, in the execution of the laws and the preservation of pub-
lie peace.' ,,194 Taking it as virtually a given that the right to arms is
possessed "'individually,' " the recorder concluded that the right
"'may, and in many cases, must, be exercised collectively,'" and that
this was also established by relevant legal authority.95 Whatever the
intentions of those involved in the settlement of 1689, the historical
evidence supports the view that the American colonists believed that
they had a right as Englishmen to have arms for purposes of private
self-defense.9 The most pervasive influence on their thinking as to
scope of the English right was almost certainly Blackstone's widely-
read Commentaries on the Laws of England.' According to Black-
192. It is often recognized that "context conditions meaning, and context often serves
to cut down an otherwise overbroad literal meaning because the shared commitments of
the speaker and the intended audience make it possible to conclude that the legislature
could not have intended the broad statutory language to apply to X." Kelley, supra note
189, at 606. In this case, however, we know that the "common defense" at issue was
viewed by most thoughtful people as a mere extension of the general right of self-defense
held by each individual citizen. See Kates, supra note 99, at 89-93 (documenting views of
Montesquieu, Locke, and other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers on the fun-
damental nature of the right of self-defense). Furthermore, the Framers of the Bill of
Rights provision omitted the word "common" that might have suggested a collective de-
fense purpose. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
193. MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 134 (quoting WILLIAM BLIZZARD, DESULTORY
REFLECTION ON POLICE: WITH AN ESSAY ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES
AND AMENDING CRIMINALS 59-60 (1785)).
194. Id. (quoting BLIZZARD, supra note 193, at 59-60).
195. Id. (quoting BLIZZARD, supra note 193, at 59-60).
196. See supra note 166-69. Don Kates points out that if the English guarantee is re-
lated to American law, it undermines the notion of a states' rights understanding of the
Second Amendment: "There were no states in England to be protected against disarma-
ment. So what Parliament was complaining of could only have been the seizure of arms
from individual citizens in violation of their common law rights." Kates, supra note 6, at
238.
197. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765).
840 [Vol. 75
SECOND AMENDMENT
stone, the Bill of Rights guarantee was among the "auxiliary subordi-
nate rights" that serve "to protect and maintain inviolate the three
great and primary rights of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property." '198 Accordingly, the Bill of Rights guaranteed to
the subjects of England "the right of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defence." ''
b. The Right to Arms in the Early American Republic
There is every reason to think that the colonial understanding of
the natural and English right to have arms for private and collective
defense carried over to the state constitutions that explicitly recog-
nized the right to arms. The first American constitutions were
adopted in the wake of the decision to declare independence, and the
On the influence of Blackstone on American thinking about the right to arms, see
MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 145 (citing N.Y. J. SUPP., April 13, 1769) (relying on Black-
stone in support of right of all Americans to hold arms for their defense); 1 TUCKER,
supra note 166, at 143 (linking the Second Amendment to the English guarantee of arms
as explicated by Blackstone). On the importance of Blackstone in American legal and
constitutional thought in general, see Robert J. Cottrol, The Second Amendment: Invita-
tion to a Multi-Dimensional Debate, in 1 GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT xi, xiii-xiv (Robert J. Cot-
trol ed., 1994); Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194 (1984)
(finding that Blackstone was the most cited English writer by major American political
writers during the period from 1760 to 1805).
198. See 1 TUCKER, supra note 166, at 140. Blackstone's formulation has the ring of
liberal individualism in it; it is not rooted in classical republican sentiment. Cf Cress,
supra note 16, at 23-24 (linking right to arms exclusively to notion of "citizenship, which
was defined in part by militia service, [that] connoted civic virtue and commitment to the
greater public good" in this context, a "well regulated militia drawn from a community's
propertied yeoman and led by its most prominent citizens preserved liberty; armed indi-
viduals threatened it").
199. See 1 TUCKER, supra note 166, at 144. For Blackstone, the English guarantee
thus had implications both for individual liberty and the collective action of the people: It
was the embodiment of "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation," and could
be employed "when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression." 1 id. at 143. Strikingly, despite the importance of Blackstone's
influence in the colonies, his treatment of the English right to arms is not addressed in
leading works favoring the narrowest readings of the Second Amendment. See Cress,
supra note 16, at 26-29 (treating English right and revolutionary period without mention-
ing Blackstone's construction of the English right or his work's influence in America);
Weatherup, supra note 47, at 974-79 (same). In another work, Blackstone is cited, but the
only point emphasized is that his treatment incorporated the language limiting the right to
arms to holdings "allowed by law." Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 10. But see
supra notes 91-95 (explaining the irrelevance of qualifying language in English provision
for understanding the Second Amendment, given American assumptions against legisla-
tive sovereignty). By contrast, the authors ignore that Blackstone's treatment viewed the
right to arms as an important right that secured fundamental natural rights, as well as the
reliance of the American colonists on Blackstone's broad construction of the English right
to arms. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 10.
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Americans' recent experiences with British confiscation of arms gave
them every reason to value the right as it had come to be under-
stood.' But their commitment to the right to arms went beyond
English legal tradition and included the right as derived from the
natural right of self-defense.20' As the conflict heightened, Parliament
revoked colonial charters under which the colonists had claimed the
rights of Englishmen, and reliance on English rights became more
and more difficult. While the Americans contended that these grants
of rights to them as Englishmen were irrevocable, they also invoked
the doctrine of natural rights that "common law might propound but
did not create and could not revoke."''
During the early years of the republic, four states included ex-
plicit right to arms guarantees in their declarations of rights,23 while
four state constitutions contained an explicit provision stating the
commitment to the citizen militia as the best form of defense.2
200. For an account of the most dramatic instances of arms seizures, see MALCOLM,
supra note 6, at 145-46. While some of the most important of these arms seizures in-
volved confiscations of stored military supplies, the arms were in the control of
alternative "militias" that were viewed by the British as nothing less than lawless groups;
they were, in short, popularly-led citizen armies, not the formally organized militias of
any governmental structure. See generally Halbrook, supra note 112, passim (describing
various English provocations relating to arms-holding that reinforced colonial resolve to
preserve their natural and traditional right to arms). For the Americans, of course, there
was a clear distinction between their citizen militias and a lawless mob or insurrectionary
group; their militias represented the people as a whole and were led by key figures in the
colonial governments. See Cress, supra note 16, at 23-24.
201. See Malcolm, supra note 98, at 314. In fact, speaking from a tradition that is as
much republican as liberal, many advocates of this period referred to a duty of self-
preservation as warranting armed resistance, as much as a right of self-defense. See, e.g.,
Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company
in Boston (1773), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA
(1760-1805), at 185, 197, 201 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983)
[hereinafter AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING] (enjoining the people to "furnish them-
selves with weapons proper for their defense and learn the use of them"); id. at 201
(arguing that "[mien are bound to preserve their own lives," and refusal to act on this
duty is "criminal in the sight of God").
202. MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 145.
203. These states were Pennsylvania, Vermont, North Carolina, and Massachusetts.
See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII (1780), supra note 82 at 1892; N.C. CONST., Deci. of
Rts. art. XVII (1776), reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 82, at 2787, 2788;
PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XIII (1776), supra note 121, at 3083; VT. CONST. ch. I, § XV
(1777), reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, note 82, at 3737,3741.
204. In the order of their adoption of such provisions, these states provisions are: VA.
CONST., Bill of Rights § 13 (1776), supra note 94, at 3814; MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art.
XXV (1776), reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 82, at 1686, 1688; N.H.
CONST., Bill of Rights art. XXIV (1784), reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 82, at 2453,2456. The New York Constitution also included a militia provision in the
body of the constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. XL (1777), reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTI-
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Pennsylvania's 1776 Declaration of Rights included the first provision
guaranteeing a popular right to arms, and its language established the
pattern for the analogous guarantees subsequently included in other
state constitutions.' The Pennsylvania guarantee stated: "That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
the state."' 6 The similarity of this guarantee to the English Bill of
Rights provision is clear and striking.' The provision is in some re-
spects obviously broader than its English counterpart: it substitutes
"the people" for "subjects which are Protestants," consistent with
America's commitment to broad-based popular rights, and eliminates
the language that arguably limits only the executive branch. Perhaps
most important for interpretive purposes, the Pennsylvania provision
tracks the English guarantee's indication that the people's arms were
for "their defence" by stating that the arms would be for "defense of
themselves."' s In addition, the Pennsylvania provision is clearer than
its English counterpart that the goal of defense against external
threat ("the defense of ... the state") is also an end for which the
people have a right to be armed. 9
Considering that the American colonists had staked their claim
that every citizen held a right to arms on the English guarantee of
arms to "subjects which are Protestants," a reasonable inference is
that the Pennsylvania provision's reference to the people's right to
arms was also understood to convey a right to every citizen. Despite
this history, proponents of a militia-only understanding of the right
have claimed that the collective reference to the right-holder ("the
people") lends support to their position.10 It has also been contended
TUTIONS, supra note 82, at 2623, 2637.
205. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 17 (Virginia and Pennsylvania articles
"were the models for almost every other state"). In fact, the Vermont right to arms pro-
vision used language identical to the Pennsylvania model. See VT. CONST. ch. I, § XV
(1777), supra note 203, at 3741.
206. PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XIII (1776), supra note 121, at 3083.
207. The 1689 English Bill of Rights provided: "That the Subjects which are Protes-
tants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by
Law." Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Seteling the Succession
of the Crowne, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (Eng.).
208. See Appendix infra.
209. If Malcolm's analysis of the English right is sound, it was intended for this collec-
tive defense purpose as well, but the language was softened because the original version
provoked fears that a right to prepare for insurrection could be inferred. See supra notes
180-83 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 29 (equating Pennsylvania arms guarantee with
declarations in favor of militias in Virginia and other constitutions; concluding that de-
fense of liberties for "themselves" is limited to militia); iL at 31 (contending that state
provisions relating to citizen use of arms "guaranteed the sovereign citizenry, described
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that a purely collective right lodged in the militia is properly inferred
because of the contrasting language of personal right guarantees; in
the state constitutions, we are told, "the expression 'man' or 'person'
is used to describe individual rights such as freedom of conscience. .1.
But there is no uniform pattern in the early state constitutions in
stating rights guarantees; purely individual rights are often stated as
the rights of "the people.
2 12
Perhaps more importantly, rights that are linked closely to the
principle of popular sovereignty, and that would be held or exercised
collectively as well as individually, are generally stated as rights of
"the people."213 The North Carolina declaration is especially instruc-
collectively as 'the people' or 'the militia,' a role in the common defense"). Ehrman and
Henigan find the language referring to defense of "themselves" ambiguous, but contend
generally that the Pennsylvania provision (and its successors) reflected only a preference
for a militia over a standing army. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 17-18.
211. Cress, supra note 16, at 31.
212. MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XVIII (1776), supra note 204, at 1688 (stating that
"the trial of facts where they arise, is one of the grea[t]est securities of the lives, liberties
and estates of the people"; contrasting with numerous rights provisions stated in more
individualist terms); N.C. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XIV (1776), supra note 203, at 2788
(containing substantially similar civil jury provision); PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. X
(1776), supra note 121, at 3083 (providing that "the people have a right to hold them-
selves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure"); idt art. XII
("the people have a right to freedom of speech"); VT. CONST., Decl. of Rts. ch. I, § XI
(1777), supra note 203, at 3741 (providing a search and seizure guarantee in favor of "the
people"); id- ch. I, § XIV (creating a freedom of speech guarantee in favor of "the peo-
ple"); id. ch. I, § XVII (stating that "all people" have a right to emigrate).
Even when "the people" is not used, individual rights provisions of the state and fed-
eral bills of rights use both the plural form ("all men" or "all freemen") as well as the
singular ("any man" or "every member of society"). It seems clear that the right to arms
could just as well have been stated in the singular, as was the case with a provision that
Jefferson proposed for the Virginia Declaration of Rights: "No freeman shall ever be
debarred the use of arms." 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (J. Boyd ed., 1950).
While it might be contended that Jefferson's proposed language sheds little light, espe-
cially because it was not included in the Virginia Constitution, the language of his
proposal comports with the general American understanding of the English right. With-
out any extrinsic evidence supporting the view that there was actually division among
Americans as to whether the right to arms extended to individuals, as Jefferson assumed,
the lack of a clear pattern in the language of the state constitutions' rights reinforces the
likelihood that there was no essential conflict on this point.
213. See, e.g., N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights art. XXXII (1784), supra note 204, at 2457
("The people have a right in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult
upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives; and to request of the
legislative body, by way of petition and remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them,
and of the grievances they suffer."); N.C. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XVIII (1776), supra
note 203, at 2788 (stating that "the people" have rights of assemblage, consultation, in-
struction, and petition); PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XVI (1776), supra note 121, at 3084
(providing that "the people" have right of assemblage, consultation, instruction, and vari-
ous forms of petition); VT. CONST., Decl. of Rts. ch. I, § VII (1777), supra note 203, at
3740 (providing that "the people have a right, at such periods as they may think proper, to
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tive: after stating a series of procedural guarantees as being held by
"every man," or indicating what "no freeman" may be subjected to,
the declaration states guarantees in favor of "the people" (or, in one
case, "all men") relating to civil jury, taxation without consent, bear-
ing arms, petition and assemblage, and freedom of religion.2 4 The
right to arms was closely linked with the idea of popular sovereignty
in many minds, as reflected in the quoted dictum that "[t]he supreme
power in every country is possest by those who have arms in their
hands. 215
Advocates of a purely collective reading of the Pennsylvania
right to bear arms also observe that the right is combined with an in-
junction against standing armies and a provision for civil authority
over the military. 6 This general theme that the right to arms fits
within a general framework uniquely relating to the military is
thought to be further reinforced by the couching of the right as a
right to "bear" arms, with its apparently military connotation. 217 The
problem with these arguments is that no one denies that the right of
the citizenry to be armed involves, at least in part, a collective inter-
est in preserving a militia as an alternative to a liberty-endangering
standing army, and that this theme would also link up with the prin-
ciple of civilian control over the military. Pennsylvanians
undoubtedly wished to preserve their collective right to arms both to
facilitate a security-enhancing militia and as a continuing check
against arbitrary power. But the association of the right to arms with
collective defense issues does not tell us that it has no connection to
reduce their public officers to a private station, and supply the vacancies by certain and
regular elections"); id. ch. I, § XVIII, at 3741-42 (providing that "the people" have rights
of assemblage, consultation, instruction, and petition).
214. N.C. CONST., Decl. of Rts. arts. VII-XIII, XIV-XIX (1776), supra note 203, at
2787-88. That the North Carolina provision was almost certainly understood as incorpo-
rating the American understanding that the English right had guaranteed every citizen a
right to have arms is underscored by the November 1776 appointment of Richard Caswell
and Joseph Hewes to the committee to frame a bill of rights and constitution for the state
of North Carolina. See HALBROOK, RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, supra note 6, at 31-32.
These were the same individuals who had asserted "the Right of every English Subject to
be prepared with Weapons for his Defense" in July of 1775. See supra note 169 and ac-
companying text.
215. Anonymous, Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Law of Na-
ture (1783), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 201, at 565, 602 (quoting
WILIAM ROBERTSON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES V (London, 1769)).
216. See PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XIII (1776), supra note 203, at 3083; see also
Cress, supra note 16, at 29 (contending that "militia" and "right to arms" provisions are
essentially the same and link the citizen's responsibility for defense "to the threat of
standing armies"); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 18 (arguing that the "military
orientation of the arms-clause is reflected in surrounding language").
217. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (discussing use of "bear" arms).
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the individual right to self-defense or that the right vests only in the
sovereign people as a whole."'8 The American colonists, after all, had
tracked Blackstone in identifying the English right to arms as grow-
ing out of a natural right to self-defense that was equally the
foundation of the collective citizenry's right to arm themselves to de-
fend their liberties. 19
If the Pennsylvania provision's text itself leaves room for doubt,
despite its obvious connection to the English right invoked by
Americans generally, those doubts should be resolved by the history
related to the federal Bill of Rights. The "constitutionalists" who
brought the Pennsylvania Constitution into being, and then defended
it for more than a decade, were by and large the same people who are
known to us as the Antifederalists who opposed the federal Constitu-
tion.' One of their members, Robert Whitehill, relied upon the
omission of a bill of rights as a ground for opposing the Constitution
and presented a proposed bill of rights to the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention on December 12, 1787.m' Whitehill's proposed bill of
rights was subsequently incorporated into the minority report of the
Convention, which was signed by Antifederalists who had played
prominent roles in adopting and defending the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution.' This Antifederalist bill of rights includes the following
provision guaranteeing the right to arms:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for
218. For discussion as to how an individual right to arms would have been perceived as
contributing to collective defense, and in fact to the viability of the militia system, see
supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
219. The perfect illustration of the connection perceived between individual and col-
lective defense was the counsel given to the people of North Carolina to arm themselves
in order to" 'be in Readiness to defend yourselves against any Violence that may be ex-
erted against your Persons and Properties.'" Halbrook, supra note 169, at 280 (quoting
Caswell et al., supra note 169, at 2, col. 3); see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
220. George Bryan, an important Pennsylvania Antifederalist, played a central role in
the drafting of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution. See J. PAUL SELSAM, THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY
150-51 (1936) (describing Bryan as principal author); Halbrook, supra note 169, at 267
(seeing Bryan as "influential" but attributing "phraseology of the document" to James
Cannon). Robert Whitehill, John Smilie, and William Findley, all strong opponents of the
federal Constitution, were prominent "constitutionalists" who defended the state consti-
tution. See SELSAM, supra, at 248. Whitehill had also been significantly involved in its
formation. See id. at 161 n.94.
221. See The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 586,597.
222. Among the report's signatories are John Smilie, Robert Whitehill, and William
Findley. See Pennsylvania Minority Report, supra note 92, at 639.
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the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for
disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals;
and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military
should be kept under strict subordination to and be gov-
erned by the civil powers.m
This Pennsylvania minority proposal not only confirms what
would have been the general understanding of the Pennsylvania right
to arms provision, but also undercuts completely the idea that the
connection between the right to arms and military issues stands as a
barrier to the individual rights understanding of the right to bear
arms. This provision uses the term "bear" to describe carrying weap-
ons for a variety of purposes, including collective and self-defense as
well as hunting, and specifically prohibits laws that would disarm "the
people or any of them" unless for compelling reasons.24 Equally im-
portant, this indisputably individual rights guarantee is included
along with the standard provisions condemning standing armies and
providing for civilian control of the military.' Finally, the guarantee
immediately before the right to arms in the minority proposed bill of
rights guarantees the freedom of speech and press to "the people."'
The right to arms provision next adopted, North Carolina's, pro-
vided that "the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of
the state."' 27  As with the Pennsylvania provision, this guarantee
tracks the English Bill of Rights guarantee in granting the right to
"the people"; language suggesting a private right to arms. This
reading receives strong confirmation as well from the invocation of a
223. Id. at 623-24.
224. But cf Cress, supra note 16, at 34 (stating that even this proposal did not move
far, if at all, "beyond the eighteenth-century notion that bearing arms meant militia serv-
ice"); id (arguing that this conclusion is reinforced because of the careful qualifications of
the "individual's right to arms"). But the cited evidence lends practically no support to
the proffered conclusion; after all, the NRA would be quite comfortable with the limited
qualifications of the right found in this provision. See CRAMER, supra note 6, at 35
(observing that in fact what is "carefully qualified" in this proposal are the conditions
under which the individual right to arms could be restricted). At the least, this proposed
language strongly confirms that the eighteenth-century concept of a right to bear arms did
not mean militia service (though it may have included such service).
225. See The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 12, 1787), supra note 221, at 597-98.
Several of the state right to arms provisions were combined with other provisions relating
to the military, and the Pennsylvania minority's proposal shows generally that the obvious
connection between the right to arms, militia provisions, and collective defense does not
preclude that the right to arms also guaranteed a personal right.
226. Virginia Debates, supra note 132, at 623.
227. N.C. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. XVII (1776), supra note 203, at 2788.
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private right to arms during the revolutionary struggle in North
Carolina.'r While some have attempted to read an exclusively mili-
tia-based right from the language indicating that this was a right to
bear arms "for the defense of the state,"' 9 the provision's focus on
collective defense is hardly surprising given that it was the right to
have arms for the purpose of resisting English tyranny imposed on
the people of North Carolina that had been immediately under
threat, and it was this collective right of self-defense that had been
the target of disarmament schemes historically. While it is difficult
to build a case that this provision itself specifically guaranteed arms
for private self-defense, given the limited scope of its language," it
228. An important voice on the committee that drafted the North Carolina Declara-
tion of Rights was Richard Caswell, one of the individuals who in 1775 called the people
of North Carolina to avail themselves of the right "of every English subject" to prepare
arms "for his defense." See HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at
283. For the relevant portion of Caswell's statement, see supra note 169 and accompa-
nying text. Caswell would be an unlikely candidate to agree to a narrow right in favor of
a purely collective interest in having a militia.
229. See, e.g., Eric S. Freibrun, Banning Handguns: Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove
and the Second Amendmen; 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1095 n.30 (1982).
230. See supra notes 95-96. Some might even attempt to infer that the North Carolina
right's reference to "defense of the state" meant that the right included only a right to
arms with which to defend the government of that state, but not to arms to be employed
to preserve liberty against a threat of tyranny presented by the state itself. While the
language probably reflects confidence in the republican legitimacy of the state's govern-
ment, and can be read partly as a reference to the ongoing conflict against the oppression
of England, it is unlikely that the same people who invoked their right to arms to resist
the tyranny presented by a government in which they had once sworn allegiance would
now be intending to limit their right to arms only for the purpose of defending govern-
ment, however oppressive or corrupt. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text
(explicating the emphasis on the security of a "free state" in the Second Amendment
analysis that seems equally applicable to the unqualified text here).
231. For an attempt to argue that the seemingly more restrictive language of the North
Carolina provision was actually an expansion of the traditional arms guarantee, see Hal-
brook, supra note 169, at 284 (arguing that "[w]hile the right to bear arms for self-defense
and other uses was encompassed in this provision, the arms guarantee expanded that right
by explicitly recognizing the right to bear arms 'for the Defense of the State' "). Hal-
brook's argument presumes that if the popular right to arms extends to individuals,
consistent with the English right, this of itself establishes that ownership for private self-
defense is part of the right. But this conclusion rests on the same assumption that oppo-
nents of a personal right have sometimes used to try to defeat the idea of a personal right
to arms. But a constitutionally protected personal right to arms does not logically entail
that the end of self-defense is considered part of the right; even if the collective defense
was the sole "end" to be achieved by the right, a personal right might still be object of
"the people's" right as the means of ensuring an armed populace from which to draw a
freedom-securing militia.
Apart from whether the right of self-defense is properly seen as part of the right to
arms guarantee in the North Carolina provision, Halbrook does make the telling point
that the drafters of the North Carolina provision were fully capable of drafting a guaran-
tee that ran only in favor of the collective people (and not to individual citizens who
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seems likely that its framers would have perceived that the lawful use
of arms possessed by right, including the exercise of the long-
established and unquestioned right of self-defense, would follow as a
logical legal consequence of the constitutional guarantee.'
It is equally unlikely that the wording of this North Carolina
guarantee reflected any reservations about, let alone hostility to, the
idea of a right of self-defense or of a private right to arms to serve as
a defense against tyranny. Both the collective right of resistance that
warranted the right to arms and the personal right of self-defense had
been relied upon by North Carolina's revolutionaries,'m and there is
no evidence to suggest that either of these ideas had come to be ques-
tioned.m To the extent that the language of the North Carolina
belong to "the people"). See id. (quoting another North Carolina constitutional provision
referring to its guarantee as "one of the essential Rights of the collective Body of the
People").
232. It seems quite likely that the right of self-defense was simply taken for granted as
an unquestioned first principle, as recognized explicitly, for example, in the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, see infra note 239 and accompanying text, so that there was not a
perceived need for an explicit guarantee of that underlying right or of its immediate con-
nection to the right to arms. While this is not to say precisely the same thing as to assert
that these rights are implicitly contained within the language of the North Carolina guar-
antee, it may be doubted whether the functional outcome of these distinguishable
readings would be much different; the right to use firearms, lawfully held, in support of
the right of self-defense has never to date been questioned in an American jurisdiction.
233. See supra note 169. Not only did key spokesmen for these views play a role in
drafting the North Carolina guarantee, see supra notes 214, 228, but the subsequent his-
tory lends additional strength to the conclusion that the purpose of the guarantee was not
to state a rejection of the accepted understanding of the right to arms as it had existed
under the English constitution. Thus a principal figure in the drafting of the North Caro-
lina Declaration of Rights, Willie Jones, see HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED,
supra note 6, at 2, also played a key role twelve years later when he introduced proposed
amendments, including a right to arms amendment, before the North Carolina Ratifying
Convention. See N.C. Debates, supra note 148, at 216 (documenting Willie Jones's offer
to introduce amendments at the convention). Jones's proposed arms amendment guaran-
teed "the people" the broad and unqualified "right to keep and bear arms," and omitted
any language limiting this right to the defense of the state. Id. at 243, 244 (containing text
of proposed arms amendment). If Jones and others were attempting to restrict the right
to arms in 1776, the effort to do so would have been duplicated in 1788. Instead, the un-
qualified guarantee adopted in other states, and proposed by other ratifying conventions,
was proposed by North Carolina as well, and the convention proceedings do not note any
opposition to the language proposed by Jones. Nothing in this history suggests that North
Carolina was committed to an especially narrow understanding of the traditional right to
arms.
234. As noted above, the explicit textual focus on collective goals of private firearms
ownership almost certainly reflected that historically it was the idea that the people as a
whole held a right to firearms for collective defense purposes that had been opposed
(mainly by governments). See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text. Decisions as to
guarantees to be included in constitutions and declarations of rights of the founding pe-
riod often reflected a determination as to whether a particular right or interest required a
constitutional safeguard. See, e.g., Statement of Madison (Aug. 22, 1787), in 2 THE
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provision can lend itself to a restrictive construction of the right to
arms, it might be argued that the drafting simply fell short of directly
guaranteeing the private right to arms for purposes of self-defense
that many Americans of that era would have taken for granted.25
The last version of a right to arms provision was drafted by John
Adams and adopted by Massachusetts in 1780. 6 Adams substituted
the phrase "keep and bear arms" in the place of the right to "bear"
arms, thus clarifying more fully that the right included ownership and
possession as well as the right to carry the arms. The word "keep"
fits nicely into the English Bill of Rights tradition recognizing the
right to "have" weapons, and it further clarifies that the right to arms
was intended as a personal right that was not limited to access to
weapons during actual militia service. 7 The Massachusetts provision
further provided that the right was held "for the common defense,"
language that again raises the issue whether a purely collective inter-
est, rather than a personal right, was intended. But the same
considerations that argue for a personal right, based on the continuity
of American thought about the right to arms as an English right and
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(opposing inclusion of an ex post facto clause in the Constitution on the ground that it
would "bring reflexions on the Constitution" by suggesting "that we are ignorant of the
first principles of Legislation, or are constituting a Government which will be so"). Wil-
son's point is that ex post facto aversion in the criminal law was so well established that
securing it in the Constitution would be superfluous. Whether this sort of reasoning was
actually employed with regard to the right to have a firearm for purposes of self-defense,
it seems very likely that the people of North Carolina would have shared the same view of
the fundamental nature of the right of self-defense as the one held by the people of Mas-
sachusetts-who made specific provision for that right in their 1780 constitution. See infra
note 236.
235. This is unsurprising. The early state declarations of rights for the most part do
not reflect a sustained effort to be comprehensive about stating basic rights; their main
purpose was to lay out shared first principles of government, rather than to provide a
code of enforceable limitations. See Donald S. Lutz, The U.S. Bill of Rights in Historical
Perspective, in CONTEXTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 3, 9 (Stephen L. Schechter & Richard
B. Bernstein eds., 1990). The omissions are often surprising. See, e.g., LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 155-56 (1988) (observing
that Virginia's Declaration of Rights, that became the pattern of the rest, omitted free-
dom of speech, assembly, and petition, as well as guarantees of habeas corpus, right to
counsel, and freedom from double jeopardy).
236. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII (1780), supra note 82, at 1888, 1892 ("The peo-
ple have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.").
237. David Hardy has observed that the word "keep" links the Massachusetts right to
arms with its English Bill of Rights counterpart inasmuch as "the phrase 'keep arms' re-
curs in post-1692 English case law interpreting the [English Hunting] Act as modified
after the Declaration of Rights." Hardy, supra note 143, at 41. As a learned lawyer, Ad-
ams most likely would have been aware of this linkage, and the subsequent history
revealing that his phrase became the standard formulation of the right provides further
evidence of the continuity of the English right with the American right to arms.
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in light of the revolutionary experience, apply with equal force to the
Massachusetts provision.
The historical context of the Massachusetts provision, moreover,
appears to shed further light on the real import of the language fo-
cusing on collective defense as the purpose for a right to keep and
bear arms. First, it is virtually impossible to argue that the Massa-
chusetts provision was drafted to avoid any inference that the right to
keep and bear arms would reinforce the common-law right to use
arms in self-defense. For one thing, the historical record is clear that
Adams was a strong defender of both the common-law right of self-
defense and, equally important, of the right to possess weapons to
that end. 8 Moreover, Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights listed among the inalienable rights of the people the right of
"defending their lives and liberties" and "protecting property.""
Perhaps most important, the historical record suggests a more com-
pelling concern that may have prompted Adams's choice of language.
The focus on collective defense may well have reflected Adams's bias
against any right to use arms collectively for the purely private pur-
poses of groups within society. On the eve of the Philadelphia
Convention, Adams wrote his famous work defending American con-
stitutions, and there he stated the view that guns should not be used
according to "individual discretion, except in private self-defense,"
because it would "demolish every constitution, and lay the laws pros-
trate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by no man." 24 While every
238. See Halbrook, supra note 169, at 296-301 (reviewing Adams's record as an attor-
ney and a revolutionary supporting these rights, including legal arguments supporting the
right of English military people in the colonies to carry arms in support of the right of
self-defense). In fact, Halbrook observes that it is widely believed that John Adams was a
source for the 1769 statement in the Boston Evening Post, see supra note 167 and accom-
panying text, relying upon the English Bill of Rights as a source of the right of colonists to
arm themselves in their own defense. See Halbrook, supra note 169, at 300.
239. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I (1780), supra note 82, at 1889. In fact, at least a couple
of Massachusetts communities objected to the wording of the right to arms provision on
the ground that it did not clearly comport with the right of self-defense recognized in Ar-
ticle I. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 134-35 (1986) (emphasizing that communities objected that the
arms provision "is not expressed with that ample and manly openness and latitude which
the importance of the right merits" and demanded the inclusion of language reflecting
that it is "an essential privilege to keep Arms in Our houses for Our Own Defence").
While these communities correctly observed that the arms guarantee could have more
clearly indicated that the right extended to private uses such as self-defense, Halbrook
points out that the right to keep arms in private homes seems clearly contemplated by the
right" 'to keep,' and not just to 'bear' arms." Halbrook, supra note 169, at 304.
240. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (Philadelphia, Young 1787) (emphasis added).
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individual held a right to own firearms, both for private self-defense
and for service in the militia in defense of the community, there was
no fundamental right to create private armies to serve private ends.24
Adams's decision to emphasize collective defense, then, in all likeli-
hood reflected the dilemma of drafting a provision that guarantees a
collective, as well as a personal, right; Adams appears to have pre-
ferred to carefully define the purpose and scope of the collective
dimension of the right, while assuming that Article I would defeat
any tendency to read the provision as precluding the right of indi-
viduals to possess arms with which to defend themselves.
4. The Significance of the Absence of a Provision Declaring the
Necessity of a "Well Regulated Militia"
The newly-proposed United States Constitution not only omit-
ted the right to keep and bear arms, but also the declarations
contained in several state constitutions stating a preference for citi-
zen militias.4 As reflected in the text of the Second Amendment,
the right to keep and bear arms is closely related to the preference
for a citizen militia as a primary tool of defense. Without question, a
central reason for assuring an armed citizenry was to facilitate a citi-
zen-based system of defense. Following the lead of political thinkers
through the centuries, the founders generally agreed that only a citi-
zen militia "could protect liberty against domestic turmoil and
241. Adams may well have feared the possibility of illicit collective employment of
arms in private militias, a development that would present the dangers of unlawful mob
action or illegitimate insurrections. He contended that the militia is "created, directed
and commanded by the laws, and ever for the support of the laws." Id.; cf. Presser v. Illi-
nois, 116 U.S. 252, 266-69 (1886) (upholding Illinois statute prohibiting formation of
private militias other than those organized by the state). Although the Supreme Court in
Presser rejected a Second Amendment claim on the theory that the Amendment did not
limit state government, see id. at 257, the Court also rejected a structural theory that the
state's militia law might interfere with the state militia's federal duties on the basis that
state authority to regulate private military activities "is necessary to the public peace,
safety and good order." Id. at 268. It seems apparent that the concerns underlying the
Illinois statute, and justifying the Court's deference to the state, may have been similar to
those that prompted Adams's drafting in terms of collective defense. See id. at 268 (the
rejection of a state power to control and regulate militias, and to prohibit formation of
purely private militias, would deny states' ability to "suppress armed mobs bent on riot
and rapine").
242. Leading the way, Virginia provided: "That a well-regulated militia, composed of
the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
State." VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 13 (1776), supra note 94, at 3814. Similar provisions
were included in the constitutions of Maryland and New Hampshire. See N.H. CONST.,
Bill of Rights art. XXIV (1784), supra note 204, at 2456; MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art.
XXV (1776), supra note 204, at 1688.
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tyrannical intrigue."243 Thus the state constitutions' stated preference
for a militia-based system of defense went hand-in-glove with opposi-
tion to a standing army, the inevitable device of tyrants bent on
imposing arbitrary will on the people.2'
Considering that the states' declarations of rights were evenly
split between provisions guaranteeing the people the right to arms
and provisions stating the long-standing republican preference for
citizen militias, those who assert that the Second Amendment does
not secure a right to private arms conclude that the "militia" and
"arms" provisions both secured the sovereign people's interest in a
militia-based defense system by different formulations that had sub-
stantially the same meaning.' But even if the basic point is accurate
at some level of generality-that these somewhat different formula-
tions were directed to the same basic ends-it would not follow that
the "sovereign people" as a collective entity is the exclusive benefici-
ary of the promise stated in the right to arms guarantees. The two
clauses have common premises-that an armed citizenry is a critical
243. Cress, supra note 16, at 30. One reason militias were considered such a key was
the presumption that ordinary citizens would not act in support of tyrannical schemes.
Thus, one defense of the Constitution relied upon the continuing significance of the state
militias:
Against whom will they turn their swords? Against themselves!-to execute
laws which are unconstitutional, unreasonable, and oppressive upon themselves!
Absurdity itself could never have thought of raising an objection on this
ground .... That when the Congress resort to the militia, which is the body of the
people, for the support and execution of the laws of the Union, it is done in con-
fidence that the laws are just and good, and worthy of the support of the people,
otherwise Congress can have no reason to expect support from that quarter.
A Letter from a Gentleman in a Neighboring State to a Gentleman in this City, NEW
HAVEN CONN. J., Oct. 31, 1787, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
74, 74-75 (David E. Young. ed., 1991) [hereinafter ORIGIN OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT].
244. For a useful overview of the deeply felt opposition to standing armies by many
eighteenth-century Americans, see MALCOLM, supra note 6, at 141-43, 150, 155-56, 159.
245. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 29 (referring to the arms and militia provisions
and asserting that the "language was slightly different, but the meaning was the same");
id at 30 (arguing that "[w]hether it was Massachusetts' declaration that citizens had the
right 'to bear arms for the common defence' or Virginia's affirmation that the militia was
'the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State,' the point was the same"); id
(concluding that various state provisions guaranteed "the sovereign citizenry" a role in
the common defense, sometimes referring to "the people" and other times to "the mili-
tia"); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 18 (observing that the "four states
with 'right to bear arms' language are almost the only states without a reference to the
militia being the proper defense for a free state" and drawing from this the inference
"that the arms clause was, in effect, a substitute for the militia clause"); id (considering
that related provisions in military sections were also "almost identical," it is "logical to
conclude that the two clauses were conceptually similar").
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safeguard of liberty and that "the ultimate 'checking value' in a re-
publican polity is the ability of an armed populace, preemptively
motivated by a shared commitment to the common good, to resist
governmental tyranny." '
This is the real significance of the critical phrase in the Virginia
militia declaration defining the militia as "composed of the body of
the people, trained to arms."' 47 The Federal Farmer, perhaps the
most forceful and articulate of all the Constitution's critics, wrote
during the ratification debate that "to preserve liberty, it is essential
that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught
alike ... how to use them. ' ,248 The militia provisions thus contem-
plated a continuation of the universal militia system comprised of
essentially all able-bodied adult males; they assumed the existence of
246. Levinson, supra note 3, at 648. In recent years, a small number of scholars have
alleged that the Second Amendment clauses have nothing to do with resisting state tyr-
anny, but are limited to providing the governments of the states with a check on the
federal government. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 33-34; Herz, supra note
14, at 64. In fact, these commentators contend that seeing these rights as relating to citi-
zen resistance of tyranny posits an implausible "insurrectionist" theory that would clash
with the purpose of militias to defend the security of the state against insurrection. See
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 55-56; Herz, supra note 14, at 69-71.
This critique, however, not only ignores the weight of the scholarship on both sides of
the Second Amendment debate, see, e.g., Cress, supra note 16, at 29-30, but is belied by
the historical context of these provisions. The state checking power theory is implausible
not only because it cannot explain the purpose of the state antecedents to the Second
Amendment, see supra note 86, but also because it fails to see the continuity between the
revolutionary setting of several of these provisions, the affirmation of the right of resis-
tance in the state constitutions of the confederation period, see, e.g., MD. CONST., Decl.
Rts. art. IV (1776), supra note 204, at 1687 (declaring that "[t]he doctrine of non-
resistance, against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of
the good and happiness of mankind"), and the continuing support for the possibility of
armed resistance during the debate over the ratification of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 106, at 17 (stating the
"essential and unalienable Rights of the People" that the "doctrine of non-resistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and
happiness of mankind"); see also infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (describing
Madison's treatment of possibility of armed resistance to a tyrannical national govern-
ment; emphasizing role of states, but also comparing such an action to revolutionary war).
While there may be a seeming paradox in the idea that the militia might function both to
suppress insurrection and to resist government, to the founding generation the common
denominator was that lawless insurrections and lawless tyrannical governments were sim-
ply two species of violent and illegal conduct that the militia was created to protect the
people against.
247. VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 13 (1776), supra note 94, at 3814.
248. Federal Farmer, supra note 133, at 342. This was the standard view. See, e.g., A
Letter from a Gentleman in a Neighboring State to a Gentleman in this City, supra note
243, at 74 (assuring that there was no need to fear congressional militia powers given that
the militia "comprehends all the male inhabitants from sixteen to sixty years of age" and
"includes the knowledge and strength of the nation").
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an armed citizenry. And this is why Madison and others went to
some lengths to reassure the people that the proposed Constitution
simply did not empower the national government to disarm the peo-
ple or to undermine the citizen-based defense systems already
existing in the states.4 9 Because Madison's argument that the peo-
ple's checking power would be alive and well under the Constitution
has been the subject of serious controversy, it is important that we
examine it closely.
In Federalist No. 46, Madison assumes the task of explaining
why the states need not fear domination by the national government
established by the Constitution. Consider this excerpt:
Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans
possess over the people of almost every other nation, the
existence of subordinate governments to which the people
are attached, and by which the militia officers are ap-
pointed, forms a barrier against the enterprizes of ambition,
more insurmountable than any which a simple government
of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military es-
tablishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are
carried as far as the public resources will bear, the govern-
ments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not
certain that with this aid alone, they would not be able to
shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the
additional advantages of local governments chosen by them-
selves, who could collect the national will, and direct the
national force; and of officers appointed out of the militia,
by these governments and attached both to them and to the
militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that
the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily
overturned, in spite of the legions which surround it.'
Advocates of a militia-centered reading of the Second Amend-
ment criticize the focus on Madison's emphasis of the important
checking function of an armed people,' insisting that Madison was
referring to the state militias and that the crux of his argument was
that the states would serve as a critical intermediate body capable of
organizing forces of resistance to any attempt to impose despotic
government.' But their argument goes too far.
249. See supra note 131-32 and accompanying text.
250. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
251. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 3, at 648-52; Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1244-45.
252. See Henigan, supra note 16, at 121 & n.52 (supporting the claim that
"insurrectionist theorists" have engaged in a "misuse" of Madison's argument with the
argument that Madison "saw the armed citizen as important to liberty to the extent that
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It is undeniable that Madison's treatment contemplates a well-
organized resistance by functioning militias, and that he sees the
states as playing a critical role as independent centers of power; but it
is equally true that Madison describes the militia system as premised
on the idea of trusting ordinary citizens with the private right to pos-
sess firearms. 3 Throughout his analysis, Madison clearly refers to
the role of both the states and the people, though their roles are ob-
viously intertwined.' Madison begins his analysis by chiding the
Constitution's critics for focusing almost exclusively on the nation
and the states, observing that they "have lost sight of the people alto-
gether in their reasonings on the subject." 5  In summarizing his
argument, moreover, Madison assures the states that they will easily
defeat an overreaching national government because it "will not pos-
sess the confidence of the people," with the implication that the
states "will be supported by the people. ' 'E6
While both the "militia" and "arms" provisions can, in a broad
the citizen was part of a military force organized by state governments" and that he was
not arguing "for the right of the people to be armed against government per se").
253. For Madison, this focus on an armed populace was not a makeshift argument
trotted out to defend the Constitution. As David Hardy has observed, in another context
Madison stated that aristocracy could never be safe " 'without a standing army, an en-
slaved press and a disarmed populace.'" Hardy, supra note 143, at 52 (quoting R.
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 640 (1970)). While Madison's focus on an
armed citizenry rests on a identification of freedom with the militia tradition, that tradi-
tion, as we have noted, rested in part on the identification of personal freedom with the
status of an independent citizenship that included the right to bear arms. See supra notes
88, 100, 201 and accompanying text. As Kates reports, "[ft]he theme of personal arms
possession as both the hallmark and the ultimate guarantee of personal liberty appears
equally in the writings of Cicero, Sidney, Locke, Trenchard, Rousseau, Sir Walter Ral-
eigh, Blackstone and Needham." Kates, supra note 98, at 143, 148-49; accord
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 7-35 (exploring the writings
of the great classical political philosophers).
254. Confirming evidence that Madison's focus is not solely on the states' ability to
organize resistance is his pointed allusion to the Revolutionary War. See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 46, supra note 250, at 321. According to Madison, "Those who are best
acquainted with the late successful resistance of this country against the British arms will
be most inclined to deny the possibility" of regular troops defeating a militia comprised of
people "fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence." Id.; accord Philadelphiensis VI (Dec. 26,
1787), reprinted in ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 243, at 179, 181
(asking if America has not "already shown to the world that no power on earth can over-
come a phalanx offreemen defending their sacred liberties").
255. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 250, at 315. He observes further that these
critics wrote as though the two levels of government are "mutual rivals and enemies" that
were "uncontrouled by any common superior." Id. Implicit in Madison's invocation of
the people's sovereignty is the recognition that ultimately the people might act to correct
abuses by either level of government.
256. Id. at 322.
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sense, be read as alternative ways of stating this general intention to
preserve a militia system that presumed the existence of a citizenry
holding a right to arms, there are good reasons to distinguish the mili-
tia and arms guarantees of the state constitutions-reasons that
become more important in 1788 (when Virginia drafted its proposed
amendment combining the two) than they may have been in the pe-
riod around 1776.' Comparing the texts alone, it is noteworthy that
the arms provisions are stated as rights guarantees in favor of the
people; by contrast, the militia provisions are not framed as rights
guarantees as such, but rather as declarations of a preference for mili-
tias (implicitly by contrast to standing armies)."8 This was not
unusual-the state declarations of rights commonly included provi-
sions stating shared principles of government, but which were quite
clearly not intended as limiting provisions. 9 The militia provisions
limit state legislative authority, if at all, only to the extent that they
are read together with provisions limiting the power of the legislature
to create a standing army. The arms guarantees, on the other hand,
seem clearly intended to limit state legislative authority, at least in
some important sense, even though there is room for debate whether
the state declarations in general were intended to state legally en-
forceable limiting provisions.'
These differences in the form and structure of these provisions
comport with differences in their substantive content. The militia
preference provisions presuppose an armed citizenry (and the con-
257. See infra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
258. It could be said of these militia provisions, as it was of the Militia Clause of the
Second Amendment, that they provided "a reminder rather than a command." Hardy,
supra note 143, at 61.
259. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
260. There are good reasons to think that the state constitutions were not drafted with
judicial review in mind, and the pervasive use of language of obligation rather than lan-
guage of command in the state declarations of rights is reflective of this approach. For
general insight, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James
Madison and the Founders' Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State
Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261, 1285 (1989) (observing, among other things, that
John Marshall contended in defense of the Constitution that the state declarations of
rights were "recommendatory" and unenforceable; hence omission of a bill of rights was
not a matter of great moment). The issue becomes somewhat muddied, however, because
the arguments on behalf of judicial review had gained greater currency, even as to the
constitutions of the states, during the period immediately preceding the 1787 Philadelphia
Convention. See David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A
Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 323 (1992) (concluding that the doc-
trine of judicial review "was not yet firmly established at the time of the ratification
debates," but summarizing views of Jefferson, Madison and others that reflected a trend
toward accepting judicial review).
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tinuation of the common-law right to arms) to lend support to the
militia system of collective defense, but they do not constitutionally
guarantee any right to arms. Their textual emphasis is unequivocally
on the militia. The arms guarantees, on the other hand, may assume
the continuing existence of the militia, but they do not in any sense
require states to create or continue to fund or support such an institu-
tion."1 Moreover, there are good reasons to think that the state arms
provisions reflect the heritage of the English Bill of Rights guarantee
of a private right to arms. 2 No doubt the adopters of both the militia
and arms provisions believed that the militia system would continue,
and that the law would continue to permit private firearms owner-
ship, both to support the militia and in support of the right of self-
defense; but the same assumption was almost certainly made in the
several states that did not even adopt a declaration of rights, let alone
a militia or arms constitutional provision. It should come as no sur-
prise, then, that the drafters of proposed amendments to the federal
Constitution saw the value of combining the militia and arms provi-
sions to form a single amendment that would speak both to the
institutional question of militias as well as to the right of the people
(including each individual citizen) to arms.
B. The "Remedy" Embodied in the Second Amendment
If the defect to be remedied was the omission of well-known
fundamental rights from the Constitution, the basic remedy was to
amend the Constitution to incorporate the most fundamental rights,
as found in the states' constitutions and declarations of rights. A
number of the basic freedoms of greatest concern were also put to-
gether into sets of proposed amendments offered by critics of the
Constitution and on occasion adopted by the state ratifying conven-
tions. As to the right to arms, the first proposed amendment of
relevance, guaranteeing a private right of arms for a variety of pur-
poses, was the one proposed by the minority report of the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention.' While this proposal was not
261. If bearing arms was seen as encompassing militia service (or even as an indirect
way of describing it), the provision might conceivably be read to prohibit the state from
affirmatively abolishing the militia because to do so would effectively defeat even the
theoretical possibility of exercising the right. But if the arms guarantee is exhausted by
militia service, as some suggest, the goal of popular involvement in collective defense
could be readily subverted by the combination of governmental neglect of the militia and
tight restrictions on private firearms ownership and use. The right to be involved in the
militia would be preserved, but it would be worth nothing.
262. See supra Part III-A-3.
263. The proposal would have guaranteed a right to arms for collective and self-
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officially adopted by the Convention which ratified the Constitution
without offering amendments, the minority report was adopted by an
impressive group of the Constitution's critics, and was widely pub-
lished.' It was proposed, moreover, within the state that supplied
the initial model of a right to arms guarantee,' and parties looking to
include an arms guarantee amendment would have been aware that
this minority proposal was an attempted elaboration of the assump-
tions underlying the original provision." Given these considerations,
it seems highly probable that if those drafting and adopting the Sec-
ond Amendment had opposed a right to private arms, they would
have chosen language, perhaps limited only to the militia declaration,
to avoid the implication that these Pennsylvanians obviously drew
from their own right to arms guarantee.
At least two other proposed amendments also unequivocally
guaranteed a right to private arms. One such proposal, drafted by
Samuel Adams and proposed at the Massachusetts Ratifying Con-
vention, provided in pertinent part: "[T]hat the said Constitution
never be construed to authorize Congress... to prevent the people of
the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their
own arms.'"' Adams's proposal is obviously similar to the state con-
stitutional arms provisions, with its guarantee running in favor of
"the people" and its tracking of Massachusetts's own specification of
the right to "keep" arms. But it also strikingly clarifies that the right
to keep arms entails the right of the people to keep "their own"
arms.=
defense as well as for hunting. For its text, see supra text accompanying note 223.
264. See 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 617 (noting that
the minority report was signed by twenty-one of the twenty-three members who voted
against ratification of the Constitution and indicating that the report "circulated through-
out the country in newspaper, broadside, and pamphlet form").
265. See supra text accompanying note 205.
266. For evidence that the group most responsible for inclusion of the original arms
guarantee in Pennsylvania included those who produced the proposal included in the mi-
nority report, see supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
267. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, at 86-87 (Boston, W. White 1856)
[hereinafter DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]. Adams's proposed amendment was never
adopted by the Massachusetts convention; neither were the other fundamental rights that
Adams proposed to protect by amendment. Even so, Madison's draft proposal of what
became the Second Amendment was understood in the Massachusetts press as embodying
the substance of Adams's proposal. See Hardy, supra note 143, at 56 n.247.
268. It is also striking that Adams's proposed amendment in favor of a right of private
arms was included alongside guarantees of liberty of the press, rights of conscience, the
right to petition, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and a prohibition on
standing armies "except when necessary for the defense of the United States." DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 267, at 87. Contrary to the claims of non-individual right
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An equally explicit guarantee of a right to have private arms is
the amendment proposed by the New Hampshire Ratifying Conven-
tion. It provided: "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless
such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.""6 9 Read together,
these proposed amendments fit the pattern revealed in the revolu-
tionary-era statements invoking the right to arms; 70 the right might
be said to run in favor of "the people," or in favor of individual citi-
zens, but in each case the guarantee contemplates a right that equally
serves public ends of collective defense, by ensuring an armed citi-
zenry capable of militia service, and private ends of self-defense and
other lawful and appropriate uses of firearms.
1. The Virginia Proposal
The actual drafting history of the Second Amendment effec-
tively begins in the Virginia Ratifying Convention. The committee,
which included Madison, combined into a single proposed amend-
ment protections relating to arms, militias, standing armies, and civil
control of the military. The arms and militia protections read as fol-
lows: "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a
well regulated Militia composed of the body of the people trained to
arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State."71 Per-
haps the most telling feature of Virginia's proposed amendment is
that it includes the "arms" and "militia" provisions of the state con-
stitutions for the first time-the pattern that would be adopted in the
Second Amendment. That both are included in a larger constitu-
tional provision is suggestive that the two sorts of provisions were not
considered to be functionally identical or completely overlapping27
It is also significant that they are included here as independent
clauses, with the apparent implication that they are viewed as separa-
ble rather than as integrated parts of a single whole, a conclusion that
is reinforced by their inclusion with two other protections that are
also separated by semi-colons.m Finally, the people's right "to keep
advocates, Adams's proposed amendments reflect that the right to keep one's own arms
was viewed as among the fundamental liberties of free people.
269. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 142, at 761.
270. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
271. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 140, at 19 (setting
forth the seventeenth proposed amendment in Virginia's "declaration or bill of rights").
272. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
273. Both the standing army and citizen control provisions, moreover, were omitted
from the federal Bill of Rights, events suggestive of the possibility that either of the other
proffered protections could have been omitted as well; indeed, the clause protecting mili-
tias is at least as closely linked to the protection against standing armies as it is to the
protection of the people's right to arms.
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and bear arms" is the first protection listed, which further suggests
that it does not hold a dependent or subordinate status among the
enumerated protections.274
As to the arms guarantee itself, given the proposals advanced
elsewhere in the country that so clearly reflected the understanding
that the right extended to privately held arms, what stands out in the
Virginia proposal is that the wording is general and unqualified.
Given that Virginia's proposed arms amendment does not even state
any purposes for which the right to arms is guaranteed, as in the
North Carolina275 and Massachusetts276 declarations of rights, it can
easily be read consistently with the Pennsylvania minority's proposed
guarantee that extended to collective and self-defense as well as to
hunting. Had Virginia's purpose been to limit the right to arms to
militia service, as many modem commentators suggest, we would ex-
pect the committee to have carefully constructed the language so as
to reject the private right to arms understanding that is so clearly re-
flected in the proffered alternatives; instead, they chose language that
lent itself to the broadest construction.
Some have drawn the conflicting inference that because the Vir-
ginia proposal, and eventually the Second Amendment, did not adopt
the language of the most broadly worded guarantees, and in particu-
lar the one expressly protecting the right to have guns for self-
defense and hunting, they intended to reject the broad understand-
ings of the right to arms stated in those proposals.' But these
arguments presume both that the broadly worded state proposals
were radical and novel proposals to expand the right to arms beyond
its prior, narrow confines of assuring citizen participation in a militia,
and that the parties to the process of amending the Constitution
would all have understood that. In fact, however, the notion that the
right to arms was limited to militia service is not supported unequivo-
cally by any text or contemporaneous statement that we have seen,'
274. In fact, the two clauses of the Virginia amendment track in an important way the
other state provisions, in that the Right to Arms Clause guarantees "a right" to keep and
bear arms, while the Militia Clause merely declares a preference for a militia. See supra
notes 257-60 and accompanying text. Considering that the Right to Arms Clause is thus a
potentially enforceable right that runs in favor of the people, including individual citizens,
it seems clear that it is the more critical, serviceable provision.
275. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 66 (suggesting that the Framers "refused to
adopt several such proposals").
278. Halbrook has tellingly observed:
If anyone entertained this notion [that the right was a "collective" right of states
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while statements lending strong support to the idea of a right to pri-
vate arms pervade the period from the American Revolution to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights." At the very least the Virginia com-
mittee would have known that the broadly worded state proposals
were not intended as radical innovations, but as restatements of a
familiar right. They, therefore, would have known that it was incum-
bent on themselves to clarify the matter in favor of a narrowly-
circumscribed right had that been their intention.
The better key to understanding the differences among these
various proposed texts is to recognize that the Virginians and eventu-
ally Madison appreciated that their purpose was to include
amendments embodying rights that were already familiar to the
American people. For good or ill, viewed from the perspective of
modem Americans, their tendency was to restate these rights in rela-
tively general language and to avoid getting bogged down in adding,
clarifying, and qualifying language.m This tendency was no doubt
reinforced by the fact that their central purpose was to clarify the ab-
to maintain militias] in the period during which the Constitution and Bill of
Rights were debated and ratified, it remains one of the most closely guarded se-
crets of the eighteenth century, for no known writing surviving from the period
between 1787 and 1791 states such a thesis.
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 83.
279. The widespread commitment to a right of private arms is documented throughout
Part III-A of this Article. The predicate to Herz's reliance on the failure to adopt the
broadest state proposals, by contrast, is his claim that "the plain meaning of [the Militia
Clause of the Second Amendment] suggests a narrow focus on the militia in defining the
right to bear arms." Herz, supra note 14, at 66. While Herz's suggestion that the Militia
Clause provides the key to "defining" the right to bear arms has previously been refuted
as textual analysis, see supra notes 69-107 and accompanying text, the compelling obser-
vation here is that the structure of the Virginia proposal clearly separates the clauses and
in no way raises an inference that the right to arms is defined as being predicated on the
militia provision. Virginia proposed an unqualified popular right to arms, and the drafters
of that provision could not have relied upon the separate Militia Clause to preclude the
inference that they were endorsing a general right to private arms.
280. A brief comparative glance at the state declarations of rights reveals substantial
differences in the amount of detail included in many of their rights provisions and
equivalent provisions of the proposed Virginia amendments. Compare MD. CONST.,
Decl. of Rts. art. XXXIII (1776), supra note 204, at 1689 (stating a duty to worship God
according to conscience and providing that "all persons, professing the Christian religion,
are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought by
any law to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or
profession, or for his religious practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall
disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality,
or injury others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights"), with Amendments Proposed
by the Virginia Convention, supra note 106, at 19 (providing that the manner of dis-
charging religious duty "can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free
exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience").
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sence of federal authority to invade these rights rather than to de-
velop their nuances or to resolve potentially varying
understandings.2'
2. Madison's Proposed "Second Amendment"
In June of 1789, Madison presented his proposed bill of rights to
Congress, which included the following language: "The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed,
and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country."
' '
Madison's proposal serves as a bridge between the amendment pro-
posed by Virginia and the final language of the Second Amendment;
while it does not place the Militia Clause as an introductory clause, in
the manner of the final text, it does appear to link the two clauses
more closely together than does the Virginia guarantee. Madison's
Militia Clause reads as an explanation of the people's right to arms
and, some might contend, by analogy to arguments based on the text
of the Second Amendment, even as a qualifying or limiting statement
of the scope or purpose of the right to arms guarantee. But a closer
examination of the wording of the two clauses, in the light of what we
know of Madison's goals in drafting the Bill of Rights, suggests an
explanation for Madison's choice of language that confirms the cen-
trality of the popular right to private arms and the role of the Militia
Clause as a general restatement of the centuries-old philosophy in
favor of citizen militias.
The critical thing to notice in Madison's arms clause is that its
force as a rights guarantee is greatly strengthened as compared to its
predecessors; Madison's guarantee does not merely state the exis-
tence of the right in question, but specifically provides that the right
"shall not be infringed."' This is no small matter. Leading scholars
on the Bill of Rights have credited Madison with completing the
transition from "declarations" of rights, not necessarily intended as
enforceable limitations on government, to a "bill" of rights that was
drafted in the hard language of legal command in the anticipation of
281. This process of moving to more general formulations is further illustrated by a
quick glance at the federal Bill of Rights equivalent of the freedom of religion clauses
reviewed above. See supra note 280; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise of [religion] .... "). Notice also that the
Second Amendment simply omits the language of the Virginia proposal that describes the
militia as "composed of the body of the people," an idea that was no doubt presumed in
the Second Amendment but which is regularly disputed by those who reject the idea that
the Amendment guarantees a right to private arms.
282. James Madison Resolution, supra note 142, at 12.
283. See id.
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judicial review.' Speaking before Congress, moreover, Madison jus-
tified the need to include provisions constituting a bill of rights partly
on the ground that courts would become the guardians of the peo-
ple's rights "[i]f they are incorporated into the constitution,"'' and
this rationale was the apparent fruit of Madison's ongoing dialogue
with Thomas Jefferson about the possible advantages of adding a bill
of rights to the Constitution.'m
Consequently, whether its provisions are drafted as prohibitions
on the exercise of certain powers or in the form of rights, guarantees,
or immunities, Madison's Bill of Rights stays away from broad and
unenforceable statements of principle that often characterized the
states' declarations of rights.' When he did choose to include state-
ments of a few basic first principles based on language in the state
declarations of rights, he proposed to insert the language into the
preamble of the Constitution-a reflection that he perceived that
such general statements did not belong in the body of the Constitu-
tion because they were not legal provisions, but statements of shared
principles that describe the presuppositions of our constitutional or-
der.m
284. See, e.g., Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions 1776-1791, in
CONSTITUTIONS AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, 116 (1987); Ber-
nard Schwartz, Madison Introduces His Amendments (May-June, 1789), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 142, at 1006, 1008-09; Lutz, supra note 235, at 14.
Lutz observed, in an earlier work, that state declarations of rights pervasively used
"language of obligation rather than command[s], 'ought,' 'should,' [etc.]," and that this
language sharply contrasted with language of command found in the same constitutions'
frames of government" that established the allocation of power within state government.
DONALD S. LuTz, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL
THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 65-66 (1980). Madison's shift to the
language of command, even as contrasted with the amendments proposed by the state
ratifying conventions, reflects his decision to propose including the amendments into the
body of the Constitution rather than in a "declaration of rights" that would precede the
body of the Constitution; it reflects his expectation that his amendments would be under-
stood as limiting provisions that could be enforced by courts.
285. THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER 1789, June 8, supra note 104, at 83.
286. See Letter from Jefferson to Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 142, at 620, 620 (noting that Madison's prior com-
ments about a bill of rights had omitted mention of a purpose "which has great weight
with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary").
287. See, e.g., PA. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. V (1776), supra note 121, at 3082 (stating
that "[g]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people" (emphasis added)); VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 12 (1776), supra
note 94, at 3814 (stating that the press "can never be restrained but by despotic govern-
ments"). As Lutz observes, such provisions are "statements of shared values and
fundamental principles rather than a simple listing of prohibitions on governmental ac-
tion." Lutz, supra note 235, at 9.
288. The language Madison proposed to add to the preamble, loosely based on lan-
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Madison's decision to strengthen the constitutional provisions
defending liberties and limiting government almost certainly im-
pacted on the drafting of what would become the Second
Amendment. On the one hand, Madison would have recognized that
Virginia's proposed militia provision, like the state declaration of
rights provisions to similar effect, was a statement of classical repub-
lican philosophy about how to preserve political liberty, rather than
an enforceable individual rights guarantee. In a sense, it did not fit
into Madison's approach to drafting amendments as meaningful lim-
iting provisions. On the other hand, given the widely voiced concerns
about the potential threat to the militia system posed by the powers
given Congress by the Constitution, Madison would have been reluc-
tant to omit any reassuring provision, and this inclination could only
have been strengthened because of his decision, consistent with a
strongly held Federalist commitment, to omit any provision limiting
Congress's authority to create a standing army.?9 Madison also un-
derstood that the people's right to possess and use arms and the
continuation of the militia system were closely related concepts, and
that a central end of the right to have arms was to maintain a body of
people capable of service in a universal militia. Madison's purpose,
then, was in no sense to qualify or limit the right to arms embodied in
existing and proposed provisions, including the amendment proposed
by Virginia; it was, rather, to tie together the "arms" and "militia"
provisions, both to underscore that they were closely related and to
avoid inclusion of a freestanding declaration of principle that would
lack "fit" with the balance of enforceable guarantees included in the
Bill of Rights.2'
guage in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, reads, in part, as follows: "That government
is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally
of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." James Madison Resolution, supra note
142, at 11. Strikingly, when others objected that Madison's proposal would serve to
muddy a succinctly written preamble, Madison acknowledged that he had chosen to in-
clude this language of "self evident" principles because several states had proposed
similar language; but he observed that those not wanting this language to be added to the
preamble "will be puzzled to find a better place." Debates in the House of Representa-
tives (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at
128-29, 138.
289. See supra note 133. Not only did Madison not include any version of the prof-
fered standing army amendments, but a proposal to insert such a provision was rejected
by the Senate on September 4, 1789. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
103, at 38 n.13.
290. David Hardy is thus correct in arguing that "[tjo read what was a recognition of
an individual right, the right to arms, as subsumed within the militia recognition is thus
not only permitting the tail to wag the dog, but to annihilate what was intended as a
right." Hardy, supra note 143, at 60.
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3. Congressional Treatment of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
By the time the Committee of the Whole in the House of Repre-
sentatives issued its report, on July 28, 1789, Madison's arms/militia
proposal had been inverted so as to place the Militia Clause first, as
in the final text of the Second Amendment.291 The amendment
adopted by the House, however, retained the language describing the
militia as "composed of the body of the people." 292 In the Senate, this
definitional language was omitted and, with other minor language
changes, the Amendment took its final form.23 The only other event
of relevance in the deliberative process of Congress is that on Sep-
tember 9, 1789, the Senate rejected a proposal to insert the words
"for the common defence" after "bear arms."
294
As a general proposition, interpreters should be wary of over-
reading the significance of mere omissions or of the decisions not to
insert additional, possibly clarifying language. In this case, however,
when the decision rejecting the inserted language is examined in the
larger historical context, it lends additional support to the conclusion
that the Amendment's drafters intended a wide-ranging right to
arms. This conclusion is powerfully reinforced, as developed above,
by the number of ratification-era proposed amendments that had so
clearly stated the right to own private arms for lawful purposes;
rather than using language that would establish a much more re-
stricted scope for the right to keep and bear arms to be protected by
the Constitution, Congress refused to add even relatively muted
qualifying language.29 Moreover, that the Senate made relatively
minor language changes that same day, changing the description of
the militia as "the best" defense of a free state to "necessary to the"
defense, reflects that this refusal to insert limiting language did not
come about because the Senate was reluctant to make any changes at
this stage in the consideration process.296 The meaning of the Second
Amendment emerges much more clearly from the historical materi-
als relating to the right to arms as it was understood in colonial
291. See House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 29,30.
292. Id.; see also House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, Article the Fifth
(Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 37, 38
(retaining language defining nature of militia).
293. See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, supra note 292, at 38 n.13.
294. Id.
295. For a more complete analysis along these lines, see supra notes 274-76 and ac-
companying text.
296. See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, supra note 292, at 38 n.13.
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America through the state constitutions. Those historical materials
support the conclusion of Tench Coxe that the Amendment was de-
signed to preserve the right of the people to their private arms. 9
C. The Post-Ratification Understanding of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms
Interpreters have often consulted post-ratification materials that
might shed light on the historical meaning of a statutory or constitu-
tional provision. There are at least two reasons that such materials
are taken into consideration. First, post-ratification materials often
shed important additional light on the original public meaning of the
provision at issue, even if they arguably deserve less weight than pre-
adoption evidence."8 Second, a consensus among the branches of
government and the people over many years can be viewed as basi-
cally establishing the meaning of a provision, especially in cases
where there is room for debate as to the original meaning.'M The
analysis of the right to keep and bear arms by nineteenth-century
courts and scholars lends strong support to the idea of a private right
to arms under either of these rationales for reliance on such materi-
als.
Perhaps the single most significant commentary on the right to
keep and bear arms is found in St. George Tucker's 1803 work,
Blackstone's Commentaries with Notes of Reference to the Constitu-
297. See supra note 122 (discussing statement of Tench Coxe).
298. It is a long-standing maxim, for example, that constructions adopted by the peo-
ple and their elected representatives in close proximity to the adoption of the
Constitution are entitled to great weight. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) (stating that a construction placed on constitutional lan-
guage by early congresses, comprised of "men who were... members of the convention
which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight," and that when such construc-
tions "have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost
conclusive"); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,401 (1819) (contending that
when a principle is "introduced at a very early period of our history" and "recognised by
many successive legislatures," it "ought not to be lightly disregarded").
299. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 307-08 (1803) (contending that acqui-
escence of "the judges, and of the people" to early constructions give them "a sanction
which ought not now to be questioned"); id. at 309 (stating that contemporary exposition
that becomes established practice for a period of years "affords an irresistable [sic] an-
swer, and has indeed fixed the construction"); see also Thomas B. McAffee, Brown and
the Doctrine of Precedent- A Concurring Opinion, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 99, 102 n.16 (1995)
(describing James Madison's acquiescence in the view that Congress had authority to
establish a national bank, despite his initial opposition on constitutional grounds, based on
his view that the issue had been settled" 'by repeated recognitions, under varied circum-
stances, of the validity of such an institution'" (quoting PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson eds., 2d
ed. 1983))).
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tion and Law of the Federal Government.m Tucker was an important
legal commentator, a contemporary of Madison, and had a brother,
Thomas Tudor Tucker, who served in the House of Representatives
that proposed the Bill of Rights."°' As important as any specific
statement in Tucker's annotated edition of Blackstone is Tucker's
explicit identification of the Second Amendment with the English
right to arms as it was described in Blackstone's work. This linkage
confirms the continuity in American thought on the private right to
arms from the beginnings of the revolutionary period to the end of
the founding period (which some place at circa 1805).m Blackstone
clearly read the English right as including a private right to arms in
support of self-defense. Concurring with Blackstone that the "right
of self-defence is the first law of nature," Tucker links the need for an
arms guarantee to government's tendency to restrict the right of self-
defense "within the narrowest limits possible." 3 Tucker assures his
American audience, moreover, that the Second Amendment will
stand as a barrier to the sort of limitations imposed by England's
game laws that had been employed to keep firearms out of the hands
of farmers and tradesmen.m"
Almost thirty years later, Tucker's son, Henry St. George
300. TUCKER, supra note 166.
301. See Quinlan, supra note 7, at 647 & n.31.
302. See 1 TUCKER, supra note 166, at 143. On Blackstone's treatment of the English
right to arms, including his association of it with the private right of self-defense, see su-
pra note 197. In fact, Tucker goes to some length to clarify that the American
constitutional right was even broader than the English right because it did not contain any
of the latter's qualifying language. See 1 TUCKER, supra note 166, at 143 n.40; accord
James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress Supporting Amendments, June 8, 1789, re-
printed in ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 243, at 645 (comparing
limited nature of English guarantees compared to those in American constitutions, noting
in particular that the English arms guarantee gave only "arms to Pretestts"); THE
CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 8, 1789, supra note 104, at 80 (corresponding portion
of Madison's speech comparing limited nature of English guarantees with the broader
American counterparts). Lutz and Hyneman's important compilation of political writings
of the founding period, for example, uses 1765-1805 to define the period under considera-
tion. See 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 201.
303. 1 TUCKER, supra note 166, app. at 300.
304. See 1 id. In another context, Tucker argued that a hypothetical law that outlawed
the bearing of arms to the end of preventing insurrections could not pass muster as an
exercise of the power granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. See 1 id. app. at 289.
Any other understanding, according to Tucker, would render the Second Amendment "a
mere nullity." 1 id. If the Second Amendment was intended only to secure the power of
states to establish militias, or purely to grant individuals only the right to use a weapon
when actually serving in a militia, Tucker's hypothetical law should have been constitu-
tional. Modem proposals to disarm citizens in an effort to fight crime are almost
perfectly analogous to Tucker's hypothetical-but he saw such a law as running rough-
shod over the Second Amendment.
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Tucker, whose own distinguished career ranged from the legal acad-
emy to the bench to the halls of Congress, wrote in his Commentaries
on the Laws of Virginia, that the "primary rights of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property," were secured, first, by "bills
of rights and written constitutions," and, second, by "[t]he right of
bearing arms."35 Tucker underscored that, in contrast to the restric-
tions often imposed under English law, this right to arms "is
practically enjoyed by every citizen, and is among his most valuable
privileges, since it furnishes the means of resisting as a freeman
ought, the inroads of usurpation.' 3°n Writing in the same era, Joseph
Story, perhaps the leading nineteenth-century commentator on the
United States Constitution, wrote that "[t]he right of citizens to keep
and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the lib-
erties of a republic" because "it offers a strong moral check against
the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers" and, in cases in which
such rulers are initially successful, will "enable the people to resist
and triumph over them." 7
Another important commentator, William Rawle, writing in
1829, described the relationship between the two clauses of the Sec-
ond Amendment in sharp contrast to the modern view that insists
that the Militia Clause serves as limiting language upon the right to
arms. Rawle begins with the Militia Clause, in which "it is declared
that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state,"
a statement, he asserts, "from which few will dissent."'' s The Right to
305. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 43
(Winchester, Winchester Virginian 1831). One can hear echoes of Blackstone's famous
work, linking the personal right to arms to the idea of securing the basic personal rights
that are given to men by the law of nature.
306. See id Tucker clearly embraces the exact view of the right to arms as a source of
security for the people's right of collective defense against tyrannous government that has
been ridiculed in the modem era as an implausible "insurrectionist" theory. See supra
note 252.
307. 3 STORY, supra note 96, at 746. Both Story and Tucker employ language de-
scribing the holders of the right as "every citizen" and "citizens" rather than the
Amendment's language of "the people," even when referring to the collective purposes
for which the right in part exists. This usage by such careful students of the Constitution
is powerful confirmation that the Second Amendment's use of "the people" simply tracks
with other guarantees, such as the Fourth Amendment, that secure personal rights, and is
not used as an equivalent to "the militia," as some modem commentators have suggested.
When collective language is employed, it is also used in a context conveying the idea of an
individual right. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (New York, Harper & Bros., 1883) ("One of the
ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purpose without resistance, is, by dis-
arming the people, and making it an offense to keep arms .. ").
308. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 125 (Philadelphia, P.H.
Micklin, 2d ed. 1829) (emphasis added).
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Arms Clause, by contrast, is described as a general "prohibition" that
serves to clarify that Congress lacks "a power to disarm the people";
it states, in other words, "[t]he corollary, from the first posi-
tion, is that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed."' Rawle accurately perceives, in short, that while the two
clauses reflect the close connection between the value placed on the
idea of a citizen-based militia and the popular right to arms, the in-
troductory clause merely declares a general principle of classical
republic political doctrine while the Right to Arms Clause functions
as a "prohibition" in support of a popular right.
Perhaps the most compelling explication of the Second Amend-
ment comes from the leading constitutional commentator of the
second half of the nineteenth century, Thomas Cooley. Cooley not
only construes the Amendment as creating a personal right to keep
arms, he manages to anticipate the twentieth-century attempt to re-
duce the scope of the Amendment by reference to the militia focus of
the first clause:
The Right is General-It may be supposed from the phrase-
ology of this provision that the right to keep and bear arms
was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an in-
terpretation not warranted by the intent.... But the law
may make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to
perform military duty, or of a small number only, or it may
wholly omit to make any provision at all; and if the right
were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act
of the government it was meant to hold in check. The
meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people,
from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to
keep and bear arms, and they need no permission or regula-
tion of law for the purpose.1
In addition to the commentators, the nineteenth-century state
and federal courts that addressed issues as to the nature and scope of
the right to keep and bear arms, under both the Second Amendment
and its state constitutional counterparts,31' all proceeded on the as-
sumption that the right to arms extended a personal right to firearms
for lawful purposes not limited to service in organized militias. The
309. Id. at 126.
310. COOLEY, supra note 87, at 298.
311. As to the significance of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to
keep and bear arms, from the nineteenth-century state constitutions down to the present,
see infra notes 404-17 and accompanying text.
312. For an extensive review, see Quinlan, supra note 7, at 652-59; see also Bliss v.
[Vol. '75
19971 SECOND AMENDMENT
decisions in this era confirm the widespread recognition that the Sec-
ond Amendment was understood as restating a fundamental right to
arms that stemmed back to the English Bill of Rights;313 that part of
the purpose of ensuring to all citizens a right to arms was to secure
liberty as well as to render possible a self-armed citizen militia;314 that
no language in the Second Amendment "restricts its meaning," and
that the right to private arms is as "comprehensive and valuable" as
the other individual rights guarantees contained in the first eight
amendments;3 5 and that the right extended to self-defense as well as
to collective defense.3 6 At least as important, not a single nineteenth-
century court adopted the views of modem courts and commentators
that the right to keep and bear arms was vested in state governments
alone or extended only to citizens actually performing militia service.
The denial of fundamental rights to the newly freed slaves in the
South after the Civil War extended to efforts to disarm African-
Americans. 17 These developments prompted Congress to take action
to protect the rights of African-American citizens, including specifi-
cally the right to keep and bear arms. An examination of the debates
surrounding the Freedmen's Bureau Act, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment shows that members of the
Reconstruction Era Congress viewed the Second Amendment as se-
curing an individual right to keep and bear arms.31 For instance,
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 90 (1822) (reversing conviction of individual for car-
rying a sword cane in violation of a statute prohibiting concealed weapons on the ground
that the law violated the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution); id.
at 93 (treating Kentucky guarantee that went back to 1792, and which was based on the
Pennsylvania model, as embodying a general right to arms that "existed at the adoption of
the constitution").
313. See Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243,249 (1846).
314. See id. at 249-50; see also Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 401 (1859) (stating that
the object of the Second Amendment is "the perpetuation of free government," and that
it is "based on the idea, that the people cannot be effectually oppressed and enslaved,
who are not first disarmed").
315. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251.
316. See State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489,490 (1850).
317. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 3, at 342-49; Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal
Security, Personal Liberty, and "The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms": Visions of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 343, 347-354 (1995)
(documenting attempts to disarm freed slaves in the southern states).
318. For an exhaustive examination of the Reconstruction Era views regarding the
Second Amendment, see Halbrook, supra note 317, passim. On whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, see RAOUL
BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989); MICHAEL
K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Amar, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1218-54;
Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1251-53. The one thing that is quite clear from the histori-
cal materials is that, to the extent that personal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
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section 14 of the Freedmen's Bureau Act states:
That in every State or district where the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion,
and until the same shall be fully restored, and in every State
or district whose constitutional relations to the government
have been practically discontinued by the rebellion, and un-
til such State shall have been restored in such relations, and
shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United
States, the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have
full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings concern-
ing personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition,
enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, in-
cluding the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured
to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or district
without respect to race or color, or previous condition of
slavery. 9
These post-ratification materials provide compelling confirma-
tion that the right to arms, as it was understood generally in colonial
and founding-era America, extended to private firearms and re-
flected a general commitment to an armed citizenry. It thus lends
strong support to the understanding of the original meaning of the
right to keep and bear arms set forth in this Article. Beyond the
strength these materials lend to the analysis of the pre-confirmation
materials supplied above, they also provide the basis for concluding
that the basic meaning of the arms guarantee was firmly established
in the first century of practice under the Constitution and that depar-
tures from this well-established consensus must carry a heavy burden
of justification. Advocates of another view must confront not only
the materials relating to the original meaning, but the weight prop-
erly given to thoughtful, well-settled practice as well. Even among
scholars who have expressed skepticism about originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation, especially when specific rather than ab-
stract meanings are sought, there has been the recognition that when
historical evidence of original intentions are combined with long-
standing practices and shared understandings, the meaning of the
Constitution may become fixed and settled."l
were among the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to keep and bear
arms would surely be included among them. See Quinlan, supra note 7, at 663-76.
319. Act of July 16, 1866, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866) (emphasis added).




Thus, for example, Professor David Richards, a scholar known
for his forceful criticisms of "originalist" constitutional analysis, has
nonetheless contended that the combination of text, context, and
constitutional practice build a compelling case that Congress has, in
recent decades, abdicated its constitutional power and duty to decide
the question whether the nation will fight a war.21 The case as to the
right to keep and bear arms, however, is even more compelling; while
virtually all parties to our constitutional discourse paid lip service to
the original allocation of decision-making authority as to war-
making, it is well known that these understandings were often hon-
ored in the breach by Presidents bent on pursuing their own policies
almost from the beginning.3 Some have even contended that this
pattern of conduct should be read as a gloss on the original under-
standing of the War Clause. 3 While such a claim is controversial,
with good reason,324 there is nothing of a similar nature to muddy the
water here. Given that the extremely limited reading of the right to
keep and bear arms, as strictly limited by the terms of the Militia
Clause, is a twentieth-century invention, its advocates should bear a
heavy burden to establish that it is anything more than a constitu-
tional aberration.
IV. THE DOCrRINE OF PRECEDENT
It has become a standard argument that the issue of a personal
right to arms has long since been resolved by a uniform set of rulings
by the federal courts. This argument has been embraced by the
American Bar Association and other important voices in the legal
establishment (including a former Supreme Court Justice and a for-
mer Solicitor General).3" It is important to understand that this
argument often appears to go beyond the make-weight suggestion
321. See id.
322. See, e.g., FRANCIS D. WORMUTH ET AL., To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE
WAR POvER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 133 (1986) (describing argument in
favor of presidential authority to wage war based on fact "that in the course of our history
the President has very frequently exercised the power to make war without congressional
authorization").
323. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 19
(1970) (discussing contention that history has legitimated the practice of presidential war-
making).
324. In the war powers context, the idea that illegality cannot attain legitimacy
through practice seems especially compelling. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
546-47 (1969) (expressing doubt about the precedential effect of unconstitutional acts of
Congress). For a powerful critique of reliance on presidential practice, see WORMUTH ET
AL., supra note 322, at 133-49.
325. See supra notes 16,50 and accompanying text.
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that the case law lends support to a preferred reading or presents the
current state of the law (subject to future decisions). Rather, the ar-
gument appears to be that these decisions have not only settled the
law, once and for all, in favor of the militia-based reading of the
Amendment, but that continuing advocacy of the constitutional right
to keep and bear arms in the face of these decisions constitutes a kind
of lawless intransigence, if not the commission of an outright fraud on
the American people.326
Considering the force and urgency with which this case law is
promoted as a debate-stopper in the current dialogue about the Sec-
ond Amendment, it is a bit surprising that so little has been offered
beyond a review of the holdings of the cases to justify such over-
whelming reliance on the current state of the law. After all, if there is
any feature of modem constitutional law with which Americans are
familiar, and particularly legal scholars, it is that the law changes. In
this century alone, we have witnessed the rise and fall, and the rise
(again) of substantive due process. The watershed of the New Deal
gave way to the Warren Court Revolution, which commenced with
the Supreme Court's precedent-shattering decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.7 Every American law student studies Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,32 a decision that overruled a leading deci-
sion of almost a century earlier.3 9 The Court's general willingness to
reconsider precedent has not abated: during the period from 1973 to
1993 alone, the Supreme Court overruled, in whole or in part, thirty-
five previous constitutional decisions.'
When it comes to the gun debate, however, it appears to be bad
form to focus on the possibility of change rather than on the current
state of the law. But we are not told why. We are offered no theory
of the doctrine of stare decisis nor any attempt at distinguishing cases
326. Indeed, it has been contended that gun rights advocates who invoke the Second
Amendment, and legal scholars who have found a personal right to own firearms as the
intended meaning of the Second Amendment, "perpetuate the popular false conscious-
ness regarding the operative meaning" of the Amendment when they fail to acknowledge
that the issue is definitively settled by the courts. Herz, supra note 14, at 145. But Profes-
sor Herz is not exactly a voice in the wilderness. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON GuN VIOLENCE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5 (1994)
(arguing that there is a great need to inform the public regarding the meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment and to make widely known the fact that the United States Supreme
Court and lower courts interpret this provision as not including an individual right to keep
and bear arms).
327. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
328. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
329. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
330. See Quinlan, supra note 7, at 691.
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like Erie. Indeed, to the extent that any sort of normative argument
is offered to support the insistence that we should "let settled law
lie,".33' it is generally rooted in the model of a "living constitution"
and the related argument that an individual right to keep and bear
arms does not fit in modem American society.332 Perplexing ques-
tions about the relationship between the courts, other branches of
government, and the people are either ignored or treated simplisti-
cally.33 In at least one case, constitutional meaning is more or less
equated with decision-making by courts,3 4 and the Supreme Court is
treated with a reverence that would make Chief Justice Marshall
blush.335 Finally, the United States Supreme Court's bare acquies-
cence in lower court constructions of its own half-century old
decision-constructions that a number of thoughtful scholars have
sharply criticized-is construed as a ratification of these decisions
deserving of virtually equal weight as a carefully considered opinion
of the Court.36
The relevance of the right to keep and bear arms in our world
must necessarily be confronted because the gun control struggle will
continue to be waged at the state level, as well as at the federal, and
numerous state constitutions include arms provisions that are simply
not subject to the case law decided by the federal courts. In the sec-
tions that follow we will suggest three reasons why precedent should
not be viewed as a significant barrier to bringing forward the right to
keep and bear arms. First, in Part IV-A we argue that the precedent
331. Herz, supra note 14, at 77.
332. See id. at 66-67. On the other hand, for those who have invested the most in de-
fending the militia-based reading of the Second Amendment in historical terms, the case
law is used mainly to confirm and support their interpretation. See, e.g., Ehrman & Heni-
gan, supra note 27, at 40-57.
333. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 105-18. For useful perspectives on some of these
questions, see Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1071
(1987).
334. See Herz, supra note 14, at 105 & n.214 (equating "legal certainty" with
"predictability of judicial decision," citing Holmes's description of "the law" as
"prophecies of what the court will do in fact"); id. (concluding that the militia-based
reading of the Second Amendment is thus a legal certainty). For a critique of this sort of
theory of law, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961).
335. See Herz, supra note 14, at 107 (continuing insistence on personal right to keep
and bear arms "ignores the judiciary's supposedly primary role in constitutional matters"
and denies "[d]ialogic legitimacy" to "those best trained to interpret the Constitution");
id. at 109 (stating that the gun rights lobby "thumbs its collective nose at the judiciary,
and at the significance of the judiciary's role in interpreting the Constitution"); id at 118
(stating that those who ignore settled case law have "marginalized the judiciary's essential
task of constitutional interpretation").
336. See id at 78-79.
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relied upon cannot carry the weight given it by opponents of a private
right to firearms when judged by any reasonable theory of stare deci-
sis. Second, in Part IV-B we suggest that the doctrine of precedent is
a two-edged sword; if the court employs it to avoid serious grappling
with the original meaning of the Second Amendment, it still must
confront the underlying substantive issues in giving principled appli-
cation to the fundamental rights doctrine it has developed in the
modem era. Finally, in Part IV-C we suggest that the federal cases
being relied upon are not as decisive as its proponents would have it,
if for no other reason than that the Second Amendment is not the
only game in town.
A. The Federal Case Law and the Doctrine of Precedent
As suggested above, when critics of a line of cases contend that it
should be reconsidered because it is incorrectly decided, it is a logi-
cally incomplete argument to insist that the question of
reconsideration is foreclosed solely on the bare existence of the cases
under fire. Given that the doctrine of stare decisis has long ceased to
be anything like an absolute doctrine, there must be an argument as
to why the doctrine of precedent should apply.37 Indeed, the conven-
tional view is that stare decisis receives less weight in constitutional
cases precisely because errors by the Supreme Court in constitutional
adjudication are otherwise so difficult to correct; ordinary political
processes are unavailable to those aggrieved by the decision.338 And
for those who believe that the Constitution "must be read against the
backdrop of changing social circumstances," rather than through the
eyes of "white property-owning males who lived in a world utterly
different than our own," an extremely robust view of the role of stare
decisis seems difficult to warrant.339 After all, stare decisis could eas-
ily become a barrier to adapting the Constitution to changing social
circumstances.
At the same time, of course, there are very few advocates of
337. It is possible, of course, to defend challenged precedents on the merits by con-
testing criticisms launched against them. But then the argument is not really one from
precedent as such; at most, the precedent is pointed to as illustrating or confirming a view
supported on other grounds.
338. For this standard view, see United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 699 (1964). An
additional factor is that certainty and stability are probably not nearly as much the critical
ingredients in constitutional law as they arguably must be in fields like commercial law
(where knowing what the law is so as to enable planning is virtually as important as what
the particular legal rule turns out to be).
339. Herz, supra note 14, at 66.
[Vol. 75
SECOND AMENDMENT
eliminating the doctrine of stare decisis altogether,3 if for no other
reason than because a constitutional order, like life, requires some
closure. We recognize "that many debatable questions require reso-
lution so that society can get on with the task of conforming to
established ground rules."'341 The real difficulty is in articulating stan-
dards to guide the inquiry as to when the doctrine of stare decisis
should have real bite, applying even when we have reason to believe
that the applicable precedent was incorrect when initially decided. 2
Fortunately, the present case is not at the cutting edge of what proves
to be a complex issue, for virtually all the factors that seem relevant
to developing a doctrine of stare decisis point away from its applica-
tion here.
Far from presenting us with a long-standing and unbroken chain
of decisions extending back virtually to the time of adoption of the
constitutional provision, the federal case law being relied upon here
is only a half a century old at best. It contradicts the views uniformly
adopted by courts and commentators for more than a century after
the adoption of the Second Amendment.M3 The Supreme Court deci-
sion that inaugurates this new era of judicial consensus joins the
consensus only ambiguously, and only if the decision is read as re-
jecting sub silentio prior declarations of the Court." This modem
case law, moreover, can be described as embodying a "consensus"
only by a careful process of exclusion-exclusion of the conflicting
decisions of other courts, especially within the states, construing
analogous right to arms provisions; 5 exclusion of conflicting declara-
tions of a coordinate branch of government, the Congress, dating
back to the 1860s,46 and exclusion of the continuing commitment of
340. For a rare case, see generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994) (arguing that rationale underlying
Marbury v. Madison, giving priority to the idea of a fixed, written Constitution, should
equally give priority to the Constitution over any and all decisions of those construing it).
For a conflicting view, see McAffee, supra note 299, at 100-03.
341. McAffee, supra note 299, at 103.
342. For one effort to grapple in a sophisticated way with these fundamental sorts of
questions, see Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).
343. See supra notes 298-320 and accompanying text.
344. See infra notes 365-80 and accompanying text.
345. See infra notes 410-17 and accompanying text.
346. See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment
Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62
TENN. L. REV. 597 (1995) (arguing that Congress's expansive declarations of the right to
keep and bear arms are entitled to great weight because it is a branch of government rep-
resented by the people).
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the American people to the right to keep and bear arms-a commit-
ment that stems not from a delusion generated by the gun lobby, but
from their adherence to the tradition that has viewed firearms as an
integral part of the right of self-defense. When these considerations
are taken together with the fundamental flaws in the reasoning and
arguments advanced in the decisions in question, and the fact that
they so clearly do an injustice to the overwhelming weight of histori-
cal evidence, it becomes evident that precedent is not an important
barrier to recognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms.
1. The Supreme Court's Construction of the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms
It is striking that the opponents of a personal right to keep and
bear arms seem invariably to start with United States v. Miller, 7 and
treat other Supreme Court cases confronting the Second Amendment
as relating mainly to the controversy over incorporation of the Sec-
ond Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. But Miller
should be read against the backdrop of the Court's prior, admittedly
somewhat meager, body of Second Amendment decisions. When all
the Court's pronouncements are read together the most striking thing
is that it has not yet conclusively resolved the most basic issue sur-
rounding the Second Amendment: Does the Amendment protect a
right of individual citizens to own a firearm or is it concerned solely
with a non-individual right of states to maintain militias free from
federal encroachment? The Court's nineteenth-century pronounce-
ments, admittedly mainly in dictum, indicate a clear leaning towards
an individual right interpretation, while Miller, its only twentieth-
century decision of relevance, lends support (albeit somewhat am-
biguously) to the personal right interpretation.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford,"9 the Court writes as though a per-
sonal right to own and use firearms was a simple given of the nation's
constitutional landscape. In one passage discussing the implications
of extending the full rights of citizenship to non-slave African-
Americans, the Court expresses concern that it would mean that such
individuals would have complete freedom to travel and sojourn in
slave states, exercise freedom of speech and rights of assembly, and
"to keep and carry arms wherever they went."350 In a second passage
347. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
348. See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 27, at 41-42, 52-53; Herz, supra note 14,
at 68-72.
349. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
350. See id. at 417.
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describing the limits that the Bill of Rights imposes even on Con-
gress's power to regulate in the territories, the Court asserts that "the
citizen" retains his fundamental freedoms-including freedom of re-
ligion, speech, press, assembly and petition, trial by jury, privilege
against self-incrimination, and, oddly enough, the right to keep and
bear arms. 5' In short, the Court speaks of the right to keep and bear
arms in the same breath as other individual rights contained in the
First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 2
Similarly, the Court in Robertson v. Baldwin353 writes as though
the idea that the Second Amendment includes a personal right to
arms of some scope is a starting point for further analysis. There the
Court argued, consistently with the analysis set forth in this Article,3"
that the federal Bill of Rights restated already-established rights in
relatively general and succinct language, relying on the assumption
that the basic rights, and "certain well-recognized exceptions arising
from the necessities of the case," would be understood without being
spelled out in clear text.355 Among the examples the Court employs
to illustrate this analysis is the observation that the right to keep and
bear arms "is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of con-
cealed weapons. The Court's analysis thus treats laws prohibiting
the carrying of concealed weapons as an "exception" to a general
right "arising from the necessities of the case," consistent with some
state court decisions upholding concealed carry laws on precisely
such a rationale.3' It is only because such laws fall within such an ex-
ception, according to the Court, that the right itself is "not infringed"
in a constitutional sense; the premise of the argument is that the right
351. See id. at 449-50.
352. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Taney grew up during the founding period,
practiced law in Maryland from 1799 to 1826, and served as the Attorney General of his
state, and then of the nation, prior to being confirmed to the Supreme Court in 1836. See
LEON FRIEDMAN & FRED L. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJORITY OPINIONS 338-43 (1995). He also served on the
Court with Justice Joseph Story. See id. at 345. Chief Justice Taney was, in short, well
situated to have gained an understanding of what thoughtful nineteenth-century legal
commentators would have thought about the Second Amendment.
353. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
354. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
355. See Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281-82.
356. See id.
357. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk) 165, 187 (1871) (upholding con-
cealed carry law as consistent with personal right to have firearms). This holding makes
no sense in the context of a militia-centered reading of the right to keep and bear arms.
A law preventing militia members from carrying concealed weapons would be nonsensi-
cal, and the question of the scope of the protection offered by the constitutional
guarantee would never be addressed if the guarantee was conceived so narrowly.
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to arms is a personal right that is subject to appropriate exceptions.
The Court's reliance on other examples of "exceptions" read into the
understanding of basic freedoms-based on freedom of speech and of
the press, double jeopardy, self-incrimination-fits nicely with Dred
Scott's grouping of the right to keep and bear arms with other expres-
sions of individual liberty, a grouping that proponents of the narrow
reading of the Second Amendment claim was never intended.
Prior to Miller, the only other Supreme Court cases dealing with
the Second Amendment were United States v. Cruikshank,358 Presser
v. Illinois,359 and Miller v. Texas.' All three cases simply track the
holding in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore36' that none of the rights
contained in the Bill of Rights were enforceable against the states.362
As Professor Van Alstyne notes, Presser and Cruikshank "merely
mimicked others of the same era in holding that none of the rights or
freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights were made applicable by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the states." Cruikshank, Presser,
and Miller, therefore, have no modem relevance to the issue of in-
corporation as it relates to the Second Amendment.3"
358. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). The defendants in Cruikshank had been convicted under the
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, of banding together and conspiring to
hinder and prevent two African-American citizens from exercising their First Amend-
ment right of assembly and their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. See
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551-53. Far from holding that the defendants' attempt at pre-
venting two individuals from exercising their right to keep and bear arms had nothing to
do with federal interference of state militias, the Court held that the Second Amendment
"is one of the Amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the na-
tional government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by
their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called ... the [police powers]."
Id. at 553 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The italicized portion of the opinion is
inconsistent with a non-individual right view of the Second Amendment. If the right to
keep and bear arms were purely a structural guarantee that protects state militias against
federal interference, the suggestion that the remedy to this "rights" violation by private
citizens should be sought in state law would be incoherent. A purely structural right could
not possibly be violated by "fellow citizens."
359. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
360. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
361. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
362. For a detailed examination of Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller, see Quinlan, supra
note 7, at 665-69.
363. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1239 n.10.
364. For a thorough analysis of the incorporation issue as it relates to the Second
Amendment, see Quinlan, supra note 7, at 669-76. As Professor Levinson observes:
The obvious question, given the modern legal reality of the incorporation of al-
most all of the rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, is what exactly justifies treating the Second Amendment as the
great exception. Why, that is, should Cruikshank and Presser be regarded as
binding precedent any more than any of the other "pre-incorporation" decisions
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United States v. Mille must be read against the backdrop of the
Court's own prior pronouncements, which reflected a century of
common understanding of the Second Amendment. The Court's
eight page opinion in Miller, as one commentator has noted, offers "a
little something for everyone."3" Both individual right and non-
individual right adherents rely on Miller to support their respective
interpretations of the Second Amendment.67 However, even some of
those who support a non-individual right construction of the Second
Amendment admit that Miller "is unfortunately less than crystal
clear."3"
In Miller, two individuals were indicted on charges of transport-
ing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun in interstate commerce in
violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934.369 The district court
quashed the indictment and held the National Firearms Act unconsti-
tutional under the Second Amendment.7 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that posses-
sion or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is
any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense.
refusing to apply given aspects of the Bill of Rights against the states?
Levinson, supra note 3, at 653.
365. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
366. McClurg, supra note 37, at 100.
367. See id. at 100-01 n.209 (providing examples of how Miller has been interpreted as
supporting both the individual and non-individual right readings of the Second Amend-
ment).
368. Herz, supra note 14, at 68.
369. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
370. See United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 307 U.S.
174 (1939). But see Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the Brady Bill and the Future of
Gun Control Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 437 (1995) ("No federal court has
ever used the Second Amendment to overturn a gun control law."); Beard & Rand, supra
note 73, at 14 ("[N]o gun control measure has ever been struck down as unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment."); Editorial, A Militia In Their Own Minds, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Apr. 27, 1995, at 14A ("[N]o federal court has ever ruled that a gun-control
law violated the Second Amendment."); Griswold, supra note 50, at C7 ("Never in history
has a federal court invalidated a law regulating the private ownership of firearms on Sec-
ond Amendment grounds.").
371. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840)).
Given the Court's emphasis on the supposed lack of connection between the particular
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A careful reader of Miller might wonder why no evidence was in-
troduced to show that short-barreled shotguns have some
"reasonable relationship" to the "preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia." The answer is simple: no evidence concerning the
militia value of short-barreled shotguns was before the Supreme
Court because, given the procedural setting of the case, no evidence
whatsoever had been introduced in the district court. The defendants
had filed a demurrer in the district court which, at the time, was stan-
dard federal court practice for challenging only the legal sufficiency
of an indictment.3" Because the district court had sustained the de-
fendants' demurrer and, therefore, quashed the indictment, there was
no occasion (or need) for the introduction of any evidence. Conse-
quently, with no evidence in the lower court record, none was before
the Supreme Court on appeal, and the Court itself was unwilling to
take judicial notice that short-barreled shotguns were "any part of
the ordinary military equipment" or that their "use could contribute
to the common defense." 373
If the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual
right to own a firearm and is truly about a state's right to maintain a
militia, why is it that the Court in Miller did not simply hold that the
defendants, non-militia members, lacked standing to raise a Second
Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934? This
question is all the more compelling given that the United States ar-
gued to the Court that the Second Amendment only guaranteed a
collective right that protected the people when carrying arms as state
militia members.374 Under the state militia-based reading of the Sec-
ond Amendment, in which no personal right for ordinary citizens is
created, it would follow that only a state, or perhaps a state militia
firearm involved in Miller and the efficiency of a militia, some commentators have read
Miller as implicitly acknowledging that the Second Amendment gives constitutional pro-
tection to privately possessed military weapons. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 3, at 654-
55.
372. See, e.g., Boehm v. United States, 21 F.2d 283,284 (8th Cir. 1927) ("It is well set-
tled that in the federal courts the legal sufficiency of the indictment should be tested by
demurrer.").
373. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
374. See 1 GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS
ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 197, at xxvii. It bears mentioning that the
Miller Court did not have the benefit of hearing argument from both sides in the case.
There was no appearance on behalf of the defendants. The Court heard only the argu-
ments of the United States, which was represented by the Solicitor General, two Assistant
Attorney Generals, and six other attorneys. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. Despite hearing
only the arguments of the United States, the Court did not adopt the argument advanced
by the government that the Second Amendment guaranteed a collective right to keep and
bear arms only when carrying arms as state militia members.
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member, would have standing to invoke the Second Amendment as a
source of constitutional protection. It has long been Court policy not
to decide constitutional questions when a case can be disposed of on
justiciability grounds, including the lack of standing. 75
Rather than looking at the status of those challenging the Na-
tional Firearms Act to determine whether they had standing, the
Court instead focused its attention on the weapon and, in the process,
adopted the "civilized warfare" test first enunciated by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Aymette v. State?76 Thus, a fair reading of Miller is
that constitutional protection under the Second Amendment depends
upon whether the weapon at issue is "part of the ordinary military
equipment" or whether "its use could contribute to the common de-
fense." The truth is that short-barreled shotguns have been used by
the military, police, and civilians since the late 1800s.3 Had such
evidence been in the record or otherwise brought to the Court's at-
tention, it is certainly plausible to postulate that Miller may well have
come out differently:
[I]f evidence had been introduced to prove the utility of
short-barreled shotguns as militia equipment, the Court's
reasoning arguably suggests that such firearms would enjoy
Second Amendment protection. Because the defendants
were private citizens and not members of a state militia, the
Court's holding might be read as implicitly recognizing ...
an individual right. In other words, the Court's analysis
suggests that had evidence been introduced that short-
barreled shotguns have military value, the constitutional
375. In fact, the Court invoked the standing requirement in two cases decided shortly
before Miller to bar challenges to other federal activity. See Tennessee Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 136-47 (1938); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302
U.S. 464, 478-81 (1938) (finding that private electrical power companies lacked standing
to challenge federal laws that created competition because they had no legal right to be
free from lawful competition).
376. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840) ("[T]he arms the right to keep which is secured
are such as are usually employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary
military equipment."). In upholding a law that prohibited the concealed carry of bowie
knives, which were viewed as weapons typically employed by criminals, the Aymette court
concluded that, by contrast, "[i]f the citizens have these arms [those usually employed in
civilized warfare] in their hands, they are prepared in the best possible manner to repel
any encroachments upon their rights by those in authority." Id. Modem readers may be
forgiven if they find unhelpful the court's reliance on "civilized warfare" as the key to
separating protected from unprotected weapons; the term strikes us today as an oxymo-
ronic phrase if one was ever heard. Even so, implicit in the court's holding was the view
that personal ownership and possession of many weapons is guaranteed by the right to
keep and bear arms; the "civilized warfare" test presented a qualification of a general
right to own and possess arms.
377. See Quinlan, supra note 7, at 678 n.180.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
right to possess them would run to the defendants as private
individuals who were unaffiliated with any militia.378
The alternative reading of Miller, favored by advocates of exten-
sive gun regulation, is that "the Court went only as far as was
necessary to dispose of the case before it," with the implication that
the military utility of the weapon was a "necessary" but not a
"sufficient" condition for granting constitutional protection?" While
it is certainly accurate to say that the Court did not clearly hold that
private possession of militarily useful weapons is protected by the
Second Amendment, the proffered alternative construction of their
intent seems strained at best. In the first place, the Court did not
suggest that it was repudiating its own prior statements regarding the
Second Amendment, nor those of the many courts that had presumed
some sort of personal right to arms.' Given that it is so much more
obvious, on the facts of Miller, that the defendants were not militia-
men than that the weapon they carried held no militia purpose, why
would the Court unnecessarily address the more complex issue if its
members believed that the Second Amendment creates no meaning-
ful personal right to own firearms of any type?
2. The Lower Federal Court Cases
In the fifty-seven years since Miller, the majority of lower federal
courts confronted with Second Amendment claims have given it a
militia-centered interpretation that has denied the existence of a pri-
vate right to arms. 8' Interestingly, many of these challenges were
raised by those involved in criminal activities, usually felons found in
possession of a firearm." Since the law is perfectly settled that re-
378. Id. at 678.
379. Herz, supra note 14, at 69.
380. See supra notes 347-64 and accompanying text (Supreme Court's prior cases);
David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme
Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1177, 1180 n.12 (1995) (citing various cases in which state
courts have invalidated state restrictions on right to arms).
381. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 64 (1995); United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988); Quilici v. Vil-
lage of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983);
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974); see also Fresno Rifle
& Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying on Cruik-
shank and Presser, the court refused to examine the scope of the Second Amendment,
stating that "it is for the Supreme Court, not us, to revisit the reach of the Second
Amendment").
382. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, No. 94-30004, 1995 WL 444656, at *2 (9th Cir.
July 26, 1995); United States v. Friel, No. 92-2418, 1993 WL 309628, at *2 (1st Cir. Aug.
17, 1993); United States v. Farmer, No. 92-5859, 1993 WL 310285, at *2-*3 (4th Cir. Aug.
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strictions on the ability of felons to possess firearms do not "trench
upon any constitutionally protected liberties, to the extent that
these decisions have commented on the scope of the Second
Amendment beyond its application to the felon in the case at hand,
such language is nothing more than dictum. 8 On the other hand, a
few lower federal courts and individual judges have recognized the
individual right reading of the Second Amendment.3
Those who view lower federal court case law as a trump card in
the debate over the constitutionality of firearm restrictions place un-
due weight on what these courts have done .3  The decisions rest on
the narrowest possible construction of Miller and on arguments from
text and history that are now largely discredited in the scholarly lit-
erature-arguments that have also been shown to be inadequate in
Parts II and III of this Article."' How much longer must the lower
federal courts wander in the wilderness of construing an opaque Su-
preme Court decision while parroting oft-recited errors of textual
and historical analysis? This is a question that can be answered only
by the Supreme Court, which may be properly criticized for its persis-
tent unwillingness to seriously confront the Second Amendment.
The fate of the Second Amendment should not depend on a line of
poorly guided and ill-reasoned lower federal court decisions.
17, 1993); United States v. Rowold, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 299352, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 3,
1993); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 145 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Synnes,
438 F.2d 764,766 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972); Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 920 n.2 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Velazquez v.
United States, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261,263 (3d Cir. 1942),
rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
383. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980). It is constitutionally permissi-
ble to prohibit felons from engaging in a wide variety of activities besides owning
firearms-e.g., voting, holding office in a labor union, practicing medicine. See, e.g., id. at
66.
384. See, e.g., Tot, 131 F.2d at 266-67.
385. See e.g., United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J.,
concurring specially); United States v. Breier, 827 F.2d 1366, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); Gilbert Equip. Co. v. Higgins, 709 F.
Supp. 1071, 1090 (S.D. Ala. 1989); United States v. Bowdach, 414 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 &
n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Miller, 26 F.
Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); see also United States v. Lopez,
2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993), affld, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (stating that it is con-
ceivable that some applications of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a
federal offense to possess a firearm in a "school zone," might raise Second Amendment
concerns). Although Lopez did not raise the Second Amendment, the court nonetheless
noted that "this orphan of the Bill of Rights may be something of a brooding omnipres-
ence here" Id. at 1364 n.46 (citing with approval Levinson, supra note 3).
386. See Henigan, supra note 16, at 107-08; Herz, supra note 14, at 73-76.
387. For a further critique of lower federal court case law, see Quinlan, supra note 7,
at 682-88 (exploring the deficiencies and weaknesses of lower federal court decisions).
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B. Precedent, Fundamental Rights, and the Right to Arms for Self-
Defense
It is ironic that the argument that precedent forecloses recogni-
tion of a personal right to have firearms would be advanced during an
era in which the United States Supreme Court has relied on nontex-
tual fundamental rights. to invalidate laws long on the books but
never previously questioned.?" Modern fundamental rights doctrine
has been defended, moreover, based on the discovery of penumbras
and emanations from the Bill of Rights,3 ' an explication of the
"liberty" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause,391 the Ninth
Amendment,3' as well as the Framers' own commitment to natural
rights and the idea of an unwritten Constitution.3 Whatever the jus-
tification, during the past thirty years the Supreme Court has relied
upon the right of privacy in striking down laws relating to (among
other things) birth control,3'3 abortion,39s marital and family rights, 96
388. Professor Tribe describes this post-1937 development as embodying a "model of
preferred rights," in which "particular forms of expression, action, or opportunity per-
ceived as touching... deeply and permanently on human personality" are given
protection "from all but the most compellingly justified instances of governmental intru-
sion." TRIBE, supra note 73, at 770.
389. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,164 (1973).
390. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
391. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
392. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Randy E. Bar-
nett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988). Indeed, it has
been claimed that part of the purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to provide a textual
home for unenumerated rights, not only because some fundamental rights might be inad-
vertently omitted or subsequently discovered, but also because the enumerated rights
might be drafted and/or construed so as not to provide ample protection to the fundamen-
tal rights that people properly hold against government. See ELY, supra note 73, at 35-36;
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 61, at 219 (expressing con-
cern that "a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be
obtained in the requisite latitude"); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional
Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 107 (1987)
(contending that Ninth Amendment should at least impart an attitude of seeing funda-
mental liberty as an inference from the structure of the Constitution as a rights-protective
document).
393. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1127 (1987).
394. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
395. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. Since Roe, as Justice Scalia observed in 1989, the
Court has erected a veritable "mansion of constitutionalized abortion law." Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
396. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-87 (1978) (marriage); Moore v.
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and the right to die."9 Given these doctrinal developments in consti-
tutional law, even if the Supreme Court felt bound by what is claimed
to be the established understanding of the Second Amendment, logi-
cally it should equally feel bound to confront the claim of a
fundamental right to the means of self-defense, including firearms,
under modern fundamental rights doctrine. At stake is the means of
securing the fundamental, as well as natural, rights to life, liberty, and
property, the very interests secured by the Due Process Clause.398
Given the urge to self-preservation, it seems difficult to reject out of
hand the contention that this right is as fundamental to one's person-
hood as the decision to refuse medical treatment. 9 And if the Ninth
Amendment is in fact "a rule against cramped construction," 4° that
calls for interpreters to consider the nation's common-law and natu-
ral rights heritage in fashioning constitutional rights, the right to arms
for self-defense would seem to fit there as well."'
There is, of course, a serious and ongoing debate among
thoughtful judges and commentators about the modern doctrine of
fundamental rights. There is also an ongoing discussion as to
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499-500 (1977) (family relations).
397. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(recognizing substantive due process liberty interest to refuse live-saving medical treat-
ment.)
398. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (citing Blackstone's characterization of
the English Bill of Rights as protecting "personal security, personal liberty, and private
property").
399. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-23 (1990) (recognizing signifi-
cant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs while
upholding reasonable imposition in prison setting). As Joyce Malcolm has observed, the
right of self-defense is "the most fundamental of all rights." Joyce L. Malcolm, Gun
Control and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REV. 813, 817 (1995) (reviewing GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 197).
400. TRIBE, supra note 73, at 1308-09.
401. See id. at 1309 (suggesting that natural law and common law are among the
"possible sources of content and meaning for this 'most comprehensive of rights' [the
right of privacy]"). We have already seen that, whatever the meaning of the Second
Amendment, the generation that adopted the Constitution viewed themselves as pos-
sessing a natural and common-law right to private arms for self-defense. See, e.g., supra
note 236 and accompanying text (setting forth express provision of 1780 Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights recognizing the right of self-defense).
A closely related strategy that is often proposed for discovering Ninth Amendment
rights is to look carefully at the rights deemed fundamental during the founding period-
especially the rights guaranteed in the constitutions of the states. See, e.g., LEVY, supra
note 235, at 278-79. The right to private arms for self-defense receives strong support by
this standard as well. Unsurprisingly, the right to have firearms for self-defense has re-
cently been the subject of a full-blown article defending it as a right protected by the
Ninth Amendment. See Nicholas Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment An Individ-
ual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 1 (1992).
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whether the Ninth Amendment was really intended to empower the
courts to find implied rights that limited the powers granted by the
Constitution."' Even so, the Supreme Court and the scholarly sup-
porters of the modem fundamental rights doctrine have some
explaining to do if the structure of the Second Amendment and mod-
em judicial decisions are the only reasons they can offer for refusing
to take the right to have arms for self-defense seriously. 43 It may be
that the Supreme Court could offer cogent reasons why the right to
private arms is not fundamental, but the process should at least
prompt the Court to confront the question whether the traditional
right to keep and bear arms should be brought forward; this is the
question that the Court's prior cases have not touched.
C. State Constitutional Guarantees of the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms: The Second Amendment Is Not the Only Game in Town
At least since the 1970s, judges and scholars have hailed the revi-
talization of state constitutional law-a renewal that was sparked by
the Burger Court's perceived retrenchment from protecting individ-
ual rights under the federal Constitution. Among others, Justice
William J. Brennan 4  and Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans
Linde45 have argued persuasively that state constitutions existed
prior to the federal Constitution and should thus be interpreted as
402. Indeed, one of the present authors is a participant in the debate who has ex-
pressed skepticism about most of the historical claims proffered by advocates of unwritten
fundamental rights. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful Debate
of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 107 (1992); McAffee, supra
note 153, passim (developing thesis that Ninth Amendment provided added security to
the rights defined by the enumerated powers scheme of Article I).
403. It might well be questioned, of course, whether such an exercise should be neces-
sary, considering that the evidence that tends to show that the founders would have
embraced a right to have arms as a corollary of the natural right of self-defense is the
same evidence that shows that the right "to keep and bear arms" in the Second Amend-
ment was intended to secure the same right. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1248 n.43.
404. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). One commentator, Justice Stewart Pollack of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, referred to Brennan's article as the "Magna Carta of state
constitutional law." Stewart Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Funda-
mental Rights, 35 RtrrGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986) (suggesting that state courts should fill the gaps left
in federal constitutional and statutory law).
405. See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9
U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); see also Hans A. Linde, E. Pluribus-Constitutional Theory
and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984) (discussing the practice of judicial review
used by the Supreme Court and state court applications of their respective constitutions).
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independent bases for the protection of individual fights.: 6 From the
point of view of federal law, there is no question that states may grant
additional constitutional protections in their own fundamental law,
provided they honor the federal "floor" established by the applica-
tion of federal guarantees to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.' °7 Although state constitutional law as a source of
scholarly inquiry receives a growing amount of treatment in the law
reviews, 8 there is still a tendency among many academics, judges,
and lawyers to think of constitutional law only in terms of federal
constitutional law.409
In the national debate over gun control and the right to keep and
bear arms, the state constitutional dimension has been largely over-
looked, even though forty-three state constitutions contain right to
keep and bear arms guarantees; 41 there exists an impressive body of
state court decisions extending from 1820 to the present interpreting
these guarantees;41' and a small body of recent scholarship exhaus-
406. For an argument that independent state constitutional review is the only justifi-
able view based on a straightforward application of well-established principles for
construing similar as well as borrowed statutes, see Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill
of Rights and Our Independent Legal Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doc-
trine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 17-33 (1987).
407. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4 (1983).
408. In addition to the steady trickle of articles written each year on various aspects of
individual state constitutions, two law reviews, the Rutgers Law Journal and the Temple
Law Review, each publish an annual issue dedicated to state constitutional law. See gen-
erally Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 909 (1995); 25
RUTGERS L.J. 933 (1994); 24 RUTGERS L.J. 907 (1993); 23 RUTGERS L.J. 723 (1992); 22
RUTGERS L.J. 815 (1991); 21 RUTGERS LJ. 793 (1990); 20 RUTGERS L.J. 877 (1989);
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1035 (1995); 67 TEMP. L.
REV. 925 (1994); 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1145 (1993); 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1119 (1992). For an
important early symposium on the subject of state constitutional law, see Symposium,
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985). For a bibliogra-
phy of the subject, see Earl M. Maltz et al., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional
Law, 1980-1989,20 RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989).
409. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1504
(1994) ("The law that most affects most people in their daily lives is still overwhelmingly
state law-except perhaps law professors, for whom it is easier to study one federal sys-
tem than many state systems, and who may, therefore, have a somewhat warped
perspective."); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-
Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74,
74 (1989) (suggesting that the federal Constitution "has the status of what might be called
the 'plain vanilla' brand-a brand so familiar that it is assumed to be correct for every
occasion").
410. See Appendix infra (listing of these provisions). California, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin do not have right to keep and bear
arms provisions in their state constitutions.
411. State courts have, on at least twenty occasions, struck down various weapons laws
as void under their state right to keep and bear arms guarantees. See Kopel et al., supra
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tively canvasses the state right to keep and bear arms landscape.412
One thing is clear: state constitutional guarantees antedate the fed-
eral Constitution, and Madison did not invent the right to keep and
bear arms when he drafted the Second Amendment-the right was
pre-existing at both common law and in the early state constitu-
tions.413 Indeed, when the modem state constitutions are taken into
account, the presence of right to arms in fundamental law documents
runs a 300-year continuum from the 1689 English Bill of Rights to the
early state constitutions and the Second Amendment, to the nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century state constitutions.
Those who deny that the Second Amendment guarantees a pri-
vate right to have firearms have not even acknowledged, much less
examined, the profound implications raised by the state right to keep
and bear arms provisions.414 The very existence of these guarantees
point up that, at some level, the question whether the personal right
to arms makes sense in our modern world will have to be con-
fronted-whether or not the federal courts are ever persuaded to
take another long look at the Second Amendment. For one thing, of
the forty-three state constitutions with right to arms guarantees, only
four states-Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina, and South Carolina-
have right to keep and bear arms provisions modeled after the Sec-
ond Amendment.415 While three of those states have no case law
interpreting their state constitutional right to keep and bear arms,
North Carolina held in 1968 that its state provision guarantees an in-
note 380, at 1180 n.12 (collecting cases).
412. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 6; HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED,
supra note 6; David I. Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judi-
cial Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 789; Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional
Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59 (1989); Robert Dowlut & Janet A.
Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 177 (1982); Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to
Keep Arms: Reflections on the Bills of Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the United
States, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1993); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in
Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bills of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 629 (1989);
Halbrook, supra note 169; Kopel et al., supra note 380; Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right to
Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican
Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994).
413. See supra notes 163-241 and accompanying text.
414. Some of those implications go well beyond the issue of precedent under discus-
sion here. If the Second Amendment is truly about protecting a collective right of state
militias to be free from federal interference, and not about the right of individuals to own
firearms, the obvious question arises: why would a state adopt a right to keep and bear
arms guarantee patterned after the Second Amendment as its own? Whatever sense the
states' rights theory might make in the context of the Second Amendment, it makes ab-
solutely no sense in the context of state constitutions.
415. For the text of these provisions, see Appendix infra.
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dividual right to keep and bear arms."" Equally important, a number
of the state constitutional guarantees unmistakably protect the right
of private citizens to own and use firearms.1 7
While the practical significance of these observations might be
diminished somewhat were Congress to enact comprehensive gun
regulations, which would preempt even fundamental state law, there
are reasons to think that these state guarantees will never be ren-
dered entirely moot or obsolete. For one thing, the Constitution
itself states at least some limits on congressional authority to regulate
guns. Thus, in United States v. Lopez 8 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that there are limits to congressional power under the
Commerce Clause in striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990, which made it a federal offense to knowingly possess a fire-
arm in a school zone. 9 While Lopez probably does not threaten to
limit congressional power to regulate commercial dealings in fire-
arms, it at least calls into question Congress's authority to take the
ultimate step favored by many gun control advocates-a general pro-
hibition on the ownership and possession of most (or perhaps even
all) firearms.42
416. See State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546-48, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9-11 (1968). In 1964,
Louisiana had a right to keep and bear arms guarantee identical to the Second Amend-
ment. A Louisiana appellate court, in a case involving a civil suit against a homeowner
who shot two intruders, stated in dicta that both the Second Amendment and its state
counterpart guaranteed an individual right to keep and bear arms. See McKellar v. Ma-
son, 159 So. 2d 700,702 (La. App. Ct.), affd, 162 So. 2d 571 (La. 1964).
417. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (providing that "every citizen has a right to
bear arms in defense of himself and the state"); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26 (recognizing
the "right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the State");
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13 ("[R]ight of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his
home, person, property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned");
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20 (providing that "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms
for the defense of self, family, home and State, and hunting and recreational use").
418. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
419. The last paragraph of the Court's opinion in Lopez contains some interesting
cautionary language:
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional author-
ity under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that
road, giving great deference to congressional action .... The broad language in
these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we de-
cline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that
the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not
enumerated.., and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local .... This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 1634 (citations omitted).
420. More structurally, five United States District Courts have held that the Brady
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Constitutional limits aside, the political constraints are even
more important. Proponents of gun control face significant obstacles
in making it the federal priority they would like it to be. To date
Congress has shown little interest in passing the stringent gun con-
trols advocated by anti-gun activists. It took Congress nearly six
years to pass the Brady Bill and five-and-a-half years to pass the
"assault weapons" ban, which passed the House by the narrowest
possible vote of 216 to 214.421 Given that there is little to indicate that
Congress is ready to take on a greatly expanded role in the field of
gun control, it appears that many battles over particular gun control
proposals will be fought in the state legislatures.
V. CONCLUSION
Embarrassing or not, the Second Amendment seems to be here
to stay, and there is nothing in the text, history, or relevant precedent
that justifies pretending that it is a dead letter. With these questions
behind us, the real issue now concerns whether there are compelling
reasons to believe that the guarantee does not fit in the world mod-
em Americans inhabit. Some would argue that the guarantee is a
dangerous anachronism and should therefore be left in the eighteenth
century. Others who agree about this basic conclusion contend that
we should amend the Constitution to eliminate the guarantee. The
possibility that we should, instead, consider taking the Amendment
seriously enough to see how it fits into the larger scheme of values
secured by the Constitution, is a topic to be considered in a subse-
quent work.
Act's background check requirement constitutes an unfunded federal mandate that vio-
lates basic postulates of our federal system. See supra note 38. Although the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on the constitutional issue raised by the background check, there is a
strong argument that it is unconstitutional under the Court's decision in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). It is, of course, far less clear that Congress could not
accomplish the same end by another means, such as conditional spending programs.




STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
PROVISIONS
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26:
That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself
and the state.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19:
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.
ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 26:
The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of
himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this
section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corpora-
tions to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men.
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5:
The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and bear
arms for their common defense.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13:
The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his
home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when
thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of
carrying concealed weapons.
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15:
Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and
the state.
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20:
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of
self, family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational
use.
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FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a):
The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be in-
fringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by
law.
GA. CONST. art. I, § I, VIII:
The light of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe
the manner in which arms may be borne.
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17:
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11:
The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right
shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the
passage of laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on
the person nor prevent passage of legislation providing mini-
mum sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a
firearm, nor prevent the passage of legislation providing penal-
ties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor
prevent the passage of any legislation punishing the use of a fire-
arm. No law shall impose licensure, registration or special
taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammuni-
tion. Nor shall any law permit the confiscation of firearms,
except those actually used in the commission of a felony.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22:
Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citi-
zen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 32:
The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of
themselves and the State.
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4:
The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and se-
curity; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
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liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be in
strict subordination to the civil power.
KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § I:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: ... Sev-
enth: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the
State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact
laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 11:
The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be
abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws
to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person.
ME. CONST. art. I, § 16:
Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right
shall never be questioned.
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII:
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the com-
mon defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to
liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of
the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an
exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6:
Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense
of himself and the state.
MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 12:
The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his
home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when
thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but
the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weap-
ons.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23:
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense
of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned
in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall
not justify the wearing of concealed weapons.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12:
The right, of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his
own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil power
when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question,
but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying
of concealed weapons.
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have cer-
tain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty,
the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for
security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for law-
ful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other
lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed
by the state or any subdivision thereof.
NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 11, 1:
Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security
and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for
other lawful purposes.
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a:
All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves, their families, their property and the state.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6:
No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear
arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recrea-
tional use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall
be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. No mu-
nicipality or county shall regulate, in any way, an incident of the
right to keep and bear arms.
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N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30:
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous
to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be
kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
power. Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying con-
cealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from enacting
penal statutes against that practice.
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1:
All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and
have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoy-
ing and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense
of their person, family, property, and the state, and for lawful
hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes, which shall not
be infringed.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4:
The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and se-
curity; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in
strict subordination to the civil power.
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26:
The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his
home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when
thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but
nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from
regulating the carrying of weapons.
OR. CONST. art. I, § 27:
The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict
subordination to the civil power ....
PA. CONST. art. I, § 21:
The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves
and the State shall not be questioned.
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R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed.
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20:
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed. As, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty,
they shall not be maintained without the consent of the General
Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held
in subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it. No
soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without
the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in the manner
prescribed by law.
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24:
The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves
and the state shall not be denied.
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26:
That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear
arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to
prevent crime.
TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23:
Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the
lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall
have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view
to prevent crime.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6:
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for se-
curity and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state,
as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but
nothing herein shall prevent the Legislature from defining the
lawful use of arms.
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the State-and as standing armies in time of
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peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and
the military should be kept under strict subordination to and
governed by the civil power.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 13:
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the peo-
ple, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a
free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of
peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all
cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24:
The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of
himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this
section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corpora-
tions to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22:
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of
self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recrea-
tional use.
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24:
The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and
of the state shall not be denied.
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